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Abstract
WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT ILLNESS REPRESENTATIONS OF CANCER
By
IAN Z. PERVIL
Advisor: Tracey A. Revenson, Ph.D.
For people who have illnesses with vague or diffuse symptoms, such as systemic cancers
that lack solid masses or tumors (e.g. leukemia), the process of adjustment appears more difficult
than for those with clearly-defined symptoms. Dual systems theory attempts to understand this
phenomenon by contending that individuals rely upon two modes of cognitive processing when
conceptualizing illnesses: implicit, System 1 processes and explicit, System 2 processes. Those
with illnesses whose symptoms lack specificity may rely more heavily on System 1 processing
and have greater difficulty adjusting.
This study tested whether illness representations mediate the relationship between cancer
patients’ tumor status (whether or not they have masses/tumors) or thinking style (levels of
System 1 and System 2 processing) and psychological adjustment (depressive symptoms, cancerrelated distress, body image, and post-traumatic growth). A national sample of 305 men and
women diagnosed with cancer completed an online survey; a subsample of 99 individuals
completed an optional measure asking them to draw their cancer at time of diagnosis and in the
present.
The hypotheses were partially supported. Tumor status was unrelated to illness
representations, thinking style, or psychological adjustment. The illness representations of
(greater) identity, consequences, chronicity, cyclicality, and emotional representations were
related to reporting more depressive symptoms and cancer-related distress, and worse body

v
image. Attributing a locus of control to self or to treatment and greater illness coherence were
related to less depression and distress, better body image, and more post-traumatic growth.
The relationship between System 1 thinking and post-traumatic growth was mediated by
a combined factor of illness representations that captured locus of control and acuteness of
illness. System 2 thinking was correlated with depressive symptoms, but no hypothesized factors
were mediators. Drawings of participants with greater System 1 thinking were more likely to be
rated abstract and contain fewer people.
Results suggest that, despite the range of illness representations of cancer, a shared
understanding of “cancer” underlies all representations. Having a solid cancer does not appear to
be an essential component of survivors’ ability to adapt; however, thinking style, particularly as
it shapes illness representations, may be an important predictor of adjustment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Kamal1, a soft-spoken but sincere 49-year-old immigrant from Algeria recalls visiting his
doctor for a routine check-up just before beginning a new job. Excited about the work he was
starting, he says he felt “perfectly healthy” on that day, just like all the days before it. After the
doctor noted irregularities in a blood test, he instructed Kamal to go to the hospital. Several days
later, after a bone-marrow biopsy and much waiting, Kamal was diagnosed with chronic
myelogenous leukemia (CML), a form of hematological (blood) cancer that causes an abnormal
proliferation of white blood cells. If left untreated, CML can lead to joint pain, fatigue,
infections, hemorrhages, and ultimately, death (ACS, 2015).
Since receiving his diagnosis, Kamal has worked hard to make sense of his illness. In
many ways, his experience seems to have defied his previously-held expectations of what cancer
means: he says that he has few, if any, symptoms from the illness and does not have a tumor.
Furthermore, he notes that he does not require conventional treatments like radiation or
chemotherapy. Perhaps because little has materially changed in either his habits or his routine,
Kamal has abundant difficulty thinking about cancer. He speaks haltingly but deliberately when
describing it:
Well, cancer is something that stops you. You know, leukemia… You know, I guess I
haven’t… It’s the same thing, but it doesn’t… I guess I’m more comfortable saying I
have leukemia than I, I have cancer. I guess. And, yeah, you know, I would say that,
yeah, I feel better… I feel comfortable more saying more like I have leukemia, even
though I am saying the same thing.

1

Name changed to preserve anonymity.
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As Kamal struggles to make sense of “cancer,” he not only has difficulty using the word itself,
but additionally defining all that cancer seems to represent for him. It is unclear why he finds
great difference between the terms “leukemia” and “cancer,” even though both describe his
illness, and to his rational mind, both are “saying the same thing.” Yet, there is reason to believe
that for Kamal “leukemia” and “cancer” do not mean the same thing, as indicated by his
preference of one word over the other. This collection of unfiltered ideas and feelings about the
disease seems to reside in a place beyond language, a place where words fail him, but where
things are known nonetheless.
In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag attempts to fathom the possible meanings that may
be attached to the word cancer in an effort to demystify the illness and sap it of its power.
Through metaphor, she conceives of cancer as a riddle, a punisher, a warrior, betrayer, or a
drama acted on the stage (Sontag, 1978). Though the images she evokes are indeed powerful and
poignant, they may do little to achieve her ultimate goal; to some like Kamal, the word cancer
still seems to evoke mystery and power. To Suleika Jaouad, a 26-year-old blogger for The New
York Times who was diagnosed with leukemia at 22, metaphor has come to provide little solace.
In her column, “Life, Interrupted,” she writes, “I am realizing that ‘beating’ cancer isn’t about
winning or losing. I wish it were, but it just isn’t. I’ve decided that the real battle I need to fight
is against this win-lose mentality” (Jaouad, 2012). Constrained by commonly-expressed
metaphors of war that permeate society, Jaouad has found that they do not sufficiently or
adequately describe her own feelings about her illness. Nonetheless, she finds herself engaged in
a different kind of fight with regard to cancer.
At issue in these examples are the ways in which individuals make sense of their
illnesses, a process that seems to become particularly complicated when illnesses do not match
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individuals preconceived notions or commonly-held beliefs. Kamal does not feel right calling his
leukemia by the name of cancer, Sontag struggles to find the right way to explain cancer in
words, and Jaouad does not personally connect to a widely-held metaphor about cancer. Yet, in
spite of these individual difficulties, each of them has attempted to represent and understand
cancer in their own ways.
Sontag recounts psychiatrist Karl Menninger’s advice to doctors to abandon “names” and
“labels” when describing cancer (Sontag, 1978); however, research suggests that names and
labels are instrumental in helping patients cope with cancer. Leventhal et al. (2012) explain that
individuals generally create cognitive representations of their illness that influence their ability to
regulate emotions and cope. This process is aided by the presence of palpable symptoms
(Leventhal et al., 2012; Petrie & Weinman, 2006). For people with vague or diffuse symptoms,
such as those who have systemic cancers that lack solid masses or tumors (e.g. leukemia, as is
the case for both Kamal and Jaouad), the process of adjustment may be more difficult than for
those with clearly-defined symptoms. As a result, the ways in which they attempt to speak and
write about their illnesses may strike some as ironic or irrational. There are others, however, who
argue for a logical explanation for these seeming inconsistencies.
Dual-systems theory may explain the discrepancy between facts and feelings by
contending that two different modes of cognitive processing are in conflict (Epstein, 1990; Evans
& Over, 1996). The first mode is characterized as affective, effortless, and nonconscious, called
implicit, experiential or System 1 thinking; the second is characterized as analytic, effortful, and
conscious, called explicit, rational or System 2 thinking (Epstein, 1994; Frankish & Evans, 2009;
Stanovich, 1999). The extent to which individuals use either System 1 or System 2 thinking
affects the beliefs they hold and the decisions they make, either in accordance with or in spite of
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rational comprehension. This explanation seems to account for Kamal’s denial of his own
“cancer” even has he accepts “leukemia,” and Jaouad’s refusal to engage in a war against cancer,
even as she fights a battle.
Increases in cognitive load cause individuals to use less System 2 thinking and rely more
heavily on System 1 processes (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Therefore, individuals with cancer,
who experience high levels of cognitive distress, may have greater difficulty coping with and
adjusting to illness than others with less distress (Peters, Diefenbach, Hess, & Västfjäll, 2008). In
particular, individuals who have been diagnosed with hematological malignancies (HM) like
leukemia or lymphoma might rely even more on System 1 processing than those with other types
of cancer because HM often presents with symptoms lacking in specificity or consistency
(McCoyd & Gruener, 2011). This may be one reason why individuals diagnosed with HM
showed significantly less posttraumatic growth than those with either breast or prostate cancers
(Morris & Shakespeare-Finch, 2011).
Current models of adaptation to illness often emphasize the role of System 2 thinking. In
Leventhal’s common sense model (CSM; Leventhal et al., 2012), individuals are thought of as
“self-regulating systems” that use both active problem-solving strategies and emotional
regulation strategies to cope with the stressors caused by the illness and to minimize emotional
distress. During a crucial step in the process, individuals develop cognitive or “common-sense”
representations of their illness that are related to psychosocial adjustment and medical outcomes,
including recovery time and future disability (Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 1985: Petrie &
Weinman, 2006).
Leventhal’s early fear studies (e.g. Leventhal, 1970) illustrated how these constantly
shifting representations, particularly when paired with action plans, can lead to changes in
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behavior. Perhaps because the model is merely a template that may be applied to a wide range of
illnesses, Leventhal et al. (2012) do not precisely explain how one comes to understand a
particular illness, other than to say that the process is dynamic and follows various heuristics.
Within the CSM, the formation of illness representations is largely based upon System 2
thinking. Yet those with illness have complicated and elaborate implicit understandings of their
symptoms that have been far less studied but which influence how people perceive of and cope
with illness (Epstein, 1994). Therefore, work needs to be done to conceptualize how System 1
thinking is involved in the formation of illness representations in cancer populations and to
consider the extent to which System 1 thinking relates to subsequent health actions, coping and
adjustment.
The current study considers the ways individuals with cancer think about their illness,
including the extent to which the form of cancer (e.g. no tumor/mass or tumor) and thinking style
(System 1/System 2) are related, independently and together, to the development of particular
illness representations. First it compares cancer patients who have visible masses or tumors to
those who do not on the extent to which they use System 1 and System 2 thinking. Then, it
examines the associations among form of cancer, thinking style, and illness representations to
measures of psychological adjustment and growth.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Health Behavior Models
Cognitive representations of illness. Individuals create cognitive illness representations
in order to make sense of their illnesses and to gain meaning. These representations come from
various sources of information, including previous experiences, cultural knowledge, their social
environment, and their current experience with the illness (Leventhal et al., 2012). Multiple
studies, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, derived five dimensions of cognitive
representations from Leventhal’s early models (e.g. Bishop, 1991; Bishop & Converse, 1986;
Lau, Bernard, & Hartmann, 1989; Meyer et al., 1985): identity, cause, timeline, consequences,
and controllability. Here, identity refers to symptoms of an illness, cause represents the factors
that are responsible for bringing about the illness, timeline suggests factors such as onset and
duration of an illness, consequences have to do with an individual’s beliefs about the impact of
the illness on lifestyle or function, and controllability refers to beliefs about treatment efficacy
and coping behaviors. A meta-analysis of research focused on illness representations has found
them to be a meaningful predictor of multiple coping strategies, and also related to psychological
well-being, social functioning, and vitality, among other outcomes (Hagger & Orbell, 2003).
Early theories of health behavior. Illness representations were not always central to the
prevailing theories of health behavior; early models of health behavior did little to recognize the
importance of cognitive representations of illness. Instead, they advocated a “medical model”
that “reinforced a rather mechanistic view of the body as a complicated machine that can be
repaired” (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996, p. 13). This schema placed the disease at the center of
the model, with patients subordinated, serving merely as victims of illness and recipients of
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medical treatment. The medical system was one in which blind compliance was expected and
failures to comply were presumed to be the fault of the patient. To Diefenbach and Leventhal
(1996), these aspects of the medical model hint at its chief shortcoming: its ignorance of patients’
psychological processes in the evaluation and understanding of their own illness.
One of the first systematic approaches to explain individual differences in health
behaviors (Becker, 1974; Rosenstock, 1974), the Health Belief Model (HBM) placed greater
emphasis on the individual than on the disease. The original HBM suggested that health
behaviors result from four cognitive factors: perceived susceptibility or risk of getting the illness,
perceived severity of illness, perceived barriers to adopting the behavior, and perceived benefits
from the behavior. This risk/reward model, which suggests an internal accounting of probability
in decision-making, took into account the mind of the patient. Though the HBM has found great
empirical support (Janz & Becker, 1984), it is not without criticism (Diefenbach & Leventhal,
1996). Detractors question the large number of variables at play in the model, how uniformly the
factors are operationalized in various studies, the lack of social variables, and the difficulty
placing moderator variables, among other shortcomings (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996).
The Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), an outgrowth of the Theory of Reasoned
Action (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), attempted to locate individuals within the social context. It
theorized that an individual’s intentions and behaviors are the product of attitude, social norms,
and perceived control and that personality and demographic variables are less meaningful factors
in decision making than societal beliefs and intentions. Though some studies have found strong
support for the model in health settings (e.g. Miller, Wikoff & Hiatt, 1992), others suggest that
intention is only a moderately useful predictor, noting that attitude plays a greater role than social
norms do in determining intention. Nonetheless, they worry about the laborious process of

8
categorizing actions as subjective and normative, and the model’s failure to conceptualize health
variables (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996).
Each of the previous health behavior models placed greater and greater emphasis on the
patient’s cognitive processes, and resultantly, each moved closer to understanding how
individuals cope and adapt to illness. It was not until Leventhal developed the first “parallel
process model,” which evolved into the Common Sense Model (CSM; Leventhal, 1970) that
cognitive representations of illness became central to health behavior theory.
Representations in the parallel process model. Leventhal (1970) first began to consider
the parts of an alternate health behavior framework when he was studying fear. Testing the FearDrive model (Dollard & Miller, 1950) in real-world situations, subjects were shown messages
and photos describing and depicting particular health threats low in fear (e.g. black and white
photos, scientific language) and high in fear (e.g. graphic color photos of blackened lungs,
personal language) conditions. Leventhal, Singer, and Jones (1965) hypothesized that when
participants were shown high as opposed to low fear messages, they would be more likely to
change their attitudes and enact action plans for avoiding health threats. Findings did not support
the initial hypothesis of an interaction effect (for the Fear-Drive model), but showed that,
regardless of condition (high or low), subjects altered their attitudes in response to fear messages,
although the effects only lasted one or two days. Furthermore, both high and low threat groups
enacted action plans to reduce exposure to health threats, even days and weeks after exposure to
the threat message. These findings contrasted those subjects who had not been exposed to threats
and did not change their behavior.
These early studies led Leventhal (1970) to develop the first “parallel process model,”
that argues health threats generate both an emotional state of fear as well as a cognitive
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representation of that threat along two separate pathways; each of these, in turn, spur the need for
procedures to manage the emotions/threats. Finally, these procedures lead to parallel actions that
are recursively assessed for their effectiveness at reducing negative emotions caused by health
threats (called fear control) or reducing the threats themselves (called danger control). The
model makes it clear that individuals need both a fear response as well as an action plan in order
to make behavioral change (Leventhal et al., 2012); neither alone is sufficient. Evidence from
previous studies about fear interpretation (Johnson, 1975; Johnson & Leventhal, 1974) reinforces
the idea that health threats are represented both semantically as cognitive understanding and
perceptually and emotionally in lived experience.
The earliest parallel process model took into account both semantic and perceptual
representations of illness. Leventhal (1970) closely examined conflicting responses to fear, but
found conflicting results in efforts to understand how fear affects attitudes and behaviors
(Leventhal et al., 2012). Millar and Millar (1996) and Diefenbach, Miller, and Daly (1999) both
found that fear encourages disease-prevention behaviors; however, Millar and Millar also found
that fear inhibits those behaviors designed to detect disease threats. Leventhal et al. (2012)
ultimately reconciled these differences with the acknowledgement that fear has differing effects
depending on its relationship to either the perceptual/cognitive pathway of the model or the
procedural/performance pathway. This acknowledgement recognizes and accepts the critical
importance of two types of representations in the model.
The shared role of both cognitions and experiences applies to outcomes like health
behaviors as well. Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal (2003) wondered, “If fear per se is not the
source of motivation for health-promoting action, what aspect or specific content of the message
is responsible for activating plans of action?” (p. 46). This question could potentially be
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answered by considering either unconscious or conscious processes, automatic reactions or
effortful contemplations, experiences or cognitions. Leventhal et al.’s initial deductions treated
both types of perception equally when they concluded that the motivational effects for illness
representations (as well as for fear) came from both the individual’s experiences and the way in
which those experiences were understood and interpreted (Leventhal et al., 2003).
Lived experiences in particular can play a unique and vital role in the parallel process
model. Leventhal and his colleagues (2012) recognized another critical link between procedural
processes and health behaviors: “experience (symptoms and functional changes) are often the
main drivers of behavior. For example, concrete, symptomatic experiences are consistent and
powerful predictors of utilization of health care” (p. 8).
An emphasis on thinking in the Common Sense Model. As the parallel process model
evolved into the Common Sense Model (CSM), the role of cognitive representations of illness
was emphasized and the parallel pathways from the earlier model were subordinated and recast
as necessary sources of information that led to the formation of illness representations. Leventhal
et al. (2012) describe the center of the CSM as a “core control unit,” (p. 5) that operates as a
feedback loop, facilitating self-regulation processes in response to health threats. This unit is
made up of at least three factors: a representation of the health problem; procedures and action
plans for controlling health threats; and appraisals of coping efforts. In the CSM, individuals
generate mental representations of their illness by incorporating information from cognitive and
procedural information sources that are shaped by social and cultural contexts. They then
interpret this information as they make decisions that help them cope with or adapt to their
illness. The entire process becomes recursive when awareness of representations, interpretations,
and decisions are reassessed through cognitive appraisals, dynamically altering the model and
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allowing the process to begin anew. A diagram of the early parallel processing model, which
eloquently illustrates the core structure, could be applied to many different diseases and contexts
(Figure 1); by contrast, the current model of the CSM serves as a dynamic framework rather than
a static structure, so unique diagrams often represent the CSM in various disease contexts.
Superficially at least, the CSM seems to take into account both types of information in
the formation of illness representations, just as in the parallel processing model. Leventhal et al.
(2012) seem to give equal weight to the dimensions when they elaborate:
Representations have structure; they are both abstract and concrete. For example, such
words as cancer and heart attack are labels for the abstract concepts that enrich the
meaning of these diseases, and the symptoms and functional changes are their concrete,
experienced features. Thus, the identity of a heart attack, cancer or migraine headache
involves an integration of abstract and experienced symptoms… (p. 8).
However, in contrast to the parallel processing model, the CSM accounts for experiences only by
way of cognitive processes. In the formation of illness representations, experience elicits emotion
through a “bottom-up influence,” where interpreted feelings activate beliefs. Cognitive
information influences feelings by exerting a “top-down influence,” in effect, redefining
symptoms. Left out of this analysis are the direct influence that experiences might have on
emotions such as fear and the influence of fear on representations that remain uninterpreted by
the individual. In the CSM, unconscious, unprocessed, uninterpreted feelings are overlooked in
favor of those experiences that have been brought to light through conscious understanding and
interpretation. This CSM’s emphasis on conscious processes does not negate its utility; it merely
suggests that potentially important factors have been omitted. There is no mention of what may

12
become of unprocessed assessments of fear, or how that may influence adaptation and behavioral
change.
The CSM seems to suggest that these experiential sources of information can only exert
influence upon decision-making when coupled with cognitive, rational understanding. Leventhal
and colleagues (2012) define this as the “symmetry rule”: the presence of symptoms causes
individuals to search for labels for them; conversely, labels cause individuals to search for
symptoms. Work has been done to categorize the links between understanding and experiences
within illness dimensions (Leventhal et al., 2012), an effort that overlooks the moments when
those processes are not consciously linked. The symmetry rule does not allow for those
experiential processes that are not consciously evoked, considered, and processed. There may be
experiential thoughts or feelings that do not directly (consciously) connect to labels, but that still
may influence the development of illness representations.
The CSM’s emphasis on cognitively-processed knowledge overemphasizes evaluation of
symptoms rather than emotions as the driving forces that motivate action plans and coping
strategies. For example, Leventhal et al. (2012) explain how the sudden onset of chest pain and
breathlessness are likely to be experienced as possible symptoms of a heart attack or how a lump
in the breast may evoke representations of breast cancer. Yet, there is little room for the ways in
which unconscious thoughts or emotions might factor into these representations in the current
CSM, and in turn, how they might directly affect outcomes. There is almost no discussion of
how fear, fantasy, or anxiety might motivate behavior, unless they stem from or are attached to
symptoms.
Despite early versions of the CSM that recognize the importance of unconscious
processes and experiences (Leventhal et al., 2003), the latest model places greater emphasis on

13
conscious process. As currently conceived, appraisal is an a priori first step in the CSM
(Leventhal et al., 2012). Thus, the role of experience, which might also influence the same
behaviors, is transformed into that which is quantifiable. Within the CSM framework,
experiences are thought of as “symptoms” and “functional changes,” because they are generally
explored after they have been interpreted. While perceptions continue to be acknowledged as
essential and important, they factor into the CSM only once they have become representations of
illness and may not be fully accounted for by the model.
Empirical studies of the CSM. Researchers have found the CSM a useful framework
through which to better understand illness and to design behavioral interventions (de Ridder,
Theunissen & van Dulmen, 2007; Donovan et al., 2007; Dracup et al., 2009; Phillips, Leventhal
& Leventhal, 2011; Ward et al., 2009). Hagger and Orbell (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of
45 studies from 1977-2002 using the CSM to consider how individuals cope with a variety of
illnesses (e.g. Alzheimers, asthma, cancer, HIV/AIDs, rheumatoid arthritis, myocardial
infarction). The vast majority of studies in the meta-analysis relied on a several established
quantitative measures including the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman, Petrie,
Moss-Morris & Horne, 1996), the Revised Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ-R; MossMorris et al. 2002), and the Injury Management Inquiry (IMIQ; Turk et al. 1986).
The meta-analysis supported the idea that the IPQ, IPQ-R, and IMIQ tap dimensions of
illness representations. Empirical relationships were found between illness representations,
coping strategies, and health outcomes (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). For example, the consequences,
identity, and timeline dimensions were positively inter-correlated, and higher scores on these
dimensions were generally associated with worse psychological adjustment and well-being. In
contrast, the control and illness coherence dimensions were found to be negatively associated
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with consequences, identity and timeline, and positively associated with better psychological
adjustment and well-being (Hagger & Orbell, 2003).
Efforts to improve the IPQ led to the creation of the IPQ-R, which reconceives several of
the cognitive dimensions and adds an “emotional representations” dimension (Moss-Morris et
al., 2002). This change is a strong acknowledgement of the limitations of the original IPQ. Yet
even this change only begins to approach underlying beliefs, either conscious or unconscious. As
a result, the IPQ, IPQ-R, and IMIQ do not examine “cognitive associations made between
symptoms and the illness which would be necessary to assess identity beliefs” (Hagger & Orbell,
2003, p. 172). Because experiential processes are more likely to underlie these cognitive
associations, they remain largely unaccounted for by current measurement instruments.
The lack of incorporation of experiences or implicit processes does not undermine the
validity of the CSM; perhaps these processes, largely missing from traditional measures of the
CSM, play a larger role in understanding the links between illness and coping. Findings by
Hagger and Orbell (2003) suggest this may be the case. Their meta-analysis concluded that the
illness controllability dimension was significantly correlated with both generic and specific
problem-focused coping, cognitive reappraisal, and seeking social support, as predicted;
however, they did not find the same (inverse) correlations with avoidance/denial, expressing
emotions, and doctor’s visits (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). A greater understanding of the role of
these processes in influencing various coping styles may help account for the disparity.
Dual-Process Models
Much of what has been overlooked by the CSM in terms of experiences can be better
explained by locating the CSM within the realm of dual-process theories in cognitive
psychology. Frankish and Evans (2009) describe dual-process theories of mind as those that
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theorize two distinct mechanisms for a given task – for example, deductive reasoning or decision
making – “which employ different procedures and may yield different, and sometimes
conflicting, results” (p. 1). Typically, “one of the processes is characterized as fast, effortless,
automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized, and undemanding of working
memory,” while the other is often described as “slow, effortful, controlled, conscious, flexible,
decontextualized, and demanding of working memory” (Frankish & Evans, 2009, p. 1). There
are many dual-process theories with overlapping ideas (Bucci, 1985; Chaiken, 1980; Epstein,
1973; Evans & Over, 1996; Goel, 1995; Jung 1964/1968; Leventhal, 1984; Paivio, 1990; Shafir
& LeBouf, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). As more researchers have
subscribed to dual-process theories, some have attempted to amalgamate the individual models
into a unified theory of mind, grouping the processing structures as those with fast-process
characteristics and slow-process characteristics (Stanovich & West, 2000) and labeling them type
1 and type 2 processes, and more recently, System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich, 1999).
In many ways, Leventhal’s earliest parallel process model fits within a dual-process
framework, where the two pathways, termed “emotional” and “cognitive” and represented either
experientially or rationally, suggest what are called “System 1” and “System 2” processes
(Stanovich, 1999). If dual-process theorists are to be believed, something critical has been left
out of the parallel process model and all subsequent theories built on its foundation. Leventhal et
al. (2003) seem aware of limitations in reflection, noting that “symptoms represented only one
type of perceptual information…and the label represented only a small portion of its semantic
information” (p. 49)
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Freud and dual-systems theory. “In which of these systems, then, are we to locate the
impetus to the construction of dreams? For simplicity’s sake, in the [unconscious]. It is
true that in the course of future discussion we shall learn that this is not entirely accurate,
and that the process of forming dreams is obliged to attach itself to dream-thoughts
belonging to the preconscious system” (Freud, 1900, p. 541).
For Freud, at the beginning of the 20th century, dreams provided a medium through which to
contemplate his most current theories of the mind. He conjectured that the origin of dreams could
be found only in the unconscious, a swirling system of feelings, fantasies, thoughts and drives.
Nascent dreams were only accessible to the conscious mind via the preconscious, which, rather
than occupying its own mental space, acted as a kind of liminal border between the partitions.
Not only did these two spheres hold different contents, they were governed by distinct rules and
functioned in entirely different ways. In particular, Freud described the unconscious as operating
according to primary process, characterized by wish fulfillment, displacement, condensation,
symbolic representation, and association, in contrast to secondary process, the more logical,
rational realm of the conscious mind (Epstein, 1994).
Freud was compelled by dreams, but this seemed only a proxy for greater understanding
of the vast range of human behaviors. Dreams provided a glimpse into a world of irrational
thought and deviant conduct, along with a reaffirmation of the discovery that humans aren’t
always in control of their own minds (Epstein, 1994). Freud made sense of this reality by
dividing the mind into two partitions. Consequently, though he might not have considered
himself as such, Freud could rightfully be considered a dual-process theorist at this stage in his
career, long before the term gained popularity about 70 years later.
Freud was by no means the first dual-process theorist, nor did he invent the idea of the
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compartmentalized mind. Frankish and Evans (2009) cite the influences of Plato’s divisions of
the soul, as well as Descartes, Aristotle, and Aquinas’s contention that particular processes
(which today may be grouped under System 2) separate humans from other animals. Sloman
(1996) cites Henry James, who theorized two distinct forms of reasoning: associative thought
and true reasoning. Even Freud’s theory of the dynamic unconscious drew overwhelmingly on
the work of Pierre Janet, Josef Breuer, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Frankish & Evans, 2009).
Characterizing Freud’s dual-process theory within a System 1/System 2 framework
illustrates the utility and limits of both the approach and of Freud’s own work. Though some
aspects of the unconscious and conscious fit crudely into categories (System 1 roughly
approximates the unconscious and System 2 corresponds to the conscious), there are other ways
in which Freud’s theory cannot be simply categorized. For example, Freud does not conceive of
the unconscious as a reasoning system, in direct contrast to modern dual-systems theorists.
Furthermore, repression seems to have no place in dual-process theories (Frankish & Evans
2009). Likewise, there are similarities and inconsistencies between the dual-process approach
and Freud’s later conception of the mind as made up of the id, ego, and superego, as well (Freud,
1923). Within this schema, the id and ego roughly correspond to System 1 and System 2
respectively, but Frankish and Evans (2009) point out that there is no direct analogue for the
superego, adding that moral codes may be learned by both systems.
Modern dual-systems theories. Work by Arthur S. Reber (1967) built off of Freud’s
understanding of the unconscious and Jung’s dual modes of interpreting information (1964/1968,
as cited in Epstein, 1996). Reber conducted some of the earliest modern studies that support
dual-process theory. In experiments on grammar and probability learning, he found that subjects
implicitly absorbed unspoken rules, even thought they could not explicitly state them. In one
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study, subjects were asked to learn strings of letters that, unbeknownst to them, followed finitestate grammar rules which could be charted and sequenced according to schematic paths.
Subjects were then presented with new sequences of letters and were asked to describe the
strings as either grammatical or ungrammatical. Much more often than random chance, they
were able to correctly categorize the strings, even without knowing the rules explicitly.
By way of explanation, Reber developed of the concept of implicit learning, which he
viewed as an unconscious process that yields abstract knowledge and stood in opposition to
conscious learning. Furthermore, he imagined the practice of obtaining implicit knowledge as
“the induction of an abstract representation of the structure that the stimulus environment
displays” that is “acquired in the absence of conscious, reflective strategies to learn” (Reber,
1989, p. 219).
Reber used an evolutionary perspective to further subdivide what he termed the
“cognitive unconscious” into primitive and sophisticated subgroups. The primitive unconscious
develops first. Grammar rules, like those that he studied, are functions of the primitive
unconscious and occur without interpretation or affect, though they influence behavior and are
necessary for survival. In contrast, the sophisticated unconscious depends “on a rich, abstract
knowledge base that asserts itself in a causal manner to control perception, affective choice, and
decision making independently of the conscious” (Reber, 1989, p. 231). Reber experimentally
showed how information of all types could be acquired outside of consciousness, and that this
information was richer and more sophisticated than that which could be described. Unconscious
cognition was primary and dominant when compared to conscious cognition. Reber further
attempted to legitimize intuition, arguing that it was a “perfectly normal” process that was
derived from implicit learning experiences (Reber, 1989, p. 232).
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The extent to which implicit learning is thought of as wholly unconscious remains
controversial, and there is debate as to whether or not dual-process theories in general should be
rejected outright (Newstead, 2000; Oberaurer, 2000; Osman, 2004). However,
neuropsychological evidence supports multiple memory and learning systems in the brain
(Frankish & Evans, 2009) as well as other evidence of implicit learning in various experimental
settings (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993).
Epstein (1994) developed a dual-process theory that integrated both psychodynamic and
cognitive theories of the unconscious. The inspiration and starting point for his work was the
evolutionary limit of Freud’s primary-process system, which Epstein argued failed to foster
adaptive behavior in real world situations. He valued the idea of the cognitive unconscious, but
found its conception “bland” (Epstein, 1994, p. 710) and lacking the fire and emotion of Freud’s
dynamic unconscious. As a result, he theorized a new model, cognitive-experiential self-theory
(CEST; Epstein, 1973, 1994). CEST is comprised of two modes through which individuals
comprehend their world, the experiential and the rational. The experiential system “encodes
reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives,” and may be thought of as “holistic,”
“affective,” “rapid processing,” “slower to change,” “experienced passively and preconsciously,”
and “self-evidently valid.” By contrast, the rational system, which “encodes reality in abstract
symbols, words, and numbers,” is “analytic,” “logical,” “slower processing,” quicker to change,
“experienced actively and consciously,” and requires “justification via logic and evidence”
(Epstein, 1994, p. 711).
Epstein compared divergences in the two systems to the choice a young woman might
face when she is must decide between two admirers, one who provides more pleasure and the
other who is more faithful, a conflict often described in the literature as occurring between “the
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heart and the head” (Epstein, 1994, p. 709). Epstein found evidence of conflict between the
experiential and rational systems in the world around him: in irrational fears, superstitious
thinking, the omnipresence of religion, and the power of stories and pictures. He also conducted
several experiments where subjects seemed to defy their own rational understanding of their
situation when making choices. In one study, which he later named the ratio-bias phenomenon,
he presented subjects with two bowls of jellybeans, one containing 1 in 10 red jelly beans and the
other containing 10 in 100 red jelly beans. Subjects attempted to win money by blindly drawing
the red jellybean from one of the two bowls. Each time they wanted to choose which bowl from
which to pick the jellybean, they had to pay a dime; otherwise, they were randomly assigned a
bowl. A considerable portion (no percentage given) paid dimes to draw from the large bowl,
even as several commented that they knew what they were doing defied their own understanding
of probability (Epstein, 1992).
Looking for a way to directly measure the relative contributions of System 1 and System
2 processes, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) developed a self-report measure, the
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), that assessed individual differences in types of thinking.
Early studies indicated that the two dimensions they were studying, experiential and rational
thinking, were uncorrelated; that is, they did not occur at opposite ends of a single dimension.
Because each of the systems was found to be unipolar, the measures were divided into
independent analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential dimensions (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Epstein et al. (1996) found that a rational thinking style is associated with greater academic
achievement, self-esteem, openness, and favorable views about the self and world, and inversely
related to anxiety and depression; the experiential thinking style was shown to be associated with
spontaneity, and emotional expressiveness, but also naïve optimism and superstitious beliefs.
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Though other attempts to locate Freud’s repression within a dual-process model have met
with skepticism, Epstein nonetheless theorizes its place in CEST. He considers Freud’s concept
of repression, in which inaccessible material strives for expression against the expenditure of
psychic energy, to be maladaptive. Instead, he argues that individuals fundamentally try to
assimilate representations of emotionally significant experiences into a coherent whole, and that
something like repression occurs when this unification cannot occur. In his model, unintegrated
material repeatedly emerges until it can (if ever) be assimilated (Epstein, 1994).
Critics argue that Epstein tries to hard to maintain a connection to psychoanalysis, when
his theories are better suited within a cognitive psychological framework (Tversky & Fox, 1995).
His work attempts to theorize the implications of dual systems across realms of social,
developmental, and clinical psychology. By placing greater emphasis on the often-overlooked or
undervalued experiential systems, he found evidence of mental health contributing to physical
health (Epstein 1987, 1990; Epstein & Katz, 1992; Epstein & Meier, 1989) and gave explanation
to practices that are often met with societal skepticism, like faith healing, shamanism, and
placebo effects (Epstein, 1994). He argued that greater understanding of the dual systems might
even, one day, influence the course of diseases such as cancer (Epstein, 1989).
Stanovich and West’s (2000) approach to dual-systems theory also stretches across
social, developmental and clinical realms, but uses decision-making as a lens through which to
explain differences in ways of thinking when applied to human reasoning. For example, they
administered multiple selection tasks in versions that were abstract (relating to numbers and
colors) and deontic (relating to real-world, moral obligations), theorizing that first, abstract
reasoning is reliant on System 2 processes and deontic understanding draws from System 1
processes, and second, that System 2 (and not System 1) differences account for individual
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differences in general intelligence (Frankish & Evans, 2009). In support of this argument,
Stanovich (1999) found that those who did better on abstract reasoning tasks consistently had
higher SAT scores, whereas the relationship disappeared for those who did well on the deontic
version of the task.
A number of theorists have maintained that individual differences, experimenter flaws,
subject misconstrual of a task, computational limitations, and performance errors could account
for these differences (e.g. Cohen, 1981; Stein, 1996); however, Stanovich and West (2000)
debunk each of these arguments. They suggest that patterns of covariance can illuminate when
the wrong norm is being applied or when subjects misunderstand tasks. Furthermore, they
suggest performance errors are minor influences and that computational limitations are not
absolute, by citing experiments where cognitive ability scores were and were not related to
various heuristics (Stanovich, 1999).
Philosophers also have bipartite theories of the mind, and of the concept of belief in
particular, that suggest a connection with the dual-process mold. Dennet (1981) distinguished
between belief and opinion, Cohen (1995) drew contrasts between belief and acceptance and
Frankish (2007) parsed two kinds of belief (nonconscious basic belief and conscious
superbelief). Commonalities among these theories illustrate that philosophers and psychologists
are likely tapping into the same dual-process structure. Frankish and Evans (2009) suggest that in
these theories “there is one type of belief that is implicit, non-linguistic, and common to humans
and animals, and another…that is explicit, conscious, language-involving, and uniquely
human…There is a clear, though not perfect, correspondence here with dual-process theories in
psychology” (pp. 20-21).
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Applying dual-process models to health behaviors. Dual-process models provide a
lens through which to look at existing theories of health, illness, and behavior change. The way
individuals make sense of their own illnesses, form illness representations, and make decisions,
lie at the center of the process of behavior change (Johnson & Leventhal, 1974; Lazarus, 1966;
Leventhal et al., 2012).
There is reason to believe that nonconscious, automatic System 1 processes have been
left out of many current theories of behavior change. A meta-analysis of 47 divergent behavioral
interventions found that medium-to-large changes in understanding or behavioral intentions led
to only small-to-moderate behavioral changes (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Furthermore, there are
great disparities among individuals in their health behaviors (Broadbent, 2010). Some studies
have shown no link between intention and behavior at all, even if intent to change exists
(Hardeman et al., 2011). Various researchers are beginning to question whether studies using
student samples (as opposed to clinical or community samples) have exaggerated the change
effects observed (Farmer, Kinmonth, & Sutton, 2006; Gardner & Hausenblas, 2004; Johnston et
al., 2004, as cited in Hardeman et al., 2011). These findings suggest that many of the theories
that are used to understand any change in behavior may be flawed, incomplete, and not
generalizable to real-world problems.
A number of social and cognitive psychologists have hypothesized how dual-process
theories explain health behaviors (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004, as cited in
Johnson & Steinman, 2009). However, these methods have rarely been translated to clinical
practice and have not been applied to research on cancer (Epstein, 1994; Ferreira, GarciaMarques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006).Because the CSM is fundamentally a dual-process theory,
individuals could be tested for the extent to which they use System 1 and System 2 processes in
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the formation of illness representations. By extension, the processes of creating illness
representations and making judgments are fundamental to understanding how behaviors change.
By applying a dual-systems framework to the Common Sense Model, it may be possible to reify
existing structures and critically examine potential areas of weakness, with the ultimate hope of
making modifications that will help researchers better understand what influences health
behaviors. Consequently, these changes will allow for more precise interventions and more
meaningful outcomes.
Before considering theories of behavioral change and how they apply to particular
illnesses like cancer, it is first necessary to think about the ways in which individuals make
meaning of their illness, and how the process of meaning-making may be understood in terms of
dual-process theories.
Meaning Making of Illnesses
Illness as metaphor. Leventhal et al. (2012) suggest that understanding illness in the
form of a representation is a crucial first step to behavior change. Representations come in many
forms, conscious and unconscious, rational and experiential. Metaphor is one means through
which people can formulate and express illness representations. Bessie (2006, as cited in
Wallerstein, 2011) acknowledged great debate over the precise definition and function of
metaphor, humorously writing, “metaphor is an abstraction, one which it is difficult to define
without resorting to metaphor” (p. 7). By contrast, Kövecses describes metaphor more
operationally, as “a figure of speech that implies a comparison between two unlike entities,
though with linking common features” (2002, as cited in Wallerstein, 2011, p. 90). Siegelman
(1990) notes that metaphor incorporates past, present, and future experiences.
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Classical psychodynamic theory suggests that metaphor is the heart or currency of
psychoanalysis, an essential part of the therapeutic process (Modell, 2005, 2009). And
Wallerstein (2011) seems to acknowledge dual-systems theory when he argues that metaphorical
language comes from within our bodies. Whichever definition is most appropriate, metaphors are
generally acknowledged as ubiquitous in language, fundamentally tied to our thought processes,
and a potentially powerful means of conveying information (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
Metaphorical language is also thought of as neither arbitrary nor ornamental, but central to the
creation of our ideas and fundamental to our thinking processes (Wallerstein, 2011), though
some debate that conception (e.g. Kövecses, 2002).
In a transformative work on understanding metaphor, Lackoff and Johnson (1980)
theorized, “Metaphors have entailments through which they highlight and make coherent certain
aspects of our experience” (p. 132). In terms of illness, it follows that that metaphor provides
both a means of communicating about a particular disease as well as a method for coping with it
(Charmaz 1995; Gibbs & Franks, 2009).
Though it has not been studied extensively until recently, scientists and researchers have
explored the role of metaphor as it pertains to various aspects of cancer diagnosis and treatment
(Domino & Lin, 1993). Work has focused on the ways that collections or groups of metaphors
reflect particular patterns of thought in those who have the illness, for example metaphors that
reflect chaos, battle, or splitting. For example, Domino, Affonso, and Hannah (1991) devised the
Cancer Metaphors test to compare imagery between cancer patients and healthy people. They
found differences in metaphors on four scales: cancer patients had lower Future Optimism,
higher Terminal Pessimism, higher Natural Disaster, and higher Foreign Intruder scores than
healthy controls. Other research explores cancer metaphors in particular populations, for
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example the role of metaphorical contradiction in female cancer survivors (Arrington, 2003) and
metaphors of sexuality in men who have survived prostate cancer (Gibbs & Franks, 2009).
Researchers note that metaphors are not static, but shift and change with the times (Kraemer,
2001), and that metaphors are not necessarily stable across cultures (Domino & Lin, 1993).
Further work has explored how doctors use metaphors in cancer treatment, arguing that
physicians tend to think about the disease in a limited number ways (e.g., the body as machine;
illness as a battle; Gibbs & Franks, 2009), and considers how the metaphors that are used affect
treatment decisions and outcomes (Periyakoil, 2008).
Metaphor’s role in meaning-making is well established and supported, perhaps most
famously by Sontag in her book, Illness as Metaphor (1978). Sontag argues that metaphors are
necessary for making sense of illnesses that cannot be easily fathomed or comprehended – even
as she suggests that the “healthiest” way of tolerating illness is without metaphor. To her,
metaphors of cancer and tuberculosis fulfill the essential human need to make sense of death,
“the thing that cannot be controlled” (p. 55).
Sontag (1978) connects illness to nonconscious processes with the notion that illnesses
are psychological. Some people believe that they have gotten sick because they unconsciously
want to, and they also believe they can will themselves back to health. While the specific points
are subject to debate, Sontag’s awareness of the use of metaphor as linked to unconscious
processes has not been overlooked by various psychoanalytic thinkers. Britton (1995, as cited in
Bergner, 2011) recognizes that fantasy-based beliefs about disease etiology likely reside in the
unconscious. Modell (2009) theorizes metaphor as the connection between unconscious feeling
states and articulated speech. Metaphor may serve as a linguistic bridge between the mind and
the body. In this way, the connection to dual-systems theory becomes clear, with metaphors
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serving as the link between System 1 and System 2 processes. Wallerstein (2011, p. 99) calls
metaphors a “royal road” to the unconscious, where unfiltered affect, fantasies, and dreams
reside, a sentiment that is agreed to by others (Aragno, 2009; Barnett & Katz, 2009; Modell,
2006). Yet, there is reason to travel this road with caution.
Although it is tempting to believe that metaphors exclusively serve as pathways into the
unconscious, there are times when individuals are quite conscious of the metaphorical nature of
their words or thoughts (Gibbs & Franks, 2002). There is no reason to believe that metaphors and
the unconscious fantasies that they represent remain separate and distinct as they are evoked and
uttered; in terms of dual-systems theory, the evocation and utterance of metaphors combines both
System 1 and System 2 processes. Ferriera et al. (2006) note that it is unlikely that any task is
“process pure”. Freudian theory (1900) suggests that unconscious thoughts are materially
transformed as they become conscious; conversely, the metaphor itself is also transformed when
attached to abstractions. Cassirer (1972, as cited in de Rocha Barros & da Rocha Barros, 2011)
alludes to these dual metamorphoses in his discussion of symbolism, arguing that symbols are
not merely containers for information that have been evoked from the unconscious; symbols,
here in the form of metaphors, additionally bears their own dynamic meaning, which may be
bent or shaped by unconscious thoughts or fantasies. Wallerstein (2011) cautions against overuse
of metaphor, arguing that doing so belittles the metaphor’s essential function of turning an
abstraction into something more comprehensible. This, in turn, may lead to greater likelihood of
reification and possible misunderstanding. Ultimately, metaphor provides an imprecise method
for tapping into the unconscious. Yet there is much reason to believe that System 1 processes are
worth exploring in order to better understand how individuals conceive of their illnesses, both
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nonconsciously and consciously, and how these representations affect coping strategies and
adjustment.
Patients’ drawings. Analysis of patients’ drawings is an approach to understanding the
influence of nonconscious processes on coping and behavioral decisions. Psychoanalytic thinkers
acknowledge the importance of non-verbal methods of communication (da Rocha Barros & da
Rocha Barros, 2011). Drawings may provide “a window into the patient’s psychological world”
with access to unconscious processes (Broadbent, Ellis, Gamble & Petrie, 2006, p. 913). Di
Gallo (2001) notes that rarely do individuals consciously draw subjects that cause anxiety or
stress; nonetheless, he cautions against relying solely on drawings while neglecting conscious
wishes. Drawings allow for idiosyncratic beliefs, which do not fit within the confines of
multiple-choice questions or on Likert scales, to emerge (Broadbent, Petrie, Ellis, Ying &
Gamble, 2004). Additionally, open-ended prompts, such as “draw your disease” minimize
researcher bias (Reynolds, Broadbent, Ellis, Gamble & Petrie, 2007). More generally and most
fundamentally, drawings may measure perceptions that are not detected by conventional
questionnaires (Broadbent et al., 2006).
Patient beliefs about illness may be greater predictors of disability than other, more
explicit measures of disease activity; yet, some perceptions may be closely tied into
nonconscious, automatic processes, which are not even apparent to the patients themselves
(Broadbent et al., 2004). In one study, patients who had experienced a myocardial infarction
(MI) were asked to draw their hearts, and researchers attempted to connect elements of the
drawings to psychological and functional measures; the amount of damage drawn on the heart
predicted the extent of recovery and the speed of return to work (Broadbent et. al., 2004).
Another study found that drawings of damage on the heart were associated with depression,
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negative perceptions of the illness, and poor physical function (Reynolds et al., 2007). A
longitudinal study found that increasing size in heart drawings predicted increased anxiety and
complaints of ill health (Broadbent et al., 2006).
These findings are noteworthy because study participants were not asked to draw damage
or adhere to particular size guidelines. This could indicate that these elements are outside of the
patients’ conscious awareness and are closely linked to System 1 processes. Furthermore, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to know whether images or underlying beliefs come first when
patients create drawings (Harrow et al., 2008). In either case, both System 1 and System 2
processes coexist and are difficult to separate; as such, it is unclear whether nonconscious and
conscious thoughts dictate what is drawn or whether the drawing itself transforms thought
processes.
Researchers have studied the drawings of various patient populations (e.g. those with
heart disease, asthma, or chronic pain; Reynolds et al., 2006), but Broadbent et al. (2004) suggest
that the technique may work better with patients where the affected body part can be easily
visualized. This logic seems biased toward System 2 thinking, where drawing is conceived of as
a process for slowly and deliberately concretizing and organizing pre-existing thoughts.
Conversely, drawing may also give voice to unspoken, nonconscious thoughts, which may or
may not be formally recognized by the artist at the time of drawing (Harrow et al., 2008), a
process that is more closely connected to System 1 thinking. Furthermore, those who have
illnesses that cannot be visualized as easily, because they lack clear, defined symptoms or lack
tangible evidence of disease, might rely more on System 1 thinking when they create drawings.
Applying the theories to cancer populations
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Cancer and the CSM. The CSM has only recently been applied to cancer. Hagger and
Orbell’s (2003) meta-analysis of the literature on the CSM from 1977-2002 only included one
study of individuals with cancer (Rees, Fry, & Cull, 2001, as cited in Hagger and Orbell, 2003).
Browning, Wewers, Ferketich, Otterson and Reynolds (2009) applied the CSM to lung cancer,
when they utilized the model to help explain the behaviors of recently-diagnosed individuals
who continued to smoke even after their diagnosis. Focusing on dimensions of illness
representation, they found that illness identity changed over time; however, they noted that the
measure (the IPQ-R) did not account for the emotional stress that occurred as those with lung
cancer attempted to stop smoking. A review by Sivell, Edwards, Elwyn and Manstead (2010)
drew similar conclusions about the failure of current measures and approaches to capture
emotions. Examining 26 articles on breast cancer and mapping the inherent constructs onto the
CSM, they found that cognitive representations of illness and consequences of breast cancer
partly predicted intention to seek help for breast cancer symptoms. Yet, only 22% of the variance
was attributable to the CSM. Sivell et al. concluded that a better understanding of the emotional
component of decision-making might have helped to account for a higher proportion of the
variance in help-seeking intentions.
Cameron and Jago (2008) attempted to account for this shortcoming when they proposed
an “expanded” CSM that considers emotion regulation strategies. They tested the expanded
model on women with breast cancer in two separate interventions, a self-regulation writing
intervention and a 12-week course that focused on emotional regulation training. Those women
who participated in the writing intervention had better mood states and adjustment in the month
following the treatment than those who did not write. Similarly, participants in the 12-week
course reported less anxiety, cancer worry, and greater emotional well-being than controls during
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treatment, and greater perceived control and reductions in emotional suppression over the
following year (Cameron & Jago, 2008). Other studies assessing the CSM and emotion
regulation have reported similar findings (Cameron, Petrie, Ellis, Buick & Weinman, 2005;
Humphris & Ozakinci, 2008).
All of these studies suggest that more research is necessary to study the connection
between cognitive representations and emotion regulation strategies, but fail to question the full
extent to which affective, experiential processes play a role in regulation or to consider how the
strength of emotions connects to an increasing reliance on System 2 processes. Researchers’
difficulties in placing emotions in the CSM might be the result of using a model that overlooks
the entirety of System 1 processes.
Dual-process models, cancer, and the CSM. Dual-process models rarely have been
considered in conjunction with the CSM, let alone within the context of cancer populations. A
study on decision-making by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) demonstrated that individuals were
more likely to make decisions by affect when they had diminished capacity for deliberation. This
finding might reasonably suggest that individuals rely more heavily on System 1 processes when
their System 2 processes become overtaxed. In a review that linked cancer, aging, and decisionmaking, Peters et al. (2008) sought out a dual-process explanation to account for age differences
in decision-making ability and then theorized how these differences might apply to a cancer
population. Peters et al. (2008) specifically linked a diminished capacity for deliberation to those
who were recently diagnosed with cancer. The distress of the diagnosis and the need for quick
decision-making are two factors that may particularly overwhelm the system; thus, cancer
patients are predicted to rely more on affect than nonpatients when making decisions.
Younger adults with cancer in particular face unique distressors. This might be in part
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because, for them, the illness is an “off-time” event in their life cycles, interfering with life goals
and self-representations. Cancer may interrupt the normative developmental trajectory,
disrupting goals of marriage, parenting, and employment (Revenson, Rubin, Pervil, MarínChollom, & Roberts, 2013; Stanton, Revenson, & Tennen, 2007). Consequently, there is
evidence to suggest that they experience greater psychological and affective distress and lower
quality of life than older cancer patients (Avis, Crawford, & Manuel, 2005).
Thus, understanding System 1 processes as they apply to decision-making is a
particularly intriguing prospect in cancer patients, whose slow, deliberative processing systems
have become overwhelmed regardless of age. Peters, one of Leventhal’s students, seems to have
come full circle in his recognition of the importance of System 1 processes. He finds agreement
with Epstein (1994) when he writes, “Finally, understanding the balance of affective and
deliberative processes in judgment and choice is fundamental to the study of decision making.
Decisions often involve both the head and the heart” (Peters et al., 2008, p. 3564).
Applying the models to hematologic cancer. Approximately 14.1 million individuals
living in America currently have or have had cancer (ACS, 2015). Among them are people
diagnosed with leukemia and lymphoma, a heterogeneous cluster of malignancies arising from
abnormalities that occur during the body’s blood-making process (McCoyd & Gruener, 2011).
Approximately 54,000 individuals are diagnosed with leukemia each year and 81,000 are
diagnosed with lymphoma; mortality rates vary widely depending on the form of the illness
(ACS, 2015).
Though psychosocial research on individuals with HM is rare, there is a large literature
on quality of life among cancer survivors. Survivors face multiple adaptive tasks that demand
significant psychological adjustment (Stanton et al., 2007). Adaptation to chronic illnesses such
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as cancer includes regulating acute psychological distress, managing uncertainty about the
future, coming to terms with body changes, making complex treatment decisions, re-evaluating
personal goals, and renegotiating social relationships. Successful adaptation can lead to better
outcomes, including less anxiety and depression and greater quality of life.
This dissertation hypothesizes that individuals with HM face different challenges than
people with other forms of cancer, and that those differences may be, in part, related to the lack
of palpable tumors or masses among those individuals with HM. More specifically, individuals
with HM may have greater difficulty coping with cancer than many of those with solid tumors or
palpable masses. A meta-analysis by Franks and Roesch (2006) suggests that individuals with
different types of cancer may use different strategies for coping, although it did not include
people with HM. However, Fadul, Osta, Dalal, Poulter and Bruera (2008) found that those with
HM had reduced and delayed access to palliative care services than those with solid tumors, in
spite of the fact that both groups had similar levels of symptom severity. A large study of quality
of life (QOL) in multiple cancer types (N = 1,429) found that those with hematologic cancer and
malignant lymphoma had significantly poorer QOL than all other cancer types (head and neck,
lung, breast, prostate, neurological, and gynecological) except for gastrointestinal cancer. Morris
and Shakespeare-Finch (2011) found that individuals diagnosed with HM and those with
colorectal cancer showed less posttraumatic growth than those with breast cancer.
The vast majority of psychosocial studies of individuals with HM focuses on the effects
of one particular treatment that only some HM patients receive– hematopoietic stem cell
transplants (HSCT; see reviews by Cooke, Gemmill, Kravits & Grant, 2009; Mosher, Redd, Rini,
Burkhalter & DuHamel, 2008). During HSCT, cancer patients receive a combination of
chemotherapy, radiation, and stem cell infusions to eradicate the cancerous blood cells and
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replace them with noncancerous cells, which come from themselves (autologous transplants) or
matched donors (allogeneic transplants). The treatment often requires eradication of an
individual’s immune system and a prolonged hospital stay. In a review of the literature on
HSCT, Mosher et al. (2008) found that a significant percentage of individuals experience
depression and anxiety (5% to over 40%) before, during, and after undergoing HSCTs.
When a wider range of treatments for HM is considered, the findings are not as
consistent. A systematic review of literature from 1990-2002 found great variance in healthrelated QOL among individuals who have the four most common types of leukemia (Radaelli,
Stephens, Laskin, Pashos & Botteman, 2003). Two small studies provide a plausible explanation
for this lack of uniformity (Berterö & Ek, 1993; Berterö, Eriksson & Ek, 1997). Conducting
qualitative interviews with 15 individuals who had either acute (Berterö & Ek, 1993) or chronic
(Berterö et al., 1997) leukemia, they found that an individual’s concept of QOL was highly
personal and idiosyncratic, regardless of the actual symptoms of the illness. These findings
indicate that either consciously or unconsciously, individuals with HM have differing
conceptions of their illness, and those differences are not determined by standard symptom report
measures.
Patients with HM have vague, generalized, or non-specific symptoms that may not be
easily recognized by medical professionals and which make the diagnosis a difficult and lengthy
process (McCoyd & Gruener, 2011). Standard treatments for HM do not require surgery, which
may be more easily conceptualized than radiation, chemotherapy, or HSCTs; with surgery, the
cancer (in the form of a tumor) is physically removed. Consequently, making meaning of the
illness may be especially difficult for those with various forms of HM (Xuiereb & Dunlop,
2003), particularly in those who do not have a palpable mass or tumor. When making decisions
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or trying to cope with the cancer, System 2 processes may become overtaxed. As a result, HM
patients may rely more heavily on affect and on System 1 processes than either healthy
individuals or those with other forms of cancer (Peters et al., 2008; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).
Central Hypotheses
To date, no studies have linked the lack of easily discernable symptoms of cancer to the
added difficulties that individuals with HM face during the course of their illness. The current
study attempts to bridge that gap through the lens of dual-process and illness representation
models. This study theorizes that cancer patients’ tumor status (i.e. whether or not they have
masses or tumors) as well as their thinking style (i.e. levels of System 1 and System 2
processing) will be related to illness representations, which, in turn will directly and indirectly
influence psychological adjustment. The model representing these relationships is depicted in
Figure 2.
More specifically, whether an individual with cancer has either a mass or tumor may
directly affect psychological functioning, as measured by depressive symptoms, cancer-related
distress, body image, and post-traumatic growth (path a of Figure 2). System 1 and System 2
processing and the illness representations they form may also affect psychological adjustment
(paths b and c). Whether or not tumor status and thinking style are related to each other (path d),
they may independently be related to illness representations (paths e and f). Consequently, illness
representations may mediate the relationship between these variables and measures of
psychological functioning. The following hypotheses are derived from Figure 2:
H1: Individuals with cancer who have either a mass or tumor will have better adjustment
(i.e. fewer depressive symptoms, less cancer-related distress, better body image, and greater
post-traumatic growth) than those without either masses or tumors.
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H2: Individuals with either a mass or tumor will use more System 2 thinking and less
System 1 thinking than those without masses or tumors.
H3a: Individuals who have greater System 2 thinking will have better adjustment and
more growth than those who have less System 2 thinking.
H3b: Individuals who have less System 1 thinking will have better adjustment and more
growth than those who have greater System 1 thinking.
H4: Particular illness representations (stronger illness identity, more acute timeline, more
chronic timeline, greater belief in consequences) will be associated with worse adjustment and
less growth, while other representations (greater personal control, treatment control, and illness
coherence) will be associated with greater adjustment and more growth.
H5: Illness representations will moderate the relationships between a) thinking style and
adjustment and growth and b) tumor status (i.e. presence or absence of a mass or tumor) and
adjustment and growth.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Sample and Recruitment
Men and women who had been diagnosed cancer were recruited for the study. Cancer site
was not specified. Eligibility criteria were: 1) between the ages of 20 and 65; 2) a cancer
diagnosis more than three months prior to participation; and 3) the ability to read and write in
English. Individuals younger than 20 were excluded because pediatric cancers typically have a
different treatment course and higher survival rates than adult forms of cancer (ACS, 2015).
Individuals older than 65 were excluded as they have a much greater incidence of cancer, greater
probability of comorbidity, and a higher likelihood of mortality (Hamaker, Stauder & van
Munster, 2014; Yancik, 2005). Participants were recruited at least three months post-diagnosis to
ensure that initial treatment decisions had been made and treatment had been initiated, and to
limit the possibility that they were experiencing acute trauma. Participants had to be able to read,
and write in English in order to understand instructions, sign consent forms, write about their
cancer, and complete questionnaires. As the study requires individuals to conceptualize their
illness and to reflect upon their own mental states, individuals who reported active psychiatric or
cognitive conditions were also excluded.
Recruitment. A national sample of individuals was recruited through Stupid Cancer, an
organization that serves the target population of young adults with cancer by creating a
community of advocacy, research, outreach, and awareness primarily through social media.
Younger adults with cancer were the focus of recruitment as they tend to exhibit greater distress,
in part because for them, cancer is an “off-time” event in their life cycles (Stanton et al., 2007;
Trevino et al., 2012).
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Multiple recruitment methods were used: 1) posting study announcements on the
organization’s websites including in chat rooms on Facebook, and on Twitter; 2) sending
recruitment emails to listservs run by the organization; 3) including recruitment information in
the organization’s promotional materials, and 4) distributing study brochures at Stupid Cancer
events. Individuals were encouraged to pass along or repost study information to friends, family,
health professionals, and colleagues. All recruitment materials can be found in Appendix A.
All of these recruitment methods directed individuals to a link for the study’s website at
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com if they met study criteria. This website automatically forwarded
to a survey address (https://ccnypsych.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6MzgpguoWatBTud)
hosted by Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com), a provider of survey collection and data analysis
software with a comprehensive suite of security features to ensure privacy and confidentiality.
Procedures
The consent form was presented electronically once individuals clicked the link. Potential
participants were informed that they should attempt to complete the survey in one sitting. Once
individuals agreed to participate, they electronically signed a consent form; a copy can be found
in Appendix A.
After consent, they were screened for eligibility once again. (They had previous selfselected themselves into the study according to the criteria; this screening verified the
information.) If they did not meet eligibility requirements, they were thanked for their time and
were automatically exited from the survey. A donation of $1 was made to one of four cancer
charities (Cancer Care, Cancer Research Institute, Prevent Cancer Foundation, and Stand Up to
Cancer) for each successfully completed survey based on participants’ selections; additionally,
participants who completed the survey could choose to enter a raffle to win one of five $75

39
Amazon gift cards as a token of thanks for their participation. A copy of the letter emailed to the
raffle winners can be found in Appendix A.
All individuals who gave consent and met eligibility criteria were then able to begin the
online survey. Surveys were completed in 45 minutes on average (SD = 29.91; range = 10 to 306
minutes). Though data were skewed, most participants (93.1%) completed the survey in less than
90 minutes. A printed version of the complete electronic survey questionnaire and all
experimental materials can be found in Appendix B.
Optional drawing measure. At the end of the survey, participants were asked if they
were willing to complete an additional measure by mail. Because this measure required
participants to draw their cancer, it could not be completed over the internet. Participants were
told that they would receive an additional raffle entry for completing and returning the measure.
Those who agreed to complete the drawing measure were given a link to a form, where
they entered their contact information. This information was stored in a separate website from
the survey responses to preserve confidentiality. The only connection between the survey and the
contact information was a 12-digit computer-generated random number. Participants were then
sent a packet containing instructions, the measure, a box of eight colored pencils, and a postagepaid envelope to return the measure. Participants were told that the drawing measure could be
completed in one, 5-10 minute session and were asked to complete the drawing measure within
24 hours of receiving the packet. Contact information was provided in case individuals were not
sure how to complete the measure. Those who did not return the completed drawing measure
within two weeks after the initial packet was sent received a follow-up email, with instructions
and an offer to send another set of materials. Once the completed packet was returned and
matched to the survey data, the 12-digit computer-generated random number which linked the
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contact information to the rest of the survey was deleted to preserve condfidentiality. A copy of
the drawing measure, the drawing measure instructions, and the follow-up letter can be found in
Appendix B.
The decision to use a hybrid of online and mail surveys was made for several reasons:
sending the entire survey by mail would be costly and was more likely to have a low response
rate among a young adult population that uses the internet on a daily basis. Furthermore, utilizing
an online survey allowed the data to be collected in a timely manner and reduced error when
translating responses into computer databases for analyses.
Survey Measures
The survey contained self-report multi-item measures assessing the constructs in the
theoretical model. The order of the measures within the questionnaire did not vary across
participants.
Illness representations. Illness representations were assessed using the Revised Illness
Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ-R; Moss-Morris et al., 2002), a modified version of the Illness
Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris & Horne, 1996). Based on
Leventhal’s Self-Regulatory Model (Leventhal et al., 1984), the IPQ was designed to assess five
dimensions of illness representation; the revised version expanded those to include nine
dimensions; however, one dimension (Causes of Illness) was not designed to be analyzed as a
scale, but rather as a grouping variable. The remaining eight dimensions (scales) are analyzed
individually; there is no summed or total scale. Each dimension is described below. With the
exception of the Illness Identity scale, all other items in the IPQ-R were answered with a fivepoint Likert-type response format ranging from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1).
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Illness Identity is measured with a “yes/no” symptom checklist that asks individuals to
endorse the presence of 14 symptoms (e.g., “nausea,” “fatigue,” “headaches”) and then to
indicate, for each symptom, whether or not they believe that it is related to their illness (in this
case, cancer). The Illness Identity score is the number of symptoms (0-14) that are reported as
being related to the illness. Higher scores indicate a greater attribution of illness-specific
symptoms (that is, more symptoms reported that are attributed to the illness).
The Timeline (Acute/Chronic) scale includes six items that assess how long individuals
believe their illness will last (e.g., “My illness is likely to be permanent rather than temporary.”).
Higher scores indicate greater chronicity. The Timeline (Cyclical) scale is comprised four items
and measures the degree to which individuals believe their illness is episodic (e.g., “My
symptoms come and go in cycles.”). Higher scores on the scale indicate belief that the illness is
more episodic or cyclical. Consequences (six items) measures the expected outcomes derived
from the illness (e.g., “My illness strongly affects the way others see me.”), with higher scores
indicating belief in greater consequences of having the illness. Personal Control (six items)
measures the degree to which an individual believes he or she has efficacy over his or her illness
(e.g., “The course of my illness depends on me). Higher scores indicate belief in greater personal
control. The Treatment Control scale (five items), measures the degree to which individuals
believe that treatment and the course of illness ultimately determines its outcome (e.g., “My
treatment can control my illness.”), with higher scores indicating greater belief. The Illness
Coherence scale (five items) measures the extent to which an individual has developed a
personal understanding of his or her illness (e.g., “I have a clear picture or understanding of my
condition). Higher scores indicate a greater sense of personal understanding. Emotional
Representations (six items) measures individuals’ emotional responses generated by their illness
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(e.g. “My illness makes me feel angry.”) with higher scores indicating stronger emotional
responses, either positive or negative.
Causal representations of the illness were measured with a checklist of 18 possible causes
(e.g., “stress or worry,” “my own behavior,” “alcohol”) rated on a five-point “strongly agreestrongly disagree” scale. These items were not designed to be combined into a scale.
Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and internal consistency reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha coefficient) for the eight IPQ-R scales are presented in Table 1. Internal
consistency reliabilities were very good on the whole, ranging from .76 to .92.
Thinking style. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40; Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj, & Heier, 1996) was used to measure System 1 and System 2 modes of cognitive processing.
The 40-item measure is composed of four 10-item subscales – Experiential Ability, Experiential
Engagement, Rational Ability, and Rational Engagement – that can be combined into two higher
order scales: Experiential Average and Rational Average. Experiential Average and Rational
Average roughly correspond to System 1 and System 2 processes, respectively, and will be used
in the majority of analyses.
The REI scales use a five-point, Likert-type format ranging from “completely true” (5) to
“completely false” (1) in response to a series of “I…” statements. The Experiential Ability
subscale measures an individual’s capacity for decision-making based on intuition and feelings
(e.g., “I believe in trusting my hunches.”), with higher scores representing higher ability. The
Experiential Engagement subscale measures an individual’s dependence upon and personal
enjoyment in using intuition and feelings to make decisions (e.g., “I tend to use my heart as a
guide for my actions.”), with higher scores representing greater dependence and enjoyment. The
Rational Ability subscale measures an individual’s capacity for thinking logically and
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analytically (e.g., “I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.”), with
higher scores representing higher ability. The Rational Engagement subscale measures an
individual’s dependence upon and personal enjoyment in thinking both logically and analytically
(e.g., “I enjoy intellectual challenges.”), with higher scores representing greater dependence and
enjoyment. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency reliability for the REI scales and
subscales are presented in Table 2. Internal consistency reliability for all of the REI-40 scales
and subscales was very good (Cronbach’s α’s all ≥ .83).
Depressive symptoms. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-D;
Radloff, 1977) was used to assess depressive symptomology. The CES-D is one of the gold
standards for measuring depressive symptoms, demonstrating strong internal consistency
reliability, and construct validity in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Van Dam &
Earleywine, 2011). The 20-item measure asks individuals to respond to a series of statements
with respect to their thoughts and feelings over the previous week, using a four-point response
format ranging from “rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” to “most or all of the time (5-7
days)”. Exemplary items include: “I was bothered by things that usually didn’t bother me,” “I
felt lonely,” and “I felt that people disliked me.” Overall scores can range from 0 to 60, with
higher scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. A cutoff score of 16 has generally been
used to indicate the presence of clinical depression in community samples and cancer
populations (Radloff, 1977). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Internal consistency
reliability was strong (Cronbach’s α = .93).
Cancer-specific distress. The revised Impact of Event Scale (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar,
1997) assesses symptoms of intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal that can occur in response to
any traumatic event, and it is often used as a measure of cancer-specific distress (e.g., Baider et
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al., 2001; Black and White, 2005; Cordova et al., 1995). The measure asks respondents to
indicate the frequency of their thoughts about cancer during the previous week using a five-point
“never” to “very often” scale; higher scores indicate greater distress. Exemplary items include:
“Any reminder of it brought back feelings about it” (intrusion), “I felt as if it hadn’t happened or
it wasn’t real” (avoidance), and “I felt irritable and angry” (hyperarousal). Descriptive statistics
and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the IES and its subscales are presented in Table 3. Internal
consistency reliability for the overall scale was strong (Cronbach’s α = .93).
Posttraumatic growth. The 10-item short form of the Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory
(PTGI-SF; Cann et al., 2010) includes the five subscales found in the original scale (i.e., relating
to others, new possibilities, personal strength, spiritual change, and appreciation of life; Tedeschi
& Calhoun, 1996). In this study only the total score was used. Higher scores indicate greater
growth. Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the PTGI-SF are presented in
Table 3. Internal consistency reliability was high for the total scale (Cronbach’s α = .89).
Body image. Body image was measured with three questions from the European
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer’s quality of life assessment (EORTC;
Aaronson et al., 1993). Using a four-point response format, participants were asked to rate the
extent to which they felt physically less attractive and less feminine/masculine as a result of a
disease or its treatment and whether they were dissatisfied with their bodies. The three items
were summed; higher scores indicate poorer body image. Internal consistency reliability was
good (Cronbach’s α = .87). Descriptive statistics for the items are presented in Table 3.
Demographic variables. Self-report questions assessed age, gender (dichotomous),
ethnicity (white/Caucasian, Latino, Black or African American, Asian or Pacific Islander, other),
sexual orientation (heterosexual or straight, bisexual, homosexual), relationship status
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(married/long-term partner, single, divorced, separated, widowed), number of children, and
religion (Christian including Catholic, Atheist or Agnostic, Jewish, Other). Employment status
was assessed as one of seven categories (employed, on medical leave/disability, student, keeping
house, seeking work, retired, unemployed). Annual income was measured in six categories
ranging from “less than $25,000” to “more than $150,000”. Education was measured in five
categories ranging from “some high school or less” to “professional or graduate degree”.
Medical variables. Participants reported the type/site of their cancer when they were first
diagnosed and at the time of the survey using a checklist developed by the American Cancer
Society (ACS, 2015). Time since diagnosis (in months) was calculated as the date the
questionnaire was completed subtracted from the date of diagnosis. Because the sample
distribution was positively skewed (skewness = 2.67), a log 10 transformation was applied to
normalize the distribution, following procedures suggested by Tabachnick and Fidel (2007) and
Howell (2007). The transformed data was less skewed (skewness = .02), better meeting
underlying assumptions for statistical tests. The transformed variable was used in all analyses.
Tumor status: What constitutes a “liquid” or “solid” cancer? In order to test the central
hypotheses, participants reported whether or not they had a tumor or mass both in the past and
currently (at the time of the survey). The three response options were “currently have masses or
tumors,” “had masses or tumors (in the past),” and “never had masses or tumors.”
A second variable was created that combined self-reported tumor/mass status with cancer
site. This was done to account for those with lymphoma, who have hematological cancer but also
may have a mass. Thus, the variable consisted of three categories: 1) individuals with a primary
diagnosis of leukemia or multiple myeloma who did not report a mass or tumor; 2) individuals
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diagnosed with lymphoma who reported a mass; and 3) those with all other cancer diagnoses
who reported having a mass or tumor.
Active treatment. Several yes/no variables assessed treatment: whether participants had
ever received chemotherapy or radiation, and whether they were currently receiving
chemotherapy or radiation. Those individuals who were currently receiving either chemotherapy
or radiation were combined to create a dichotomous variable denoting that they were currently in
active treatment (yes/no). The active treatment group included both those individuals who were
receiving cancer treatment for the first time as well as those who had relapsed. Whether or not
participants had undergone surgery was erroneously omitted from the survey questionnaire;
therefore, these data were not available to include in creation of the variable.
Drawing One’s Cancer
The drawing task was based on methods developed by Broadbent et al. (2004) for
patients who suffered a myocardial infarction. Participants who volunteered for the drawing part
of the study were mailed two sheets of letter-sized paper and a box of eight colored pencils (red,
orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, brown, black). Participants were asked to use the pencils to
create two drawings: “… draw a picture of what you think your cancer looked like when you
were first diagnosed and another picture of what you think your cancer looks like now.” They
were also told, “We are not interested in your drawing ability – a simple sketch is fine. If you
want to start over, please use the back of the page.” It was expected that participants would
complete their drawings within the box or use the box as a guide, though no explicit instructions
required them to do so. The drawings were coded on a number of dimensions using ideas and
procedures adapted from Broadbent et al. (2004); details of the coding procedures are presented
in Chapter 5 and Appendix C.
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Data Analyses
Data analysis proceeded in stages. First all questionnaire items were inspected for
variance and all scales examined for internal consistency reliability. Second, the theoretical
model was tested with quantitative measures from the questionnaire. Analyses of the drawing
measure involved both quantitative analyses using the codes and a more qualitative interpretation
of the data.
In testing the model presented in Figure 2, each of the paths relating to the theoretical
model will be examined. First, results will be presented pertaining to the factors that may be
directly associated with psychological adjustment (paths a, b, and c). ANOVAs and t-tests will
be used to determine what relationship, if any, exists between tumor status and psychological
adjustment, while correlations will test the associations between thinking style and adjustment as
well as illness representations and adjustment. After using ANOVAs and t-tests to determine
whether there are associations between tumor status and thinking style (path d), associations
between each of these factors and illness representations will be tested (paths e and f). ANOVAs
and t-tests will examine the associations between tumor status and illness representations, while
correlations will test the associations between thinking style and illness representations. Finally,
in a test of the full model, mediation analyses using the bootstrapping procedures (Preacher &
Hayes, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) will determine whether illness representations mediate
the relationship between tumor status, thinking styles, and psychological adjustment.
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Chapter 4
Testing the Theoretical Framework
Participants
A sample of 305 individuals completed the online survey. Of those, 280 completed the
writing measure that was included as part of the survey, and 99 returned the optional drawing
measure. Figure 3 presents the flow chart detailing consent, participation, and exclusion.
Participants were generally young to middle-aged, white (88.5%), female (86.6%),
heterosexual (89.8%), and well-educated (74.4% had a college degree or greater). Nearly twothirds identified as Christian or Catholic (60.5%) and over half were employed (58.0%). The
sample was equally divided between those who were married or had a long-term partner and
those who were not; roughly a third of the sample had one or more children (35.7%). Detailed
participant characteristics can be found in Tables 4 and 5.
A sample with a wide range of types of cancer was sought and many cancer sites were
represented (see Table 6). Breast cancer, lymphoma, and genital cancer diagnoses were the most
frequent (>10% of the sample each). Over three-quarters of the sample reported that they have or
have had either a mass or tumor (84.8%). This percentage differed by cancer site. Most
respondents with non-blood cancers reported having masses or tumors (93.9%); only 16.2% of
those diagnosed with leukemia or myeloma indicated that they had either masses or tumors, and
nearly all (98.1%) of those with lymphoma reported having them. Thus, cancer site is not a
proxy for having had a mass or tumor.
There was also a wide heterogenity in years since diagnosis: Participants had been
diagnosed from less than a year to 34 years. The distribution was positively skewed, with over
half of participants having been diagnosed for 2.5 years or more, and one quarter of the sample
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diagnosed more than 5 years earlier. Most (79.7%) of the participants had undergone
chemotherapy at some point for their cancer, and nearly half had radiation (45.6%). Nearly one
quarter of the sample was currently undergoing active treatment (either chemotherapy or
radiation).
Using the 16-point cutoff on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
(CES-D; Radloff, 1977), slightly more than half of participants (54.8%) met criteria for
depression. This is far greater than the 21% prevalence rate found in a recent meta-analysis of
depression rates among inpatient and outpatient oncologic and hemotologic cancer patients
(Mitchell et al., 2011).
Covariates
Multiple demographic and medical variables were examined as possible covariates (see
Tables 7-10). Few variables were related to the outcome measures and no patterns were found.
Being in active cancer treatment was related to four of the eight dimensions of illness
representations (Table 10). Because it was hypothesized that illness representations play a
critical role as mediators of the relationships between tumor status or thinking style and
psychological outcome, and because being in active treatment has been related to psychological
distress in other studies (Jacobsen & Andrykowski, 2015; review by Mitchell, 2011), active
treatment was included as a covariate in all mediation analyses.
Lower post-traumatic growth was reported by participants who identified as atheist or
agnostic more often than by either those who identified as Christian (including Catholics) or by
those who identified as other religions; removing two questions on the post-traumatic growth
measure which explicitly ask about religious growth weakened the magnitude of the effect,

50
(F(2, 298) = 4.81, p = .01), but it was still significant. Because religion was not related to any
other variables in the study, it was not used as a covariate for mediation analyses.
Bivariate Associations
The bivariate associations for each path in the model (Figure 2) will be presented before
examining meditational models.
Is tumor status related to psychological functioning (path a)? As presented in Tables
11-12, no differences between tumor status groups were found on any of the four measures of
psychological functioning (depressive symptoms, cancer-related distress, body image, and posttraumatic growth). This finding was consistent with both the respondent’s self-report of a
tumor/mass and the three-category variable that combined self-reported tumor status with cancer
site. Thus, those with “more solid” vs. “less solid” cancers did not differ in terms of
psychological functioning.
Is thinking style related to psychological functioning (path b)? There were few
significant associations between System 1 and System 2 thinking and psychological outcomes,
and the pattern was not consistent (Table 13). System 1 (experiential) thinking was related to
greater post-traumatic growth but was not significantly related to depressive symptoms, cancerrelated stress, or body image. System 2 (rational) thinking was related to fewer depressive
symptoms but was not related to the other outcome variables. When the dichotomous variable
indicating clinical levels of depression was used in place of the continuous scale, System 2
thinking was no longer significantly related to depression, t(302) = -1.55, p > .05; however, those
with scores less than 16 had higher System 1 thinking than those who met clinical criteria for
depression, t(303) = -2.63, p = .01.
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Exploratory analyses examined whether the interaction of System 1 and System 2
thinking was associated with the psychological outcome variables. To do this, System 1 and
System 2 thinking were each divided into “high” and “low” groups using a median split,
resulting in four resulting groups (i.e. high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low). Although the
main effects in these analyses of variance replicated the individual findings for System 1 and
System 2 thinking presented above for all four outcomes, none of the interactions were
significant (Tables 14-17).
Are illness representations associated with psychological functioning (path c)?
Unlike most continuous measures, lower scores on all but the Illness Coherence IPQ scale do not
indicate less well-defined conceptions of illness. In some cases, such as Consequences and
Personal Control scales for example, low scores may represent as strongly-held views or clearly
defined conceptions as high scores, and several of the scales are explicitly bimodal (e.g.,
Timeline (Acute/Chronic). This makes interpretation of correlations difficult so the meanings of
the associations will be explained in each case.
Depressive symptoms. All eight IPQ scales were significantly correlated with depressive
symptoms (Table 18). For five of the IPQ scales (Identity, Consequences, Timeline
(Acute/Chronic), Timeline (Cyclical), and Emotional Representations), higher IPQ scores were
related to greater depressive symptoms; for the other three dimensions (Personal Control,
Treatment Control, and Illness Coherence) higher IPQ scores were related to fewer depressive
symptoms. That is, individuals who attributed a greater number of their symptoms to their
illness, had greater belief that the illness would have consequences on self, family, friends, and
finances, believed their illness was more chronic or cyclical in nature, and whose illness inspired
greater positive and negative emotional reactions were more likely to report greater depressive
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symptoms. By contrast, those who had located control of their illness in either themselves or in
the course of treatment and those who reported a clear understanding of their illness were more
likely to have lower depression.
Cancer-related distress. Correlations between the IPQ scales and the cancer-related
distress measure (IES-R) followed the same pattern as with depressive symptoms (Table 18).
Examining the three subscales of the IES-R separately, the pattern held for both the Intrusion and
Hyperarousal subscales, but not the Avoidance subscale, where only three of eight scales showed
significant correlations, again in the same directions as for depressive symptoms. Specifically,
the Timeline (Acute/Chronic) and Emotional Representations subscales were related to greater
avoidance, whereas Illness Coherence was related to lower avoidance.
Body image. As shown in Table 18, all eight illness representation scales were
significantly correlated with body image following the same pattern described previously: Five
dimensions (Identity, Consequences, Timeline (Acute/Chronic), Timeline (Cyclical), and
Emotional Representations) were related to worse body image, and three dimensions (Personal
Control, Treatment Control, Illness Coherence) were related to better body image.
Post-traumatic growth. Correlations between the illness representation scales and posttraumatic growth showed a different pattern: Only half of the four dimensions were significantly
correlated with post-traumatic growth (see Table 18). Greater Personal Control, Treatment
Control and Illness Coherence were correlated with greater reports of growth. The Timeline scale
was negatively related to growth, meaning that a greater belief in the illness’s acuteness (vs.
chronicity) was correlated with positive growth.
To what extent do cancer patients who have a mass or tumor differ from those who
do not in System 1 and System 2 thinking (path d)? Cancer patients who reported a mass or
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tumor did not differ from those who did not report a mass or tumor with regard to both System 1
and System 2 thinking (see Table 19). An alternate analysis comparing those individuals with
leukemia or multiple myeloma who reported no tumors to those with lymphoma (who did report
masses or tumors) and those with solid tumor cancers also showed no significant differences on
any REI scales or subscales (Table 20).
To what extent do cancer patients who have tumors or masses differ from those who
do not with respect to illness representations (path e)? Comparing survivors with a selfreported mass or tumor to those without, there was a significant difference in only one of the
eight illness representation scales: Individuals without a self-reported mass or tumor had higher
scores on the Treatment Control scale that those with tumors, meaning that those without tumors
attributed greater importance to the effect of treatment on medical outcomes (see Table 21).
Comparing patients with leukemia or myeloma with no tumors reported to those with
lymphoma (with masses) and patients with solid tumor cancers, the finding for Treatment
Control remained significant, with leukemia/myeloma and lymphoma patients showing higher
scores than those with solid tumors. A second significant finding emerged for the Timeline
(Acute/Chronic) scale: Lymphoma patients represented their illness as less chronic than either
the leukemia/myeloma (with no tumors reported) or solid tumor groups (see Table 22).
Is thinking style associated with illness representations (path f)? As shown in Table
23, greater System 1 thinking was positively correlated with two of the eight illness
representation scales: Personal Control and Treatment Control. These associations largely were
attributable to scores on the Experiential Engagement subscale rather than Experiential Abilities
subscale. System 1 thinking was not significantly correlated with Illness Coherence, although the
Experiential Engagement subscale was.
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System 2 thinking was positively correlated with only one illness representation, Greater
Illness Coherence. (System 2 thinking was correlated significantly with both the Rational Ability
and Rational Engagement subscales; thus, the overall associations were attributable to scores on
both subscales.)
Testing the Mediation Models
Mediation analyses were used to test the model presented in Figure 2. It was predicted
that illness representations would mediate the relationships a) between tumor status and
psychological functioning, and b) between thinking style and psychological functioning.
Preliminary analyses. An exploratory second order factor analysis with oblique rotation
was performed on the eight illness representation scale scores in order to create more
parsimonious measures for multiple reasons. First, the assessed dimensions of illness
representations were highly inter-correlated. Second, they showed similar patterns of bivariate
correlations, as described earlier. Third, this would minimize the likelihood of creating type I
errors with multiple analyses.
Both the eigenvalues and scree test suggested a two-factor solution, which explained
49.58% of the common variance. Using a criterion of factor loadings greater than .40, one factor
was comprised of the Identity, Timeline (Cyclical), Consequences, Illness Coherence (reversed)
and Emotional Representations scales and the second was comprised of Timeline
(Acute/Chronic; reversed), Personal Control, and Treatment Control scales. The factor analysis is
presented in Table 24. The first factor included those scales related to the impacts of the illness
on self and others (including the emotional consequences), and was named Illness Impact. The
second factor was comprised of scales relating to locus of control and the acuteness of the
illness; it was named Control Over Illness. To compute scales, scores were reversed if
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appropriate, standardized, and summed. The mean of each factor, then, was zero, and the score
denoted how many standard deviations above or below the mean it was.
Multiple mediation analyses were conducted according to methods described by Preacher
and Hayes (2008). This approach to mediation allows for the presence of indirect effects without
a main effect, and is also able to test two or more mediating variables at once. Furthermore, the
indirect effect of a specific mediator may be tested with respect to all other mediators in the
model, and the significance can be considered within the context of the entire model. Indirect
effects are determined through bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008); 5,000 bootstrap samples
were used and the confidence interval was set at 95%.
Mediation analyses. The first set of models examined the relationship between the
dichotomous tumor status variable (i.e., the self-reported absence or presence of a mass or
tumor) and psychological outcomes, mediated by the two illness representation indices. Four
separate models were computed, one for each outcome variable. The second set of models was
identical but replaced tumor status with System 1 and System 2 thinking styles (separately); thus,
eight meditation equations were computed to test the second model. As previously discussed,
whether or not individuals were currently undergoing active treatment (i.e. chemotherapy or
radiation) was used as a covariate in all mediation analyses.
Preacher and Kelley (2011) suggest a strategy for calculating effect sizes in mediation
models that considers the indirect effect as a portion of the maximum possible indirect effect
given the particular variables being analyzed. The obtained value, κ2, may be evaluated in a
similar fashion to the coefficient of determination, R2, with small medium, and large effect sizes
regarded as 0.01, 0.09, and 0.25 respectively (Cohen, 1977; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). For those
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variables with indirect effects, with a sample size of 305, statistical significance set to .05, even
small effect sizes (κ2 ≈ 0.02) meet the threshold to achieve a statistical power of .80.
Do illness representations mediate the relationship between tumor status and wellbeing? The multiple mediation analyses revealed no significant findings for any of the outcome
variables in terms of total effects (sum of direct and mediated effects), direct effects (with
mediating effects removed), or specific indirect effects (through mediating variables). The
standardized regression coefficients illustrating these relationships can be found in Figures 4-7
for depressive symptoms, cancer-related distress, body image and post-traumatic growth,
respectively. The coefficients for the mediation analyses are presented in Tables 25-28.
Do illness representations mediate the relationship between thinking style and
psychological outcomes?
System 1 (experiential) thinking. Results of meditational analyses for System 1 thinking
confirmed a significant positive relationship (total effect) between System 1 (experiential)
thinking and post-traumatic growth (b = 5.65, β = 0.28, SE = 1.14, t = 4.98, p < .001). That is,
greater use of experiential thinking was related to greater post-traumatic growth. The relationship
was attenuated slightly when controlling for the illness representation mediators (direct effect),
but remained statistically significant (b = 5.02, β = 0.25, SE = 1.12, t = 4.49, p < .001; change in
β = 0.03).
Tests of indirect effects using bootstrapping procedures found that Control Over Illness
significantly mediated the relationship between System 1 thinking and depressive symptoms,
cancer-related distress and post-traumatic growth. (There were no direct or indirect effects for
the outcome variable of body image.) Through Control Over Illness, System 1 thinking was
related to lower depressive symptoms, lower cancer-related distress, and greater post-traumatic
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growth. The standardized regression coefficients illustrating these relationships can be found in
Figures 8-11. Full analyses for all four outcome variables are presented in Tables 29-32.
Given the significant total, direct, and indirect effects of System 1 thinking on posttraumatic growth, the ratio of the indirect to the total effect indicates the percentage of the total
effect that is mediated (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993). Using this calculation, Control Over Illness
mediated approximately 11% of the total effect of System 1 Thinking on post-traumatic growth.
For those variables with indirect effects, the effect size was determined to be small, κ2 ≈ 0.02.
System 2 (rational) thinking. Although a significant negative relationship (total effect)
between System 2 thinking and depressive symptoms was found, multiple mediation analyses
revealed no indirect effects between System 2 (rational) thinking and any of the outcome
variables (Tables 33-36). The standardized regression coefficients illustrating these relationships
for the four outcome measures can be found in Figures 12-15.
Factors Related to Clinical Levels of Depression
Given the high prevalence of depression in the sample population, a discriminant
function analysis was conducted to differentiate between those who met criteria for clinical
depression (CES-D score ≥ 16; Radloff, 1977) and those who did not. Multiple variables were
entered stepwise into the model, including self-reported tumor status, thinking style (System 1
and System 2), the two illness representation factors (Illness Impact and Control Over Illness),
demographic variables (i.e. age, income, marital status, and gender), and medical variables (i.e.
active treatment and time since diagnosis). Using Wilks’ lambda as the selection rule, one
significant function emerged (χ2 (3) = 78.03; p < .001), consisting of three variables: Illness
Impact, Control Over Illness, and System 1 thinking. A structure matrix for all variables entered
into the model is presented in Table 37.
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The centroid for the clinically depressed group occurs at .52 and for the non-depressed
group at -.62. Cases that were classified as depressed demonstrated high scores on Illness Impact
and low scores on Control Over Illness and System 1 Thinking. Conversely, cases that were
classified as non-depressed demonstrated low scores on Illness Impact and high scores on both
Control Over Illness and System 1 Thinking. The outcomes replicated findings of the bivariate
and meditational analyses, and the discriminant function was able to correctly classify 72.7% of
the cases (Table 38).
Summary of Analyses
In this sample of mixed cancer patients, illness representations were strongly related to
multiple measures of adjustment and growth. One subset of dimensions – a stronger sense of
illness identity, greater belief in consequences, greater belief in the chronicity or cyclicality of
one’s illness, and stronger emotional representations – was related to greater depression, more
cancer-related distress and worse body image. By contrast, another subset – attributing a locus of
control to either the self or to the cancer treatment, and having a more coherent sense of one’s
illness – was related not only to less distress but also to positive growth. Believing that the illness
was acute (vs. chronic) was correlated with positive growth but not with distress. These subsets
of dimensions largely, but do not entirely, match the two factors of illness representations,
Control Over Illness and Illness Impact, that were experimentally derived through factor
analysis.
Thinking style was related to distress and adjustment, both directly and indirectly. For
System 1 (experiential) thinking, there was a direct relationship with greater post-traumatic
growth; for System 2 (rational) thinking, there was a direct association with greater depressive
systems. Additionally, System 1 thinking was indirectly related to posttraumatic growth,
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depressive symptoms, and cancer-related distress, mediated by a combined factor of illness
representations which captures the locus of control and acuteness of the illness. This mediated
relationship accounted for 11% of the variance of post-traumatic growth. Thus, both System 1
and System 2 are related to the formation of illness representations and adjusting to illness,
though the processes operate in different ways by thinking style.
By contrast, and contrary to predictions, the form and shape of the cancer – whether or
not an individual has a tumor (both self-reported and as divided by form of cancer) – has little
relationship to the form of individuals’ illness representations, thinking styles, or levels of
psychological adjustment and distress.
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Chapter 5
Drawing Cancer
Participants and Procedures
The quantitative findings suggest that System 1 and System 2 thinking are related to
various measures of psychological adjustment and functioning, either directly or indirectly
through the construction of cognitive illness representations, but what might these
representations look like? More broadly, how do those with cancer “visualize” their illness? To
get a more direct measure of the way participants may conceive of their illness, patients’
drawings were examined for underlying clues as to how thinking styles or illness representations
affect the ways individuals conceptualize their illness.
In all, 99 of the 305 participants (32.4%) completed the drawing measure; all returned
both drawings. Figure 3 presents the flow diagram including the drawing measure. There were no
significant differences on any demographic and medical characteristics between those who
completed drawings and the remainder of the sample.
Developing the Coding Categories
Initial coding of the drawings used both directed and conventional qualitative content
analysis techniques (Hseih & Shannon, 2005), which were adapted to apply to visual rather than
written data. Coding categories were generated with an awareness of previous drawing studies in
patients with chronic illnesses (e.g. Broadbent et. al., 2004; Broadbent et al., 2006; Reynolds et
al., 2007), whose work examined the size, color, and content of drawings. Content dimensions
were initially determined principally by the aims of the current research; following central
hypotheses, they included the presence or absence of a tumor and whether a drawing could be
rated as abstract (i.e. not easily understood, without an identifiable, concrete object – person,
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place, thing, event, or circumstance – contained within the drawing), as both were hypothesized
to be related to illness representations, distress, and adjustment.
Once initial codes were in place, drawings were examined, and additional categories were
allowed to emerge from the data using a process similar to open coding (Schreier, 2012; Strauss
& Corbin, 1990). Categories were generated by two independent coders (the Principal
Investigator and an undergraduate assistant), who remained open to unanticipated and emergent
themes, and adapted the coding process recursively as needed. Emergent categories included
depictions of people (faces, bodies, and facial expressions), bodies (whole or parts), medical
objects (e.g. blood and medical equipment), and settings (e.g. grounded in space, inside, or
outside), as well as the presence or absence of words and their content.
Drawings were coded without knowledge of the participant’s survey responses (e.g.
gender, form of cancer, tumor status, etc.). Approximately 15% of all drawings were coded by
the PI and an undergraduate assistant and checked for inter-rater reliability; disagreements were
decided by discussion, and modifications were made to the coding scheme as necessary. Cohen’s
kappa was computed for several key variables (i.e. size of drawing, presence/absence of color,
abstractness of drawing, presence/absence of blood); kappas ranged from .88 to 1.00. A copy of
initial coding rules can be found in Appendix C.
Content of the Drawings
Drawings were initially analyzed on 15 dimensions. Findings for “your cancer at the time
of diagnosis” will be discussed first, then “your cancer now” will be discussed, and then
comparisons will be made between sets of drawings.
Cancer at time of diagnosis. The drawings varied widely. Over half the sample (55.8%)
drew large pictures taking up over half the allotted space, almost all used color (97.0%), and
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more than half added words (51.5%) to their drawing. Just over half the sample drew people
(53.5%), though often just a single individual or body parts (84.9% of those who drew people).
Of those who drew faces (48.5% of the sample), nearly half were rated as sad faces (47.4%),
while nearly a third of the faces were rated neutral in emotion (28.9%), and very few were rated
as happy (5.3%). Nearly one third (30.3%) of the drawings were rated as abstract – defined as a
drawing with no easily identifiable people, places or things; thus, it was impossible to discern
understanding, events, or circumstances of the drawing. Slightly more than half of individuals
(65.2%) depicted a tumor or mass; no individuals without a tumor or mass drew one, although
some who had a tumor did not draw it. Surprisingly, few drew blood (11.7%) or medical objects
(7.1%) and not a single participant drew a medical professional. The findings for the coded
variables for this drawing can be found in Table 39.
Cancer now. Drawings depicting an individual’s cancer at the time of the survey were
similar to their drawings depicting their cancer at the time of diagnosis, with a few notable
exceptions. First, in the “cancer now” drawing, significantly fewer individuals depicted a tumor
(16.7%, as compared to 65.2%; p = .002; two-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test). More individuals used
words (63.6%, as compared to 51.5%; p < .001; two-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test). And though
roughly the same number of participants drew people and faces, more individuals were depicted
as happy (57.8%) than either neutral (11.1%) or sad (8.9%). (Pearson’s χ2 tests could not be
conducted to determine significance due to small samples sizes.) Table 40 presents the findings
for the coded variables for this drawing.
Comparison of drawings. Pairs of drawings by each individual were compared to
examine changes between cancer at the time of diagnosis and at the time of the survey. A new
variable was created that took into account both words and visual content in order to make a
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determination of perceived change in mood. Drawings were rated for change on multiple
dimensions including number of words rated as either happy or sad, change in depictions of
illness symptoms and severity (e.g. change in tumor size), and change in visual content (e.g.
rainclouds to sunshine). Scores rating change on each of these dimensions were aggregated with
four possible ratings: 1) negative change; 2) no change (neither worse nor better); 3) positive
change, with reservations; and 4) positive change, with no reservations. These scores were
treated as a continuous variable.
Neither System 1 thinking (r(99) = -.07, p > .05) nor System 2 thinking (r(99) = .05, p >
.05) was associated with the change variable; similarly, there were no differences between those
who had self-reported tumors or masses and those who did not (t(97) = -0.31, p > .05).
In terms of adjustment and well-being, however, greater change (toward more positive
drawings) between drawings was associated with less cancer related distress (r(98) = -.21, p =
.03) and greater post-traumatic growth (r(99) = .22, p = .03). Furthermore, those who were in
active treatment (chemotherapy or radiation) had significantly lower scores (i.e. more negative
change) than those who were not in treatment (t(40) = -3.11; p = .003).Time since diagnosis was
unrelated to changes in the drawings.
Illness Representations through Drawing
One of the primary questions in this dissertation is whether cancer patients with a liquid
vs. solid tumor differ in the way they think about illness and form illness representations.
Overall, there were few differences between the drawings of those participants who reported
having masses or tumors and those who reported no masses or tumors. Those with solid cancers
were more likely to depict masses or tumors in their drawings both at the time of diagnosis and at
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the time of surgery than those with more liquid cancers, but did not differ on any other variables
coded in the drawings (see Tables 41-42).
Similarly, there were few significant associations between the two illness representation
scales (Illness Impact and Control Over Illness) and any features of the drawings (see Tables
37-38). On drawings referring to the time of diagnosis (Table 41), those participants who
perceived greater control over illness had larger drawings and were more likely to add words to
their drawings. These findings were replicated with the drawing referring to the present time, but
the effect sizes were smaller (Table 42). There were no significant associations between any of
the drawing variables and Illness Impact.
As shown in Tables 41-42, the drawings of those participants who showed greater System
1 (experiential) thinking differed significantly from those who showed less System 1 thinking on
several variables. On drawings depicting the time of diagnosis, greater System 1 thinking was
related to pictures that were medium-sized, (vs. small or large), rated abstract, and contained
fewer people, faces, and bodies. Additionally, there was a weak negative relationship, (t(67)
= -1.74; p = .09), between greater System 1 thinking and the likelihood of drawing a tumor or
mass. For the drawings depicting individuals’ cancer in the present time, greater System 1
thinking was only related to fewer depictions of people and bodies (and weakly related to fewer
faces, (t(97) = -1.95, p = .05). For both sets drawings, there were no significant associations
between any of the drawing variables and System 2 (rational) thinking.
Interpretation of the Drawings
The quantitative analyses provided few significant findings when examining the
differences in cancer drawings between those with solid or liquid tumors. Although the results
showed differences for those with particular thinking styles, they lacked nuance and explanation.
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Thus, an interpretative analysis can provide greater depth and detail beyond that which is
measured through traditional quantitative methods (Ezzy, 2002; Willig, 2001). Building on
particular questions driven by the quantitative analyses, the following sections examine the use
of words, the depiction of people, the nature of abstract drawings, and the nature of change. Each
section begins with an illustrative example and then discusses common themes across the
sample.
The meanings of written words in cancer drawings. In Figure 16, two grey clouds with
devils’ horns loom over a red sky. They have lightning bolts for fangs and red slits for eyes,
spilling raindrops onto the ground below. Words seem to be hanging in space throughout the
drawing: “mortality,” “overwhelmed,” “sad,” and “helpless,” among them. On the left, a broken
tree with the word “blindsided” written on its trunk bends over its fallen branches. A tornado
with the letters “AML” swirls on the right. Between them, an orange figure of a man, labeled
“me” says, “Help me!” in a word bubble.
Words appear everywhere in this depiction of cancer at the time of diagnosis, titled “The
Raging Storm Within,” by a 34-year-old man who was diagnosed with acute myeloid lymphoma
only 15 months earlier. Like nearly two-thirds of the sample (64.6%), he used words in his
drawings despite the fact that the instructions neither explicitly asked for nor recommended that
respondents use words. And as noted earlier, individuals with higher scores on the IPQ-R scale
Control Over Illness were more likely to use words in their drawings. In his depiction of his
cancer, words seem to play multiple roles that help this man convey his thoughts and feelings in
various ways, as it may for many with cancer. Qualitative content analyses suggest three possible
functions for words in their drawings.
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For most of the individuals who added words, the words appeared to serve a labeling or
naming function (n = 51; 79.7% of those who used words). Individuals labeled internal organs
(e.g., “liver,” “bile duct,” “kidney”), bodily changes resulting from cancer (e.g., “scar,”
“[medication] port,” and “thickening due to cancer cells”), as well as the cancer itself (e.g.,
“lymphedema,” “It’s a tumor,” “The [white blood cells] are attacking the cancer cell, if that’s not
obvious,” and “The red is my cancer. My tumor was 11.1lbs”). On four occasions, participants
even imbued the cancer with emotion words (e.g., “Angry tumors and cells invading). One
patient provided the cancer with a name: “Marge, the 16cm ovarian dysgerminoma.” Participants
also labeled people (e.g. “son,” “husband,” “friends”) and objects (e.g., “bloodwork” and
“medical bills”).
More than half of participants who used words used them metaphorically to represent
feeling states (e.g., love, hope, sadness) or other complex thoughts (n = 35; 54.7%). Sometimes
question marks were used alone or attached to words (n = 11; 17.2%), possibly to denote fear,
confusion, or uncertainty. Depictions of feelings sometimes appeared as word clouds (n = 11;
17.2) – drawings that prominently and centrally feature multiple words and phrases (e.g.
“Death,” “Not me!” “Worry sometimes, but in God’s hands,” “Scars forever”), in various colors
and at differing angles. Of those who drew word clouds, drawings were equally divided among
those from whom words were either completely disconnected from drawings (no pictures),
connected loosely to simple drawings (e.g., surrounding a mass or individual), or, as in the
drawing by the 34-year-old man described earlier, more fully incorporated into more complex
drawings.
Occasionally, the representation of feelings was depicted as an explicitly extended
metaphor, where words served to illustrate the metaphor. For example, in drawings of their
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illness in the present time, five individuals drew pictures of their cancer buried in the ground
beneath a tombstone on which “RIP” was written; in some cases, words provided the “death”
date of an individual’s cancer as well. When asked to draw her cancer at the time of diagnosis, a
26-year-old woman diagnosed with lung cancer 15 months earlier drew a picture of a road
labeled “road of life,” which curved and led to a tombstone at the top of the page; for her
drawing of her cancer at the time of the survey, she again drew the “road of life,” though this
time the road was straight and led to an angel-like figure (Figures 17-18). Another individual
drew a picture of a forest beside mountains and a sun, with the description, “I must climb a
mountain full of trees, but I’ll get to that beautiful sunrise.”
Some individuals used words within thought or dialogue bubbles, as if giving “voice” to
individuals within the drawings (n = 15; 23.4%). These individuals “spoke” with a range of
emotions including joy (e.g., “Yahoo”), fear (e.g., “My white blood cells are killing my red
blood cells! Oh no!), reassurance (e.g., “I will always be here for you”), and displeasure (e.g.,
“This sucks. Game over.”), or need: as the 34-year-old man in the earlier example so simply and
desperately states, “Help me!”
The depiction of people in cancer drawings. There is a face in the center of Figure 19,
but it does not belong to a person; instead, it belongs to cancer. With sharp teeth and angry eyes,
it looks out menacingly and tauntingly, saying “Muhahahaha”. It is being viewed through a
screen, possibly an x-ray-like device, and it radiates in multiple colors – purple, yellow, blue, and
green. By contrast, the body it is attached to almost feels like an afterthought. It is hardly
depicted at all. The edges of a crude torso are orange, drawn roughly so that lines overlap and
make out the uneven form of two legs. A simple line indicates a belly button; there are no arms,
there is no head, there is no human face. This depiction of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a
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24-year-old woman diagnosed with vaginal cancer four years earlier is emblematic of many of
the representations of people, bodies, and faces found in the drawings. The quantitative analyses
found an inverse association between System 1 thinking and the number of people, bodies, and
faces represented in drawings, suggesting that these depictions may be related to the way
individuals think about their illness.
Overall, 59 participants (59.6%) drew either bodies or faces of people in their drawings.
The vast majority of participants who drew people did not depict whole individuals (n = 56;
94.9%), as in the drawing described earlier. That is, people were instead drawn as body parts
with missing arms, hands, legs, feet, heads or facial features (e.g. nose, ears). Though drawings
ranged in level of artistic aptitude, more than a third depicted individuals as stick figures (n = 22;
37.3%). For those who drew faces in either drawing (n = 48; 48.5%), most depicted at least one
face with missing features (n = 40; 83.3%).
When humans were drawn, they were often depicted alone (88.1% of the participants
who drew people). When groups of people were drawn, the drawings sometimes contained
unlabeled others, or the people were explicitly labeled as friends or family members. As noted
earlier, no one participant drew a doctor or medical professional (either explicitly labeled or
drawn in medical uniform) in either drawing.
The bodies depicted in drawings often contained both external (e.g. hands, faces) and
internal (e.g., organs, tumors) elements, just as in the drawing by the 24-year-old woman
described earlier. Nearly two thirds (n = 37; 62.7%) incorporated both internal and external
elements, and the nature of these drawings ranged from simple to complex: For example, one
participant drew a heart symbol over a stick figure, while another drew an intricate illustration of
magnified breast cancer cells within a female body.
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Abstract representations of illness in cancer drawings. In Figure 20, the choice of
colors seems purposeful, if incomprehensible – brown, black, yellow, green, and red. A network
of dots interconnect to create a lattice-work that suggests three dimensions. Red lines link a red
dot to yellow and green. A black dot surrounded in green is connected to reds, and greens, and
browns along many different colored lines. Colors are on top of colors, indicating the possibility
of amending or correcting earlier drafts of the figure. And yet the figure itself remains
mysterious – is it a molecule? A collection of cells? A tumor? The universe? Without words,
more details or description, clear understanding remains elusive.
This depiction of cancer in the present time by a 41-year-old man diagnosed with acute
lymphocytic leukemia more than 25 years earlier, defies easy comprehension. Greater System 1
thinking was associated with more abstract depictions of illness like his (i.e., those drawings with
a dearth or absence of easily-identifiable people, places, things such that it is impossible to
discern understanding, events, or circumstances), suggesting that the form and content of
drawings may be related to the ways individuals conceive of their illness. A more qualitative
interpretative analysis of the drawings coded as abstract (n = 34; 34.3%) found few
consistencies. These drawings varied widely in terms of size, shape, and content. Size ranged
from very small (pea-sized) to filling the entire drawing space with layers of colors. Shapes of
objects were both rounded and angular. Abstract objects were both separated and linked together
with lines. Some drawings incorporated iconography (e.g. objects that looked like hearts,
lightning, hands, or veins), while others lacked any discernible shapes.
Depiction of change in cancer drawings. The monster in Figure 21 somehow appears
both menacing and silly. It has sharp teeth and big hands, yet it is covered in blue fur and is
making a foolish, child-like smile. The 27-year-old woman diagnosed with bone cancer 12 years
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earlier who drew it describes the drawing in detail in a description she returned with it. She
writes, “In the ‘first diagnosed’ picture, the monster is more of a kids’ monster…while it was
definitely a little bit of scary [then], the beast seemed beatable. Looking back, it seemed almost
easy that first time.”
It stands in stark contrast to the monster in Figure 22, which is nearly twice its size and is
covered with a thick tree-like exoskeleton. Its head is shrunken and yellow, its hand is reaching
out and crushing something within it. Leaves covering its body seem to rustle and fall. Of this
monster, of the same woman’s cancer in the present time, the artist writes, “Today’s monster is
bigger, tougher. With a relapse and a second cancer now at play, I have to fight much
harder…but if you look closely, his hand is grasping for the growth. He’s losing a few leaves.
He’s still huge and scary, but there’s hope and a chance that he can be defeated.”
These dual depictions of cancer provide an articulate representation of the ways the
illness can grow and change over the course of a lifetime. The drawings by the 27-year-old
woman simultaneously reveal the personal aspects of her own journey and common experiences,
feelings, and fears many cancer patients may share. Drawings like hers and others can be
examined both in terms of valence (positive or negative) and totality of change (i.e. with or
without reservation), taking into account both words and content. Based on this scoring system,
drawings naturally gathered into four categories. As noted earlier, depictions of positive change
in one’s drawing were associated with both less distress and greater growth; furthermore, those
in active treatment had fewer depictions of positive change.
A small minority of those participants who completed drawings (n = 6; 6.1%) illustrated
a negative change between drawings. In these drawings, the depicted tumors increased in size,
the stage of the cancer increased (e.g. “stage 4”), or individuals candidly described their
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worsening illness in words. One respondent poignantly wrote, “All the good things in my life are
gone except a few friends and my son. I’ve lost everything including who I am…and soon my
life.”
Roughly one fifth (n = 18; 18.2%) depicted drawings that did not seem to differ from
each other in terms of valence. Sometimes, the pair of drawings appeared nearly identical in
terms of size, color, and content. In others, the size of depicted tumors remained the same. In still
other cases, the cancer had changed forms, but that did not necessarily equate to a change in
underlying feelings. For example, one individual drew a picture at the time of diagnosis of a
headless body filled with spiky red-haired, angry faces with open mouths, labeled “angry tumors
inside”. In the drawing of cancer in the present, the body was no longer filled with “angry
tumors”; instead, it was replaced by “scar tissue.” Yet, the “angry tumors” had not disappeared.
They were now floating in space, taunting the body mercilessly with phrases like, “I’m coming
back!!” “You’re different” and “I never go away!” among others.
The vast majority of respondents (n = 75; 75.7%) drew pictures that illustrated positive
change, with drawings of cancer at the time of the survey containing universal widely-known
symbols of triumph and happiness (e.g. sunshine, rainbows, finishing lines in races,
mountaintops, smiles, etc.) and words of joy and hope (e.g. “Remission!” “Life gets better!”
“Hair growing back,” “Healing”). But for more than half of those individuals (n = 44; 44.4%),
the drawings of cancer at the time of the survey also depicted reservations or hesitations. Here,
negative thoughts and feelings were manifest in multiple ways. Sometimes they appeared as
words of uncertainty, remorse, or frustration (e.g. “Future?????” “Is it lurking, seeking an
opportunity to return?” “Survivor’s guilt,” and “Bills suck.”); other times they appeared as in
drawings (e.g. grey clouds over a sunny sky). One respondent articulately depicted a tiny
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monster with red eyes, peeking out from behind a cracked door in the top corner of the drawing.
Other individuals used a combination of words and pictures to convey their thoughts (e.g. a dark
patches/clouds in otherwise bright drawing, with the words “cancer,” “cancer thoughts,” or
“relapse” on them).
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Chapter 6
Discussion
At the heart of this dissertation is the question, “What are ways of thinking about illness
representations of cancer?” It is a question that can be read in at least two ways. The first
considers how individuals with cancer think about their illness, which has been at the theoretical
center of the work. It considers how several factors, including thinking styles and physical
manifestations of the illness (i.e. whether or not an individual has a tumor), may relate to the
ways individuals conceive of their illness. Furthermore, it wonders whether individuals who
think about their cancer differently from one another – believing they have more personal control
over their illness or feeling that their illness will last forever – may be associated with differing
outcomes in terms of adjustment, coping, vitality, and well-being. Here, illness representations
provide the nucleus of a complex of related factors that are all involved in the process of
understanding illness.
Just as meaningfully, the central question may be read in a second way. This reading
considers the ways researchers might understand and interpret the ways individuals make sense
of their illnesses, which has been at the methodological center of the work. In one line of
thinking, illness representations may be understood quantitatively and can be reduced to a
number of discrete dimensions. Years of research have altered the number and content of these
dimensions (Moss-Morris et al., 2002), a trend that is likely to continue as individuals attempt to
understand, define, and include more aspects of illness in both cognitive and emotional realms.
Qualitative analysis – here, in the form of drawings – provides evocative insights and hypotheses
in the places where quantitative understanding and existing theory are limited. Working in
tandem, quantitative and qualitative analyses bring together a narrative of understanding that is
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greater than the sum of parts, bringing more understanding, depth, and richness than either
methodology alone.
Both the methodological and the theoretical come together to provide new ways to think
about illness representations of cancer in the following discussion. The discussion begins by
attempting to reconcile the personal, individual interpretations those with cancer have about their
illness with the widely-held, common understanding those with cancer all share. Given these
competing interpretations, the second section considers the multiple forms that individuals’
illness representations may take, with a conversation about whether particular interpretations of
cancer may be harmful or beneficial or both. The third section attempts to understand how
individuals thinking styles – System 1 (experiential) or System 2 (rational) thinking – may be
related to the ways they make sense of their illness, and wonders whether one particular thinking
style is advantageous over another. The final sections acknowledge the limits of the current
research and consider future directions and possibilities.
Cancer, Above All Else
A shared understanding. In Illness as Metaphor, Sontag (1978) describes cancer in
myriad metaphorical terms – as an invader, a revolt, and a form of self-expression, among others.
Her conceptions are nearly as diverse as the cancer population itself, made up of individuals of
all ages, colors, religions, and sexual orientations, as well as those who are rich and poor, single
and married, unemployed and employed, relatively unschooled and highly educated. Yet, despite
all of this seeming variety, results of the quantitative analyses in this study found no systematic
differences in the ways individuals with cancer conceive of their illness across a wide range of
demographic and medical variables, including age, gender, marital status, number of children,
education level, annual income, time since diagnosis, and perceived survivability. Contrary to the
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original primary hypothesis, even the physical form that cancer takes seems to have little
connection to one’s illness representation, whether individuals have cancers with “liquid” tumors
(as with leukemia or myeloma), masses (as with lymphoma), or tumor-based cancers.
This does not mean that individuals with particular forms of cancers fail to have deeplyheld beliefs about their illness. Indeed, they may have strong representations and strong attitudes
that underlie them. Furthermore, these results suggest that despite the range of metaphorical
identities that cancer may take and the unique characteristics of those diagnosed with cancer, a
common, shared understanding of “cancer” underlies all representations and supersedes most
individual differences. Cancer is, well, cancer.
Individual differences. The fact that a commonly-held conception of cancer exists does
not suggest that individual differences are erased. For example, those with lymphoma (masses)
were more likely to believe their illness was acute than either those with blood cancer or tumorbased cancers, while those with tumor-based cancers were less likely to believe that the
treatment course would determine the outcomes of their illness. Those who were older were
more likely to believe that their cancer will be a chronic (life-long) rather than an acute
condition. This finding suggests a potential explanation for the higher rates of suicide in older
adults with cancer (Cole et al., 2014). Individuals with children understandably had a greater
belief in consequences arising from their illness, while those who had a greater time since
diagnosis had less of a belief in those consequences. Perhaps having the experience of living
with cancer (or living cancer-free) for a time changes the ways individuals consider the impact of
the illness on their lives and on the lives of others around them.
Alternatively, it may be related to whether or not individuals are in active treatment.
Across a number of dimensions, those who were in active treatment (that is, those patients who
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are currently undergoing chemotherapy and radiation) did have some differing representations of
their illness from those who were not in active treatment. Specifically, those in treatment
attributed fewer symptoms to their cancer and were more likely to believe that their illness was
more acute, less cyclical, and had fewer consequences. These results indicate that those currently
undergoing active treatment may be dealing with unique challenges not experienced by the rest
of the cancer population, findings already suggested by multiple cancer researchers (Holland,
2002; Jacobsen & Andrykowski, 2015). Thus, more work should be done to understand and help
those individuals with cancer while they undergo treatment.
What cancer looks like. An examination of shared illness representations only provides
a rough approximation of the ways those with cancer think about their illness. Overall, their
illness representations are more often coherent than not; that is, those with cancer have found
ways to make sense of their illness, even if those ways differ from person to person. Despite this
understanding, as a group, they believe their illness is likely to stir up difficult feelings and
emotions. Perhaps this is because, among other things, they have a strong belief that their illness
will lead to consequences for themselves or others, particularly family and friends. Their sense of
their illness timeline is wide-ranging: They are equally likely to believe that their illness will be
either acute or chronic, cyclical or invariable. Finally, they are more likely to assign a locus of
control to their illness than not. That is, they believe that their own actions or their treatment will
determine the course of their illness. These findings differ somewhat from Moss-Morris et al.’s
(2002) sample of those with chronic pain, in that scores for chronicity of the illness were
generally lower, while coherence of illness representations and treatment control were higher.
Though these data provide meaningful insights, they somehow fail to capture the depth
and magnitude of a cancer diagnosis. There are multiple reasons to believe that cancer is a
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significant, life-altering event that requires multiple coping strategies for a wide range of
individuals, regardless of the form that cancer takes (Low, Beran, & Stanton, 2007). Most
strikingly, as a population, more than half the sample meets criteria for depression, far greater
than both depression rates in the general population and among other studies of cancer
populations (Mitchell et al., 2011). Other indicators of individuals’ experiences of cancer,
including drawings of their cancer, can provide even greater insight, perhaps even tapping into
unconscious fantasies, fears, and beliefs about the illness.
The isolation that is a part of cancer is perhaps most eloquently and concretely illustrated
through cancer drawings. In them, a cancer diagnosis is generally depicted as both a lonely and
solitary experience, in accordance with other cancer literature on the subject (e.g. Friedman,
Florian, & Zernitsky-Shurka, 1989; Wells & Kelly, 2008). Though individuals are sometimes
represented with friends or family at the time of diagnosis, far more often, they are drawn alone.
Notably, neither doctors nor any other medical professionals were depicted in any of the
drawings. Furthermore, the distress words that appear in many of the drawings seem to function
as attempts to call out to others, who may or may not be present, supportive, or understanding.
The significant negative correlation between the presence of words and Control Over Illness
supports this assertion.
Taken together, these findings suggest that for many, a cancer diagnosis is an isolating
event. There are multiple reasons why this may be so: Among them, newly-diagnosed
individuals may feel like they have been singled out from the rest of their social world, having
contact with few individuals who are in precisely the same situation as they are. A diagnosis
inevitably leads to some disruption in usual social ties, including an inability to perform the same
work-related tasks or take part in the same social engagements, replaced instead with doctor and
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hospital visits and home care. Society’s general stigma over discussing cancer and shame related
to the illness may prevent individuals from disclosing their illness, causing them to feel further
segregated. The treatment course itself may literally isolate individuals from others (e.g. stemcell and bone marrow transplants). Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, expressions of
loneliness may be manifestations of an individual’s profound fear of death, the ultimate isolation.
Other aspects of the drawings speak to a sudden change in identity where the illness
becomes primary, where normalcy is shattered, and where wholeness is lost following a cancer
diagnosis. In many individuals’ self-depictions of their cancer, they illustrated their bodies as
transparent. Sometimes, the interior objects – such as bones, cells, and tumors – were drawn with
greater detail than the external, which somehow seem like an afterthought. Furthermore, bodies
rarely appeared whole; far more often, they were fragmented, incomplete, or missing features.
These qualities seem manifestations of the ideas conveyed by anthropologist Susan
DiGiacomo, who, after being diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, described her own search
for “continuity and wholeness” by writing about her illness. Her wide-ranging essay Metaphor as
Illness: Postmodern Dilemmas in the Representation of Body, Mind and Disorder addresses
changes in bodily and mental representations following a cancer diagnosis. She describes the
way prevailing biomedical viewpoints reify the transformation of the body “from an integrated
and functioning adult into a collection of diseased body parts” (DiGiacomo, 1993, p. 120) and
the subsequent loss of agency. In her conception, individuals becoming “acted-upon objects,” (p.
122) passive receptacles or petri dishes for disease; agency is instead taken up by doctors who
detect illnesses and seek cures. This depiction is not so far from the medical model used in the
earliest theories of health behavior (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996). Its appearance in cancer
drawings serves to show the intransigence of old and outdated paradigms that become deeply
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ingrained in individuals’ conscious and unconscious representations of illness. The window
provided by their cancer drawings provides a stark visual depiction of the upheaval, loss of
wholeness, and subsequent disintegration that she describes.
Impact on future research. Those who have been diagnosed with cancer have a widelyshared, collective understanding of their illness, despite some individual differences. Put more
simply, cancer trumps all. Demographic and medical characteristics, specific diagnoses, and
treatment courses are secondary to cancer itself and all that it represents. Given that individuals
with cancer seem to view their illness as both lonely and solitary, it is worth noting that they may
have more in common with each other than they initially realize. This awareness could lead to
interventions that might help individuals with cancer feel less alone – for example, changing the
way the medical field separates those with various forms of cancer and different courses of
treatment. Those who are seeking support may be encouraged to look farther afield – even to
those with other forms of cancer – recognizing that many cancer-related experiences and feelings
may be common or widely-shared. Those with rare forms of cancer and those who get cancer
“off time” might feel less isolated and part of a larger community.
The study data bring other facets of this representation to light – among them, the
emotions cancer evokes, the fears of consequences on self and others, the sense of isolation, the
potential loss of control, and the shattering of a sense of wholeness. Drawings allow for the
incorporation of less-conscious representations. Using multiple methodologies begins to tap into
those aspects of the illness that are difficult to quantify – for example, one’s sense of bodily
integrity, or one’s ability to make use of available supports – which are underrepresented in
conventional models of illness (Leventhal et al., 2012; Moss-Morris et al., 2002). Greater
understanding of the ways these illness representations are formed and may be changed

80
(particularly those representations that negatively impact adjustment and coping strategies) can
help guide future research.
Types of Illness Representations
Representations across the cancer population. Though much research has been done
examining the relationships between illness representations and outcomes in individuals with
various ailments, including specific forms of cancer (e.g. Hagger and Orbell, 2003; Leventhal et
al., 2008; Llewellyn, McGurk, & Weinman, 2007; Stanton et al., 2007), less research has been
conducted across the entire cancer population. While site-specific cancer studies indeed yield
meaningful insights, there is also much to be gained by looking at a larger cross-section of those
with multiple forms of cancer, particularly since it has been shown that the illness
representations of cancer are widely shared. Results indicate that among those with various
forms of cancer, illness representations are deeply connected to a range of measures of
psychological adjustment, including those that are potentially harmful (depression, cancerrelated distress, and body image) as well as those are potentially protective (post-traumatic
growth).
Two subsets of representations. Results showed that the eight dimensions of illness
representations measured by the IPQ-R could be organized into two subsets when associated
with measures of distress and adjustment. One subset – consisting of a greater attribution of
symptoms to one’s illness, a greater belief in one’s illness having consequences on self, friends
and family, a greater belief that the illness is chronic or cyclical, and stronger emotional
responses to illness – was associated with greater distress and worse adjustment outcomes. The
other subset – consisting of a greater belief that the course of one’s illness is dependent either on
self or on treatment, and a more coherent personal understanding of illness – was not only
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significantly associated with less distress but also with greater positive growth. These subsets do
not precisely match the factors of Control Over Illness and Illness Impact that were empirically
derived through factor analysis; however, these findings are in accordance with other studies,
including a meta-analysis on illness representations among populations with various illnesses
(Hagger & Orbell, 2003), and more specifically in several cancer populations (Gould, Brown, &
Bramwell, 2010; Rozema, Völlink, & Lechner, 2009).
The subsets found in this dissertation match two subsets of dimensions described by
Hagger and Orbell (2003) in their meta-analysis. Yet this study adds greater depth of
understanding to their meta-analysis, which acknowledges the difficulty of making crosscomparisons because of moderating variables such as “illness type, severity, chronicity, and
symptomatic characteristics” (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). Even for those with multiple forms of
cancer, ranging in symptomatology, severity, and chronicity, results of the meta-analysis were
widely supported.
To Hagger and Orbell (2003), the driving force behind the first subset of dimensions is
illness identity. They theorize that those individuals with strong illness identities (that is, those
who had strong beliefs that symptoms were related to their illness) were more likely to endorse
greater chronicity/cyclicality and believe in worse consequences. This hypothesis intuitively
makes sense, and there is now strong, collective evidence across multiple studies to support both
the claim and the associations between these dimensions.
Various studies have found a relationship between the second subset of dimensions and
psychological well-being, vitality, and greater social functioning. It was originally theorized that
those who had a stronger belief in control over their illness would be more engaged, better able
to plan, and ultimately, better able to cope with the illness (Hager & Orbell, 2003; Moss-Morris
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et al., 1996). However, subsequent changes to the IPQ divided the control dimension into two
components – belief in personal control over illness and belief that treatment course determines
the outcome – allowing for a more nuanced understanding about the nature of control as it relates
to function.
Results from this study showed that both personal control and treatment control were
related to outcome. Rather than a stronger belief in personal control, it seems that the process of
ascribing a locus of control either to oneself or one’s treatment may be related to better
adjustment outcomes. This is congruent with Taylor’s (1983) theory of cognitive adaptation to
illness in which making an attribution for one’s cancer – any attribution – was related to better
adjustment.
Moreover, this finding occurs regardless of whether or not an individual is engaged in
active treatment, in contrast to some other studies (Rozema et al., 2009). In fact, being in active
treatment was related to four dimensions of illness representations – stronger illness identity,
greater belief that the illness is either chronic or cyclical, and greater belief in consequences
arising from the illness – and these four dimensions are generally related to greater distress and
less growth (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). Yet there were no direct or indirect relationships between
being in active treatment and measures of adjustment and growth. This reinforces the notion that
this population faces unique and complicated challenges that are not fully understood and defy
simple categorization (Holland, 2002; Jacobsen & Andrykowski, 2015).
Overwhelmingly, research has established that self-generated feelings of control (i.e.,
personal control) are related to better adjustment to illness in a cancer population (Osowiecki &
Compass, 1998; Taylor, Helgeson, Reed, & Skokan, 1991; Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984);
however, this finding comes with a few caveats: The cross-sectional nature of research –
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including this study – makes it difficult to find causality, and there is no consensus about
whether the attribution of control is directly related to outcomes or whether the relationship is
moderated by circumstantial factors (e.g. illness severity, prognosis, etc.).
Furthermore, research has found considerable disagreement about whether internal or
external attributions of control are more beneficial for psychological adjustment to illness
(Andrykowski & Brady, 1994). Taylor et al., (1991) theorize that vicarious control, a belief in
powerful others who have the ability to control difficult events in a individual’s life, may be akin
to personal control in terms of benefits. For those with cancer, this may be equivalent to belief in
the medical establishment’s ability to treat the illness (i.e., treatment control). However,
prognosis may play a large role in whether vicarious control is related to greater adjustment,
meaning those with a poor prognosis do not benefit from this kind of control. Put simply and
bluntly, vicarious control only “may be adaptive only when there is, in fact, something that can
be controlled” (Taylor et al., 1991, p. 106).
Taylor et al.’s (1991) belief that control over illness and illness severity are linked is
supported by findings in the current study. A factor analysis of illness representations generated
the variable Control Over Illness, comprised of the dimensions of personal control, treatment
control, and timeline (acute/chronic, reversed). Here, the timeline dimension may serve as a
proxy for either illness severity or prognosis, though it is noteworthy that one’s beliefs do not
have to match the actual survival rates for a particular type of cancer. Thus, individuals with
greater attributions of control, either in self or in the course of treatment, and those who believe
that their illness is more likely to be acute (shorter in duration) are those with greater Control
Over Illness, and those who are more likely to have better adjustment outcomes.
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Locating emotions and meta-cognitions. Though the dimensions of emotional
representations and illness coherence were not measured in early studies, there are reasons to
believe that they have always played an important role in the ways that individuals conceive of
their illness. For example, in a chronic fatigue syndrome population, the first subset of
dimensions (not accounting for emotional representations) has been associated with greater
venting of emotions, perhaps long serving as a proxy for this latent dimension; similarly, the
second subset of dimensions (not accounting for illness coherence) has long been associated with
cognitive reappraisal and planning (Moss-Morris et al., 1996).
The meta-analysis (and most early studies) does not fully account for variables that
consider the emotional pathway of the common sense model (CSM; Leventhal et al., 2012) or
meta-cognitions of illness. This study, by contrast, illustrates how emotional and meta-cognitive
variables may fit into the model. Results from the study showed that one subset of illness
representations consisted of both cognitive variables (except for the control dimensions) and an
emotional component; the second subset consisted of the control dimension as well as the metacognitive component.
The fact that these cognitive and emotional constituents are found side-by-side in these
groupings supports Leventhal et al.’s (2012) original schema, giving additional support to the
idea that the CSM is a dual-processing model that simultaneously handles both cognitive and
emotional streams of information. Furthermore, a search for latent variables through factor
analysis established the dimension of Illness Impact, where cognitive and emotional
representations work in tandem to explain the multiple ways cancer impacts individuals.
Future work on illness representations. It now seems established that illness
representations are deeply connected to various measures of adjustment and well-being among
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individuals coping with serious illness. Thus, they provide a provocative area of research when
thinking about ways to affect change in those with illnesses. Yet, much work remains to be done
to understand how people arrive at particular representations of their illness, whether these
representations are stable or mutable, and whether particular interventions can change individual
representations. Furthermore, it is unclear what mediators and moderators may affect the links
between illness representations and these outcomes.
Determining to what extent the processes of emotional venting and cognitive reappraisal
can be attributed to the dimensions of emotional representations and illness coherence is a
meaningful area for future study. It is worthwhile continuing to understand to what extent
emotions serve as a proxy for those representations which cannot be easily quantified, such as
unconscious beliefs or fantasies, and how these representations can be best understood and
measured.
Thinking Styles: Two Roads Diverge
Differing pathways. Results indicated that individuals use both experiential (System 1)
thinking and rational (System 2) thinking when making sense of their cancer. These thinking
styles are orthogonal, such that it is possible for individuals to use more or less of either or both
types of thinking at any given time (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This conception of thinking styles
fits precisely within the framework of the CSM, where cognitive and emotional streams are
processed independently but concurrently (Leventhal et al., 2012).
More provocatively, the results suggest that the ways individuals make sense of their
illness differ for those who use either more System 1 or System 2 thinking. Though it was
originally hypothesized that those who rely more heavily on System 1 thinking would have a
more difficult time adjusting to their cancer, the data did not support the claim. Instead, System 1
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thinkers found other ways to make sense of their illness that did not necessarily rely on cognitive
appraisals or rationalization.
System 1 thinking was associated with greater post-traumatic growth. This suggests that
those who rely more on feelings and intuition may be better able to grow after experiencing
difficult circumstances. Conversely, those who have greater adjustment following trauma might
be better able to access their feelings and intuitions. Only longitudinal data can untangle this.
Among those with cancer, System 1 thinking was also related to several outcome
measures of adjustment including depression, cancer-related distress and post-traumatic growth,
through indirect pathways. For System 1 thinkers, the pathway from thinking style to adjustment
was mediated by Control Over Illness. This collection of representations is comprised of
dimensions that attribute a locus of control either to oneself or to the course of treatment and are
associated with a stronger belief in the acuity of one’s illness.
According to the CSM, those who utilize higher levels of System 1 thinking find ways to
cope by believing that either they or their treatment will affect the outcome of their illness and by
believing that their illness will not last for a long time. At times, this method of coping may share
much in common with the defensive strategy of denial. Yet, one could hypothesize that, given
the severity of the diagnosis, denial could indeed support a greater sense of hope, activity,
personal control, and less overt distress, all of which could be highly beneficial. It should be
noted that those who utilized greater levels of System 1 thinking in this study did not report
fewer depression or less cancer-related distress than those who utilized greater levels of System 2
thinking. That is, forming these particular illness representations was not more beneficial than
any other method of processing utilized by those who relied more heavily on System 2 thinking.
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Perhaps forming these representations is the way that System 1 thinkers with cancer deal with
their illness as best they can.
System 2 thinking was directly associated with lower levels of depressive symptoms,
suggesting that the act of thinking rationally and logically about one’s cancer may help people
feel better about their illness; however, because the data are cross-sectional, it is also possible
that those who are less depressed were more likely to exhibit greater levels System 2 thinking.
Theory suggests that being more depressed may make it harder to process things cognitively, as
System 2 processing requires greater cognitive abilities than the more elemental and intuitive
System 1 processing (Peters et al., 2008; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). It follows then that less
stress on cognitive systems – such as when one feels less depressed – may allow a person to
better utilize their System 2 processing systems. Leventhal et al. (2012) suggests that both
scenarios may be correct, and that the process of adjustment is both multidirectional and
recursive. It is worth noting that System 2 thinking was not directly or indirectly related to the
other outcomes of cancer-specific distress, body image, or post-traumatic growth. These findings
may be in part attributable to the preponderance of globally-focused, overtly emotion-based
items on the measures; those who utilize greater System 2 thinking may be less likely to endorse
these items under any circumstances. More broadly, the findings imply that the multiple
processes of coping occur along many different paths in multiple ways, and that System 2
thinking may only play a limited, if meaningful, role in some forms of adjustment.
Strikingly, the differences in System 1 and System 2 thinking could be detected in
individuals’ drawings of their cancer. Those findings suggest that unconscious processes play a
role in the formation and development of illness representations. Greater System 1 thinking was
associated with drawings that were more abstract, used fewer words, and were less likely to
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depict people (and consequently faces and bodies). Despite these commonalities, abstract
drawings took myriad forms. They were small and large, were generally colorless or included
wide swaths of color, depicted single and multiple shapes, and connected those objects through
links or left them separated. These findings are in keeping with commonly-held stereotypes
about the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinkers (see Evans & Over, 1996;
Epstein, 1994; Goel, 1995; Shafir & LeBouf, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
In this study, System 1 thinkers were less likely to rationalize their illness by symbolizing it in
words or making metaphors of it through text or drawings. They were less likely to tether their
conceptions of their illness to concrete objects like people, places, and things; and they were
more likely to draw abstract shapes or even formless colors that somehow personally and
provocatively represented their illnesses. Greater utilization of System 1 thinking did not prevent
individuals from making sense of their illness.
All roads lead to Rome. As hypothesized, illness representations were associated with
positive and negative adjustment outcomes. This suggests that individuals may have multiple
ways of understanding – some that are more personal and others that are shared. Some survivors
may use words or pictures as metaphors to describe their cancer, while others rely on feelings
and abstractions. Sontag’s exhaustive catalog of metaphors may have limits, as some patients
may not rely on metaphors at all to make sense of their illnesses; study results suggest they may
make meaning in ways that cannot be described in words or images. If this discussion is to be
answered definitively, more work will need to be done to find precise ways to assess metaphor
more fully.
At first it may seem contradictory that, although there appears to be a widely-held,
common understanding of cancer among those who have been diagnosed with the illness, those
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with cancer nonetheless seek to understand their illness using dramatically different methods.
Perhaps the adage that all roads lead to Rome applies here: Although individuals may make sense
of their cancer uniquely and personally, they ultimately arrive some level of shared
understanding, and consequently some common illness representations. Though the process of
adjusting to cancer is overwhelmingly difficult for all, those with differing thinking styles utilize
distinct methods in order to adjust to their illness. Despite those differences, these strategies,
both directly and indirectly related to measures of coping, are equally effective (or ineffective, as
the case may be) for both groups. Perhaps it is better said that all roads lead to Rome, even if
some have to ascend mountains to get there. Future research aimed at interventions designed to
help individuals deal with their illness should be conscious of the cancer population’s
heterogeneity, not only in terms of its symptoms and treatment, but also in terms of thinking
styles and illness representations.
Study Limitations
Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened
Into the rose-garden (Eliot, 1943, p. 3).
In his Four Quartets, T.S. Eliot reminds readers and researchers of what might have
come to fruition had a different path been followed. Such regrets are true even with research, and
over the course of several years, the myriad decisions made while studying the ways individuals
with cancer think about their illness offer no exception. Limitations exist in both the study’s
sample and constructs.
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First, the study data were collected at one time. Therefore, it is impossible to determine
directionality of causal relationships between styles of thinking, illness representations and
adjustment. The decision to have individuals draw their cancer both at the time of diagnosis and
in the present attempts to mitigate this limitation in one instance, but even that measure only
roughly imagines and approximates the passage of time. Furthermore, when assessing constructs
like thinking style and illness representations, it is impossible to know whether these traits are
relatively stable (as hypothesized) or more amorphous and mutable, and what biological,
psychological, or social circumstances, if any, may bring about changes.
A second limitation involves the generalizability of the findings. A decision was made to
include as wide a range of individuals with cancer as possible – young and old, male and female,
rich and poor, etc. Doing so provides answers to particular questions about the population at
large, but at the cost of specificity. The sample was limited by the number of individuals who
had any particular type of cancer, so comparisons between cancer types were impossible.
Similarly, the subsamples weren’t large enough to examine the hypotheses for any single type.
Despite efforts to be as inclusive as possible, the sample is nonetheless homogenous –
largely female, white, younger, Christian (including Catholic), heterosexual, and well-educated.
This specificity limits the validity of findings to a general population. These results are likely a
consequence of recruitment through an online support organization. In general, younger, white
women are more likely to seek support online (Im et al., 2007), and these attributes likely extend
to online support communities and social networks (Owen et al., 2010; Owen, Bantum, Gorlick,
& Stanton, 2015). Because the recruitment source, Stupid Cancer, brands itself as providing a
community for young people with cancer, the population might have been even younger than
what was typically anticipated for online recruitment. The decision to recruit a younger sample
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of adults who may be more distressed, given that their cancer is an “off-time” event (Revenson et
al., 2013; Stanton et al., 2007) further limits generalizability across the lifespan.
A third limitation was the failure to ask individuals whether or not they had or were
undergoing surgery for their illness; this was nothing more than an error made in adapting some
questions, but a critical one in light of this study’s central hypotheses. Taking into account
surgery status might have yielded important insights about illness representations, cancer-related
distress, and body image in both quantitative and drawing measures. Surgery often results in
removal of the cancer, or at least a concrete symbol of the cancer, which could have affected
System 1 and 2 thinking, illness representations, and outcomes Those participants who were in
active treatment had different illness representations from those who were not. While few might
have considered surgery as active treatment, it may have shaped illness representations. The
active treatment variable in this study, however, does tell us about those undergoing adjuvant
treatment (chemotherapy or radiation) for their cancer and, as such, is valuable.
Finally, the multi-dimensional structure of several of the variables in the model –
specifically, the eight measurable dimensions of illness representations – and the finding that the
mediated effect size was small (rather than small-to-medium, as hypothesized) made it difficult
to maintain adequate statistical power throughout the study. Though every effort was made to
increase power by gathering data from a sufficiently large sample size and combining multiple
variables into single factors where conceptually and theoretically appropriate, nonetheless, the
possibility of type I errors persists. Hypotheses involving the mediated model were unable to
withstand tests designed to correct for family-wise error (e.g. Benjamini, Krieger, & Yekutieli,
2006), so these results should be thought of as exploratory rather than definitive.
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Concluding Thoughts
This dissertation began with a belief that a clearer understanding of cancer could help
everyone in the cancer community – patients, family, friends, and doctors, among others – better
appreciate, speak about, respond to, and treat those in need. The aim is as simple to comprehend
as the realization of that goal is difficult. It has been long known that cancer is often cryptic,
inscrutable and enigmatic. Doctors, philosophers, and writers have all made attempts to make
sense of it, and despite their inevitable failures at simplification and clarification, the aim
rightfully persists.
Results from this dissertation get at some of these core difficulties, as they establish two,
sometimes contradictory lines of thinking. On one hand, cancer can be an immensely personal,
lonely, isolating, disruptive, perspective-shattering experience. There is no one who quite has the
same understanding of cancer as any one individual, and that makes comparisons between
individuals with cancer impossible. With this in mind, it seems important for those in the
community to be open to multiple interpretations and understandings, to appreciate the viewpoint
of the individual, and to make every effort to empathize with views that are different from our
own beliefs.
On the other hand, cancer can be understood collectively, regardless of the particular
form that it takes or the individual whom it strikes. According to this line of thinking, cancer is
bigger than any individual representation of it, and there is strength and hope that may be gained
from shared understanding. Consequently, the medical establishment should rightfully wonder
why those with particular forms of cancer are seen in different hospital wings, and why those
facing similar struggles are intentionally cordoned off from one another. Likewise, future
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research should consider the costs and benefits of studying the whole population rather than
those with any particular form of cancer.
Sontag also aimed to understand cancer to relieve suffering (Sontag, 1978). She hoped
that an inventory of metaphors could demystify the illness, so that metaphors would no longer be
necessary and that cancer could then be spoken of directly (Clow, 2001). This approach, while
noble, seems myopic and fundamentally limiting of the role of metaphor; nonetheless, her
shortcoming is indicative of a more widely-held misunderstanding (and one which is sometimes
even shared in this study): the belief that the ultimate reason for understanding cancer is to
decrease pain and increase happiness for those in need. What if instead, the goal is not in finding
a single correct interpretation or quantifying the illness into understandable dimensions, but
instead in appreciating the process of meaning-making? As Viktor Frankl eloquently states in his
holocaust memoir, Man’s Search for Meaning, “Man’s main concern is not to gain pleasure or to
avoid pain but rather to see a meaning in his life” (Frankl, 1962, p. 136). That is, making
meaning of cancer, either personally or collectively, is fundamental to the experience of having
cancer. As an end in itself, meaning making is essential to our humanity and to the experience of
what it means to be alive. This meaning can be found in metaphorical words, symbolic drawings,
a measure of post-traumatic growth or other sources. It can be found in thoughts and feelings, in
processes conscious and unconscious, that are much more difficult to symbolize but are equally
valid. While beautiful in its richness and variety, what we think cancer looks like – the way we
see it, draw it, think about it, or feel it – may be relatively unimportant; yet, our ability to fathom
it at all is nothing short of incredible.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Illness Representation
Illness Representation

Mean

Median

SD

Possible Range

Actual Range

Cronbach’s α

6.36

6.00

3.74

0-14

0-14

--a

Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

19.60

20.00

6.66

6-30

6-30

.92

Timeline (Cyclical)

11.61

12.00

3.71

4-20

4-20

.77

Consequences

24.84

25.00

3.96

6-30

6-30

.80

Personal Control

19.78

20.00

4.50

6-30

7-30

.82

Treatment Control

17.49

18.00

3.65

5-25

5-25

.76

Illness Coherence

18.52

19.00

4.45

5-25

5-25

.86

Emotional Representations

21.85

23.00

5.23

6-30

6-30

.89

Illness Identity

Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions
Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater
endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness
representation.
a
Cronbach’s α can not be calculated for the “Illness Identity” dimension, as it is derived from the sum of endorsed
items.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Thinking Style
Thinking Style
System 1 Thinking

Mean

Median

SD

Possible Range

Actual Range

Cronbach’s α

3.62

3.65

0.57

1-5

1.85-4.95

.89

Experiential Abilities

3.65

3.70

0.60

1-5

1.80-5.00

.88

Experiential Engagement

3.59

3.70

0.61

1-5

1.60-5.00

.86

System 2 Thinking

3.87

3.90

0.55

1-5

2.10-5.00

.92

Rational Abilities

3.89

3.90

0.59

1-5

1.80-5.00

.83

Rational Engagement

3.85

3.80

0.62

1-5

1.60-5.00

.84

Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40).
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Psychological Functioning
Psychological Functioning

Mean

Median

SD

Possible Range

Actual Range

Cronbach’s α

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

20.06

18.00

12.38

0 - 60

1 - 56

.92

IES-R Cancer Related Distress

27.04

25.00

16.93

0 - 88

0 - 80

.93

Intrusion

1.37

1.25

0.92

0-4

0-4

.88

Avoidance

1.17

1.00

0.77

0-4

0 - 3.75

.80

Hyperarousal

1.12

1.00

0.95

0-4

0-4

.85

2.76

3.00

0.95

1-4

1-4

.87

30.52

31.00

11.59

0 - 50

0 - 50

.89

EORTC Body Image
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

Note. n = 305 for all analyses. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event
Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic
Growth Inventory – Short Form.
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Table 4
Participant Demographic Characteristics
Characteristic

n

%

Age (n = 298, M = 35.08, SD = 9.37,
Range = 20 - 63)
Gender (n = 305)
Female

264

86.6

Male

41

13.4

269

88.5

Latino

7

2.3

Black or African American

8

2.6

Asian or Pacific Islander

5

1.6

Multi-ethnic or Other

15

4.9

Heterosexual

274

89.8

Bisexual

20

3.6

Homosexual

11

6.6

Married or Long-term Partner

151

49.5

Single

131

43.0

Divorced

18

5.9

Separated

3

1.0

Widowed

2

0.7

None

193

64.3

1

47

15.7

2

40

13.3

3

13

4.3

4

5

1.7

≥5

2

0.6

Ethnicity (n = 304)
White/Caucasian

Sexual Orientation (n = 305)

Relationship Status (n = 305)

Children (n = 300)
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Table 4
Participant Demographic Characteristics (Continued)
Characteristic

n

%

Religion (n = 301)
Christian (incl. Catholic)

182

60.5

Atheist or Agnostic

95

31.6

Jewish

13

4.3

Other

11

3.7

Employed

177

58.0

On Medical Leave/Disability

59

19.3

Student

30

9.8

Keeping House (Unpaid)

15

4.9

Seeking Work

15

4.9

Retired

4

1.3

Unemployed

4

1.3

< $25,000

76

25.9

$25,000-49,999

64

21.7

$50,000-74,999

58

19.7

$75,000-99,999

38

13.0

$100,000-149,999

40

13.6

> $150,000

18

6.1

Some High School or Less

1

0.3

High School Graduate or GED

15

4.9

Vocational College or Some College

62

20.3

College Degree

120

39.3

Professional or Graduate Degree

107

35.1

Employment Status (n = 304)

Total Family Income (n = 294)

Highest Level of Education (n = 305)
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Table 5
Participant Medical Characteristics
Characteristic

n

%

Currently have a mass/tumor

59

19.9

Had a mass/tumor (in the past)

192

64.9

Never had a mass/tumor

45

15.2

Yes

243

79.7

No

62

20.3

Yes

139

45.6

No

166

54.4

Yes

19

6.2

No

286

93.8

Yes

71

23.3

No

234

76.7

Time Since Diagnosis (n = 304, M = 52.35,
SD = 63.74, Range = 3- 410)
Masses or Tumors (n = 294)

Had Chemotherapy (n = 305)

Had Radiation (n = 305)

Had a Transplant (n = 305)

In Active Treatment (n = 305)
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Table 6
Participants by Cancer Site
Cancer Type (n = 305)
Breast

n

%

65

21.3

Lymphoma

16.7

Hodgkin’s Lymphoma

36

11.8

Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma

15

4.9

Genital System

12.8

Ovary

20

6.6

Uterine Cervix/Corpus

9

3.0

Testis

6

2.0

Prostate

2

0.7

Vagina and Other Genital, Female

2

0.7

Leukemia

9.1

Leukemia (Acute Lymphocytic; ALL)

14

4.6

Leukemia (Acute Myeloid; AML)

11

3.6

Leukemia (Chronic Lymphocytic; CLL)

2

0.7

Leukemia (Chronic Lymphocytic; CLL)

1

.3

Endocrine System

7.5

Thyroid

17

5.6

Other Endocrine

6

2.0

Digestive System

6.2

Colon

13

4.3

Anus, Anal Canal, Anorectum, Rectum

3

1.0

Pancreas

3

1.0

Brain and Other Nervous System

11

3.6

Melanoma

10

3.3

Soft Tissue (Including Heart)

9

3.0

Urinary System

2.6

Kidney and Renal Pelvis

7

2.3

Bladder

1

0.3
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Table 6
Participants by Cancer Site (Continued)
Cancer Type (n = 305)

n

%

Myeloma

6

2.0

Bones and Joints

5

1.6

Lung and Bronchus

4

1.3

Oral

0.6

Mouth

1

0.3

Pharynx

1

0.3

24

8.2

Multiple; Other

Table 7
Correlations Between Continuous Demographic Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles
Age
(n = 298)

# of Children
(n = 300)

Education
(n = 305)

Income
(n = 294)

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

.07

-.06

-.07

-.21***

IES-R Cancer Related Distress

-.10

-.04

-.01

-.09

EORTC Body Image

-.07

.00

-.02

-.04

PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

-.08

.06

-.02

-.03

.04

.01

-.04

.06

.01

-.07

-.04

.00

.04

-.12*

Consequences

.04

.13*

-.04

-.08

Personal Control

.01

.05

.01

.01

Treatment Control

-.10

-.01

.04

.11†

Illness Coherence

.06

.05

-.02

.12*

-.05

.01

.10

.00

System 1 Thinking

-.02

.11*

-.06

-.12*

System 2 Thinking

.00

-.13*

Psychological Functioning

Illness Representations
Illness Identity
Timeline (Acute/Chronic)
Timeline (Cyclical)

Emotional Representations

.00
.20

***

Thinking Style
.32***

.18**
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Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. Illness representations
were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher
raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness
representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40).
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.

Table 8
Associations Between Categorical Demographic Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles
Gender
(n = 305)

Ethnicity
(n = 304)

Sexual Orientation
(n = 305)

Marital Status
(n = 305)

Parent Status
(n = 300)

Religiona
(n = 301)

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

-1.79†

-1.32

-1.26

-2.03*

-0.58

0.09

IES-R Cancer Related Distress

-0.84

-0.94

-1.26

-0.62

0.21

0.64

1.13

-0.25

-1.64

-0.00

0.43

0.53

1.23

11.99***

-0.27

1.43

1.21

1.55

-0.58

0.16

Psychological Functioning

EORTC Body Image
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

0.29

-0.29

0.52

1.93

0.53

1.41

-2.58*

†

Illness Representations
Illness Identity
Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

1.11

0.57

1.09

-2.79

**
*

-1.66

0.30
†

Timeline (Cyclical)

0.16

-0.27

-2.07

Consequences

0.33

0.66

-2.28*

1.27

2.08

0.82

Personal Control

-1.51

-0.31

0.01

0.99

0.98

0.87

Treatment Control

-0.82

0.73

2.24*

-0.08

-0.49

0.13

Illness Coherence

0.16

1.49

0.39

0.11

0.81

0.14

-0.17

-0.66

-1.60

0.69

1.16

0.34

0.11

0.18

-1.05

-0.24

1.55

Emotional Representations
Thinking Style
System 1 Thinking
System 2 Thinking

0.68

-0.48

-0.98

-0.73

-2.52

1.44
*

1.53
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Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. Illness representations
were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),”
higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic
illness representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40).
a
Coefficients for “Ethnicity,” are F values; all other coefficients are student’s t values.
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.

Table 9
Correlations Between Continuous Medical Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles
Time Since Diagnosis
(n = 304)

Survivability %
(n = 281)

Psychological Functioning
CES-D Depressive Symptoms

-.06

-.04

IES-R Cancer Related Distress

-.22***

-.06

EORTC Body Image

-.13*

.00

.01

-.10

-.04

-.04

.02

-.08

Timeline (Cyclical)

-.03

.02

Consequences

-.14*

-.08

Personal Control

-.05

.08

Treatment Control

-.14*

.04

Illness Coherence

-.03

.12†

Emotional Representations

-.08

-.05

System 1 Thinking

-.09

.00

System 2 Thinking

.06

-.01

PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth
Illness Representations
Illness Identity
Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

Thinking Style
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Note. Survivability calculated by matching participants by gender and cancer site with National Cancer Institute Surveillance, Epidemiology
and End Results (SEER) survivability statistics. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale
– Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short
Form. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline
(Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a
more chronic illness representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40).
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.

Table 10
Associations between Categorical Medical Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles
Mass/Tumor
(n = 294)

Had Chemotherapy
(n = 305)

Had Radiation
(n = 305)

Had Transplant
(n = 305)

In Active Treatment
(n = 305)

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

-0.55

-0.15

0.83

0.59

0.85

IES-R Cancer Related Distress

-0.96

-1.34

0.10

0.22

Psychological Functioning

EORTC Body Image

-0.78

2.36

PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

-1.17

0.27

*

0.78
†

1.75†

0.53

1.66

0.59

-0.21

0.10

0.55

1.88†

0.52

1.21

2.57*

Illness Representations
Illness Identity
Timeline (Acute/Chronic)
Timeline (Cyclical)

-1.06

-1.14

0.20

0.51

2.78**

1.25

1.30

1.79†

0.27

2.95**

3.15**

0.75

1.28

3.78***

-0.49

0.20

-0.81

1.05

0.90

-0.06

-0.12

-0.19

Consequences

-0.46

Personal Control

-0.58
*

Treatment Control

-2.00

Illness Coherence

1.24

0.64

1.25

-0.78

0.88

Emotional Representations

0.39

0.28

0.10

-0.50

-0.27

System 1 Thinking

-1.07

-0.17

-1.48

0.07

-0.75

System 2 Thinking

0.87

0.44

-0.53

0.92

-0.68

Thinking Style
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Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. Illness representations
were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher
raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness
representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40).

†

= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.

Table 11
Differences Between Those With and Without a Self-Reported Tumor or Mass on Psychological Functioning
Psychological Functioning

Tumor Status
No Mass/Tumor
Mass/Tumor

t

df

p

95% CI
LL
UL

Cohen’s d

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

21.00 (11.73)

19.90 (12.50)

-0.55

303

.58

-5.04

2.84

-0.09

IES-R Cancer-Related Distress

29.30 (17.24)

26.66 (16.88)

-0.96

299

.34

-0.37

0.13

-0.15

1.39 (0.92)

1.36 (0.92)

-0.18

301

.86

-0.32

0.27

-0.03

-0.47

0.02

-0.27

Intrusion

†

Avoidance

1.35 (0.90)

1.13 (0.74)

-1.77

300

.08

Hyperarousal

1.22 (0.95)

1.10 (0.95)

-0.77

300

.44

-0.42

0.19

-0.13

2.86 (1.03)

2.74 (0.94)

-0.78

303

.44

-0.42

0.28

-0.12

32.38 (12.72)

30.20 (11.38)

-1.17

303

.24

-5.86

1.50

-0.18

EORTC Body Image
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

Note. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event
Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory –
Short Form. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
†
= p ≤ .10.
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Table 12
Differences Among Those Without a Tumor, With a Mass, and With a Tumor on Psychological Functioning

Psychological Functioning

Tumor Status
Leukemia/Myeloma
Lymphoma
(No Tumor)
(Mass)

Other
(Tumor)

F

df

p

η2

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

20.03 (12.15)

20.23 (10.86)

19.98 (12.99)

0.36

2, 282

.70

.00

IES-R Cancer-Related Distress

29.87 (18.75)

25.40 (16.56)

27.13 (17.00)

0.65

2, 278

.52

.00

Intrusion

1.38 (0.90)

1.31 (0.93)

1.38 (0.92)

0.12

2, 280

.88

.00

Avoidance

1.34 (1.01)

1.02 (0.62)

1.16 (0.76)

1.63

2, 279

.20

.01

Hyperarousal

1.36 (1.05)

1.12 (0.93)

1.11 (0.96)

0.87

2, 279

.42

.01

3.03 (0.99)

2.69 (0.89)

2.76 (0.94)

1.40

2, 282

.25

.01

32.77 (12.16)

28.58 (11.53)

30.75 (11.24)

1.41

2, 282

.25

.01

EORTC Body Image
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

Note. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event
Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory –
Short Form.
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Table 13
Correlations between Thinking Styles and Psychological Functioning
Thinking Style
Psychological Functioning

System 1

System 2

-.08

-.15**

-.15**

-.08

-.01

-.03

Intrusion

.00

-.01

Avoidance

-.04

-.02

.01

-.06

EORTC Body Image

.04

.02

PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

.27***

CES-D Depressive Symptoms
CES-D Depression Cutoff (>16)
IES-R Cancer-Related Distress

Hyperarousal

-.02

Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Thinking Style measured by the Rational Experiential
Inventory (REI-40). CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IESR = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research
and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form.
**
= p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001

108

Table 14
Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Depressive Symptoms
System 1 Thinking

Low

System 2 Thinking
n
High

n

Low

22.59 (12.97)

79

19.36 (11.44)

73

High

20.73 (12.97)

71

17.67 (11.76)

82

F

η2

df

p

1, 301

0.21

Main effects and interaction on depressive symptoms.
System 1 Thinking

1.58

*

System 2 Thinking

4.98

1, 301

0.03

System 1*System 2

0.00

1, 301

0.95

.00
.02
.00

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI40). Depressive symptoms measured by the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D).
*
= p ≤ .05
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Table 15
Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Cancer-Related Distress
System 1 Thinking

Low

System 2 Thinking
n
High

n

Low

28.15 (18.61)

79

26.25 (15.26)

71

High

26.84 (17.18)

70

26.83 (16.62)

81

F

df

p

η2

Main effects and interaction on cancer-related distress.
System 1 Thinking

0.04

1, 297

0.85

.00

System 2 Thinking

0.24

1, 297

0.63

.00

System 1*System 2

0.23

1, 297

0.63

.00

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI40). Cancer-related distress measured by the Impact of Event Scale – Revised (IES-R).

110

Table 16
Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Body Image
System 1 Thinking

Low

System 2 Thinking
n
High

n

Low

2.71 (0.95)

79

2.72 (0.94)

73

High

2.73 (0.96)

71

2.85 (0.96)

82

F

df

p

η2

Main effects and interaction on body image.
System 1 Thinking

0.43

1, 301

0.51

.00

System 2 Thinking

0.36

1, 301

0.55

.00

System 1*System 2

0.23

1, 301

0.63

.00

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI40). Body image measured by the European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer (EORTC) Body
Image Module.
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Table 17
Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Post-Traumatic Growth
System 1 Thinking

Low

System 2 Thinking
n
High

n

Low

27.49 (11.58)

79

28.04 (11.45)

73

High

33.21 (10.33)

71

33.30 (11.73)

82

F

df

p

η2

Main effects and interaction on post-traumatic growth.
System 1 Thinking

17.91

1, 301

0.00***

.06

System 2 Thinking

0.06

1, 301

0.80

.00

System 1*System 2

0.03

1, 301

0.86

.00

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI40). Post-traumatic growth measured by the PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form (PTGI-SF).
***
= p ≤ .001
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Table 18
Correlations Between Illness Representations and Measures of Psychological Functioning
Illness Representations

Psychological Functioning

Illness
Identity

Timeline
(Acute/
Chronic)

Timeline
(Cyclical)

Consequences

Personal
Control

Treatment
Control

Illness
Coherence

Emotional
Representations

CES-D Depressive Symptoms

.22***

.27***

.16**

.31***

-.24***

-.30***

-.37***

.56***

IES-R Cancer-Related Distress

.21***

.21***

.19***

.26***

-.16**

-.17***

-.33***

.60***

Intrusion

.20***

.18***

.20***

.29***

-.19***

-.20***

-.31***

.58***

Avoidance

.11†

.16**

.09

.11†

-.09

-.53

-.23***

.45***

Hyperarousal

.25***

.22***

.21***

.26***

-.13*

-.19***

-.32***

.56***

EORTC Body Image

.24***

.13*

.19***

.33***

-.13*

-.17**

-.12†

.37***

PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth

.03

-.14*

-.03

.05

.28***

.21***

.11*

-.07

Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ
dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline
(Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness representation. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression
Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF =
Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form.
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.
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Table 19
Differences Between Those With and Without a Self-Reported Tumor or Mass on Thinking Styles
Thinking Style
System 1 Thinking

Tumor Status
No Mass/Tumor
Mass/Tumor

t

df

p

95% CI
LL
UL

Cohen’s d

3.70 (0.53)

3.60 (0.57)

-1.07

303

0.28

-0.28

0.82

-0.18

Experiential Abilities

3.73 (0.58)

3.63 (0.60)

-1.01

303

0.31

-0.29

0.93

-0.17

Experiential Engagement

3.67 (0.54)

3.57 (0.62)

-1.00

303

0.32

-0.29

0.95

-0.17

System 2 Thinking

3.81 (0.43)

3.87 (0.57)

0.72

302

0.47

-0.11

0.24

0.12

Rational Abilities

3.85 (0.48)

3.89 (0.60)

0.48

302

0.63

-0.14

0.23

0.07

Rational Engagement

3.78 (0.54)

3.86 (0.64)

0.81

303

0.42

-0.12

0.28

0.14

Note. n = 305 for all results. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential
Inventory (REI-40). CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 20
Differences Among Those Without a Tumor, With a Mass, and With a Tumor on Thinking Style

Thinking Style
System 1 Thinking

Tumor Status
Leukemia/Myeloma Lymphoma
(No Tumor)
(Mass)

Other
(Tumor)

F

df

p

η2

3.71 (0.60)

3.53 (0.56)

3.62 (0.58)

1.02

2, 282

0.36

.01

Experiential Abilities

3.72 (0.64)

3.58 (0.56)

3.65 (0.62)

0.54

2, 282

0.58

.00

Experiential Engagement

3.71 (0.58)

3.48 (0.63)

3.60 (0.62)

1.35

2, 282

0.26

.01

System 2 Thinking

3.83 (0.41)

3.86 (0.52)

3.87 (0.58)

0.10

2, 281

0.91

.00

Rational Abilities

3.86 (0.49)

3.85 (0.60)

3.90 (0.60)

0.17

2, 281

0.85

.00

Rational Engagement

3.79 (0.50)

3.88 (0.56)

3.84 (0.65)

0.17

2, 282

0.84

.00

Note. n = 305 for all results. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational
Experiential Inventory (REI-40).
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Table 21
Differences Between Those With and Without a Self-Reported Tumor or Mass on Illness Representations
Illness Representations
Illness Identity

Tumor Status
No Mass/Tumor
Mass/Tumor

t

df

p

95% CI
LL
UL

Cohen’s
d

6.22 (3.94)

6.38 (3.71)

0.27

303

.79

-1.02

1.35

0.04

Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

20.59 (6.36)

19.44 (6.70)

-1.06

302

.29

-3.28

0.98

-0.18

Timeline (Cyclical)

10.96 (3.75)

11.72 (3.70)

1.25

300

.21

-0.44

1.94

0.20

Consequences

25.10 (3.56)

24.80 (4.03)

-0.46

300

.64

-1.57

0.97

-0.08

Personal Control

20.14 (4.48)

19.71 (4.51)

-0.58

300

.57

-1.87

1.02

-0.10

Treatment Control

18.50 (3.08)

17.31 (3.72)

-2.00

301

.05*

-2.35

-0.02

-0.35

Illness Coherence

17.75 (4.19)

18.65 (4.49)

1.24

300

.22

-0.53

2.33

0.21

Emotional Representations

21.56 (5.32)

21.90 (5.22)

0.39

302

.69

-1.34

2.02

0.06

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions
Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of
the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness representation. CI = confidence
interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
*
= p ≤ .05.
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Table 22
Differences Among Those Without a Tumor, With a Mass, and With a Tumor on Illness Representations

Illness Representations
Illness Identity

Tumor Status
Leukemia/Myeloma Lymphoma
(No Tumor)
(Mass)

Other
(Tumor)

F

df

p

η2

5.96 (4.28)

6.47 (3.65)

6.30 (3.73)

0.18

2, 282

.84

.00

Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

19.43 (6.43)

16.68 (6.34)

20.06 (6.65)

5.53

2, 281

.00**

.04

Timeline (Cyclical)

10.54 (4.14)

11.08 (3.67)

11.83 (3.72)

2.03

2, 279

.13

.01

Consequences

25.03 (3.94)

24.55 (3.64)

24.89 (4.17)

0.18

2, 279

.83

.00

Personal Control

19.63 (4.56)

19.36 (3.83)

19.82 (4.72)

0.22

2, 279

.80

.00

Treatment Control

18.77 (3.04)

18.70 (3.05)

16.93 (3.82)

7.19

2, 280

.00***

.05

Illness Coherence

17.13 (3.91)

19.30 (3.90)

18.43 (4.67)

2.22

2, 279

.11

.02

Emotional Representations

21.85 (5.06)

21.35 (5.65)

22.14 (5.14)

0.48

2, 281

.62

.00

Post-Hoca

Leuk > Lymph; Other > Lymph

Leuk > Other; Lymph > Other

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Illness Representations measured by the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ); all IPQ
dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic)”, higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),”
higher scores indicate a more chronic illness representation. Post-hoc analyses were conducted using Tukey’s HSD; differences indicated where p
≤ .05.
a
Post-hoc comparisons using LSD (p ≤ .05).
**
= p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.
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Table 23
Correlations Between Thinking Style and Illness Representations
Thinking Style
Illness Representations
Illness Identity

Average

System 1
Abilities Engagement
.10†

.07

Average

System 2
Abilities Engagement

.03

.02

.01

.03

Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

-.07

-.04

-.10†

.04

.03

.05

Timeline (Cyclical)

-.03

-.01

-.05

.01

-.02

.04

.08

.08

.04

.00

.07

-.02

.00

-.04

-.01

.01

-.02

Consequences

.09

Personal Control

.12

Treatment Control

*

**

.08

.15

.13*

.10†

.14*

Illness Coherence

.11

.09

.12*

.18***

Emotional Representations

.01

.01

.01

.03

.15**
-.02

.19***
.08

Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Thinking Style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI40); Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all
IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement
of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness
representation.
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001.
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Table 24
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis of Illness Representation Scales With Oblique Rotation
Illness Representations

Illness Impact

Control Over Illness

Consequences

.72

-.02

Illness Identity

.70

.08

Timeline (Cyclical)

.69

.11

Emotional Representations

.58

-.14

Illness Coherence

-.45

.07

Treatment Control

.01

.87

Personal Control

.10

.80

Timeline (Acute/Chronic)

.17

-.67

Note. Factor loadings > .40 appear in boldface.
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Table 25
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Depressive Symptoms
CES-D Depressive Symptoms
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

Tumor Status (Total Effect)

-0.70

-0.02

2.06

-0.34

.73

Tumor Status (Direct Effect)

-1.39

-0.04

1.72

-0.81

.42

Active Treatment

-0.85

-0.03

1.44

-0.59

.56

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

0.34

0.01

1.00

-1.56

2.41

Control Over Illness

0.34

0.01

0.44

-0.43

1.30

Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 0.39, p = .67, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 26
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Cancer-Related Distress
IES-R Cancer Related Distress
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

Tumor Status (Total Effect)

-2.22

-0.05

2.80

-0.79

.43

Tumor Status (Direct Effect)

-2.89

-0.06

2.42

-1.20

.23

Active Treatment

-1.53

-0.04

2.03

-0.75

.45

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

0.44

0.01

1.39

-2.13

3.36

Control Over Illness

0.23

0.00

0.35

-0.29

1.16

Note. Model: F (2, 294) = 0.55, p = .58, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. IES-R = Impact of Event Scale –
Revised. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 27
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Body Image
EORTC Body Image
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

Tumor Status (Total Effect)

-0.07

-0.03

0.16

-0.46

.64

Tumor Status (Direct Effect)

-0.10

-0.04

0.14

-0.72

.47

Active Treatment

-0.10

0.04

0.12

-0.85

.40

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

0.02

0.01

0.06

-0.09

0.15

Control Over Illness

0.01

0.00

0.02

-0.01

0.06

Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 1.71, p = .18, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. EORTC = European Organisation for
Research and Treatment of Cancer. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 28
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Post-Traumatic Growth
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth
Variable

b

β

SE

t

Tumor Status (Total Effect)

-2.03

-0.02

1.92

-1.05

.29

Tumor Status (Direct Effect)

-1.65

-0.05

-1.86

-0.89

.37

0.91

0.03

1.56

0.58

.56

Active Treatment

p

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact
Control Over Illness

0.01

0.00

0.12

-0.17

0.38

-0.38

0.01

0.48

-1.38

0.55

Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 0.70, p = .50, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth
Inventory – Short Form. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 29
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Depressive Symptoms
CES-D Depressive Symptoms
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 1 Thinking (Total Effect)

-1.71

-0.08

1.26

-1.36

.17

System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect)

-1.26

-0.06

1.06

-1.18

.24

Active Treatment

-0.75

0.02

1.42

-0.52

.60

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact
Control Over Illness

0.16

0.01

0.58

-0.62

-0.03

0.33

<.05

-0.99

1.34

-1.37

-0.06

Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 1.26, p = .28, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression
Scale. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 30
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Cancer-Related Distress
IES-R Cancer Related Distress
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 1 Thinking (Total Effect)

-0.16

0.00

1.73

-0.09

.93

System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect)

-0.10

0.00

1.51

-0.07

.94

Active Treatment

-1.17

-0.03

2.02

-0.58

.56

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

-0.22

0.01

0.83

Control Over Illness

-0.19

-0.02

0.36

<.05

-1.44

1.79

-1.31

-0.04

Note. Model: F (2, 294) = 0.24, p = .79, Adjusted R2 = -0.01. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised. CI = confidence
interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 31
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Body Image
EORTC Body Image
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 1 Thinking (Total Effect)

0.08

0.04

0.10

0.78

.44

System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect)

0.09

0.05

0.09

0.97

.33

Active Treatment

0.12

0.05

0.12

1.00

.32

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact
Control Over Illness

0.01

0.01

0.04

-0.06

0.08

-0.02

0.01

0.02

-0.07

-0.00

Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 1.91, p = .15, Adjusted R2 = 0.01. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). EORTC = European Organisation for Research and
Treatment of Cancer. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 32
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Post-Traumatic Growth
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 1 Thinking (Total Effect)

5.65

0.28

1.14

4.98

.001***

System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect)

5.02

0.25

1.12

4.49

.001***

Active Treatment

1.40

0.05

1.50

0.94

.35

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

0.00

0.00

0.07

Control Over Illness

0.62

0.03

0.35

<.05

-0.14

0.16

0.67

1.47

Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 12.53, p < .001, Adjusted R2 = 0.07. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form.
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
***
= p ≤ .001
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Table 33
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Depressive Symptoms
CES-D Depressive Symptoms
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 2 Thinking (Total Effect)

-3.32

-0.15

1.30

-2.55

.01**

System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect)

-3.25

-0.14

1.08

-3.00

.00**

Active Treatment

-0.88

-0.02

1.41

-0.62

.53

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

-0.26

-0.01

0.63

-1.50

0.95

Control Over Illness

-0.19

-0.01

0.36

-0.46

0.98

Note. Model: F (2, 296) = 3.61, p = .03, Adjusted R2 = 0.02. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression
Scale. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
**
= p ≤ .01.
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Table 34
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Cancer-Related Distress
IES-R Cancer Related Distress
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 2 Thinking (Total Effect)

-0.88

-0.03

1.79

-0.49

.62

System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect)

-0.70

-0.02

1.54

-0.45

.65

Active Treatment

-1.39

-0.03

2.01

-0.69

.49

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact
Control Over Illness

-0.33

0.01

0.90

-2.17

1.38

0.15

0.00

0.30

-0.32

0.94

Note. Model: F (2, 293) = 0.33, p = .72, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised. CI = confidence
interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 35
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Body Image
EORTC Body Image
Variable

b

β

SE

t

p

System 2 Thinking (Total Effect)

0.03

0.02

0.10

0.32

.75

System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect)

0.04

0.02

0.09

0.46

.64

Active Treatment

0.12

0.05

0.12

0.96

.34

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact
Control Over Illness

-0.02

-0.01

0.04

-0.10

0.06

0.00

0.00

0.01

-0.01

-0.05

Note. Model: F (2,296) = 1.66, p = .19, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). EORTC = European Organisation for Research and
Treatment of Cancer. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 36
Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Post-Traumatic Growth
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth
Variable

b

β

SE

t

System 2 Thinking (Total Effect)

-0.53

-0.02

1.23

-0.43

.67

System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect)

-0.32

-0.02

1.19

0.27

.79

1.16

0.04

1.55

0.75

.46

Active Treatment

p

95% CI
LL
UL

Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators.
Illness Impact

-0.01

0.00

0.08

-0.25

0.12

Control Over Illness

-0.21

-0.01

0.40

-1.10

0.52

Note. Model: F (2, 296) = 0.23, p = .79, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form.
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.
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Table 37
Structure Matrix of the Discriminant Function Analysis for Clinical Depression
Independent Variable
Illness Impact

Function
.87

Control Over Illness

-.54

System 1 Thinking

-.23

Active Treatment

.12

Age

.07

Total Family Income

-.05

Gender

-.05

Self-Reported Masses or Tumors

.04

Marital Status

.04

System 2 Thinking

.02

Note. n = 289 for all analyses. Variables in bold were included
after stepwise analysis using Wilkes’ lambda as the selection
rule. Illness Impacts is a combined variable consisting of five
dimensions of illness representation as measured by the Illness
Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ; Consequences, Identity,
Timeline (Cyclical), Emotional Representations, and Illness
Coherence (reversed); Control Over Illness is a combined
variable consisting of three dimensions of illness representation
measured by the IPQ (Treatment Control, Personal Control,
Timeline (Acute/Chronic, reversed)). Thinking style measured
by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40).
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Table 38
Classification Results of Discriminant Function Analysis for Clinical Depression

Actual Group Membership

Predicted Group Membership
Depressed
Not Depressed
(CES-D ≥ 16)
(CES-D < 16)

# of Cases

Depressed (CES-D ≥ 16)

95 (69.9%)

41 (30.1%)

136

Not Depressed (CES-D < 16)

41 (25.0%)

123 (75.0%)

164

Total Cases

300

Note. Depressive symptoms measured using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression Scale (CES-D).
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Table 39
Descriptive Characteristics for Drawings at Time of Diagnosis
Characteristic

n

%

Small

15

17.4

Medium

23

26.7

Large

48

55.8

Drawing contains color

96

97.0

Drawing is black and white

3

3.0

Drawing contains words

51

51.5

Drawing contains no words

48

48.5

Drawing is abstract

30

30.3

Drawing is not abstract

69

69.7

Yes

53

53.5

No

46

46.5

45

84.9

8

15.1

Yes

61

61.6

No

38

38.4

18

47.4

Neutral

11

28.9

Happy

2

5.3

Facial expressions not concordant

5

13.2

No facial expression (face depicted)

2

5.3

Rated Size of Drawing (n = 86)

Color (n = 99)

Words (n = 99)

Rated Abstract (n = 99)

People Depicted (n = 99)

Number of People
(of those who drew people; n = 53)
1
>1
Faces Depicted (n = 99)

Rated Facial Expression
(of those who drew faces; n = 38)
Sad

135
Table 39
Drawing at Time of Diagnosis Descriptive Characteristics (Continued)
Characteristic

n

%

Yes

48

48.5

No

51

51.5

31

64.6

Only bodies

15

31.2

Faces and bodies not concordant

2

5.3

Drawing depicts medical professional(s)

0

0.0

Drawing depicts no medical professional(s)

99

100.0

Drawing depicts tumor(s) or mass(es)

45

65.2

Drawing depicts no tumor(s) or mass(es)

24

34.8

Drawing depicts blood

11

11.1

Drawing depicts no blood

88

88.9

Drawing depicts medical objects

7

7.1

Drawing depicts no medical objects

92

92.9

Bodies Depicted (n = 99)

Bodies Associated with Faces
(of those who drew bodies; n = 48)
Faces and bodies

Medical Professional(s) (n = 99)

Tumor or Mass (n = 69)

Blood (n = 99)

Medical Objects (n = 99)
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Table 40
Descriptive Characteristics for Drawings at Time of Survey
Characteristic

n

%

Small

19

21.3

Medium

21

23.6

Large

49

55.0

Drawing contains color

96

97.0

Drawing is black and white

3

3.0

Drawing contains words

63

63.6

Drawing contains no words

36

36.4

Drawing is abstract

25

25.3

Drawing is not abstract

74

74.7

Yes

54

54.5

No

45

45.5

41

75.9

13

24.1

Yes

45

45.5

No

54

54.5

26

57.8

Neutral

5

11.1

Sad

4

8.9

Faces expressions not concordant

3

6.7

No facial expression (face depicted)

7

15.6

Rated Size of Drawing (n = 89)

Color (n = 99)

Words (n = 99)

Rated Abstract (n = 99)

People Depicted (n = 99)

Number of People
(of those who drew people; n = 54)
1
>1
Faces Depicted (n = 99)

Rated Facial Expression
(of those who drew faces; n = 45)
Happy
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Table 40
Drawing at Time of Survey Descriptive Characteristics (Continued)
Characteristic

n

%

Yes

46

46.5

No

53

53.5

36

78.3

Only bodies

9

19.6

Faces and bodies not concordant

1

2.2

Drawing depicts medical professional(s)

0

0.0

Drawing depicts no medical professional(s)

99

100.0

Drawing depicts tumor(s) or mass(es)

12

16.7

Drawing depicts no tumor(s) or mass(es)

60

83.3

Drawing depicts blood

7

7.1

Drawing depicts no blood

92

92.9

Drawing depicts medical objects

3

3.0

Drawing depicts no medical objects

96

97.0

Bodies Depicted (n = 99)

Bodies Associated with Faces
(of those who drew bodies; n = 46)
Faces and bodies

Medical Professional(s) (n = 99)

Tumor or Mass (n = 72)

Blood (n = 99)

Medical Objects (n = 99)

Table 41
Associations of Drawing Variables at Time of Diagnosis with Tumor Status, Illness Representations, and Thinking Style
Drawing Variables
Rated size of drawing (n = 99)a
Words appear in drawing (n = 99)

Tumor
Status

Illness
Impact

0.44

0.47

-1.13

0.99

Control Over
Illness
5.70**c
-2.82

**

System 1
Thinking

System 2
Thinking

3.85*b

0.46

0.68

-0.58
*

0.24

Rated abstract (n = 99)

0.42

1.19

-0.22

2.42

People depicted (n = 99)

0.26

0.38

-0.68

-2.07*

-1.15

-0.11

1.45

0.07

-0.93

-0.34

Number of people (n = 53)
Faces depicted (n = 99)
Bodies depicted (n = 99)
Tumor or mass depicted (n = 69)

-0.88
-0.11
2.45*

0.21

0.11

-1.73

*

-1.61

**

-1.21

-0.27

-0.39

-2.64

-0.48

-1.32

-1.74†

0.71

Coefficients for “Rated size of drawing” are F values; all other coefficients are student’s t values. bPost-hoc (LSD, p ≤ .05):
medium drawing > large drawing; medium drawing > small drawing. cPost-hoc (LSD, p ≤ .05): large drawing > medium
drawing; large drawing > small drawing.
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01.
a
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Table 42
Associations of Drawing Variables at Time of Survey with Tumor Status, Illness Representations, and Thinking Style
Drawing Variables
Rated size of drawing (n = 99)a
Words appear in drawing (n = 99)

Tumor
Status

Illness
Impact

Control Over
Illness

System 1
Thinking

System 2
Thinking

0.19

0.18

2.46†b

0.92

0.46

-1.25

0.05

†

-0.23

1.64

-1.66

0.72

-0.14

1.20

0.95

0.32

People depicted (n = 99)

-0.28

-0.03

-0.61

-2.08*

-1.32

Number of people (n = 53)

-0.29

0.35

-0.78

0.59

0.76

Rated abstract (n = 99)

Faces depicted (n = 99)
Bodies depicted (n = 99)
Tumor or mass depicted (n = 69)

-0.95
-0.87
2.45*

-0.22

-0.17

-1.95

†

-0.94

**

-0.98

0.01

-0.52

-2.74

1.13

-1.08

0.62

0.63

Coefficients for “Rated size of drawing” are F values; all other coefficients are student’s t values. bPost-hoc (LSD, p ≤ .05):
large drawing > small drawing.
†
= p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01.
a
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Representation
of danger

Action plans

Appraisal

Representation
of fear

Coping
procedures

Appraisal

Situational
stimuli:
Inner and outer

Figure 1. The parallel processing model. From “Living with Chronic Illness: A Contextualized, Self-Regulation Approach” by Leventhal, H.,
Halm, E., Horowitz, C., Leventhal, E., & Ozakinci, G., 2008, in S. Sutton, A., Buam, & M. Johnston (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Health
Psychology, p. 6.
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a

Tumor Status
Presence or Absence of a
Mass or Tumor

e
d

f
Thinking Style

Illness Representations
Identity
Timeline (Acute/Chronic)
Timeline (Cylical)
Consequences
Personal Control
Treatment Control
Illness Coherence
Emotional Representations

Psychological Functioning
c

Depressive Symptoms
Cancer-Related Distress
Body Image
Post-Traumatic Growth

Experiential (System 1)
Rational (System 2)

b
Figure 2. Theoretical model of the relationships between tumor status, thinking styles, illness representations, and psychological functioning.
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860 individuals clicked
on the survey link.

590 individuals

2 individuals

consented.

declined consent.

72 were excluded.
35 were diagnosed with
cancer <3 months prior to
beginning the survey;
15 did not meet age criteria
(<20 or >65);

518 met inclusion
criteria.

482 began the survey.

1 was not able to speak, read,
or write in English;
21 reported an active
psychiatric or cognitive
condition that could interfere
with participation.

305 completed the

250 agreed to complete

survey.

the drawing measure.

229 provided contact
information for mailing.

99 returned a completed
drawing measure.

Figure 3. Flow of participants through recruitment, online survey, and drawing measures.
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Figure 4. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on depressive symptoms. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all
values, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Figure 5. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on cancer-related distress. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all
values, * = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Self-Reported
Tumor Status

-.12*
Cancer-Related
Distresss

-.05 (-.06)
Illness Representations
Factor 1
.02

Illness Representations
Factor 2

-.04
Self-Reported
Tumor Status

.36***
-.09
Body Image

-.03 (-.04)
Illness Representations
Factor 1

Figure 6. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on body image. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, *** = p
≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Factor 2
-.04
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Body Image
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Illness Representations
Factor 1
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Self-Reported
Tumor Status
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.26***

-.06 (-.05)
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Growth

Figure 7. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on post-traumatic growth. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all
values, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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.13*
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.47***
-.21***
Depressive Symptoms

-.08 (-.06)
Illness Representations
Factor 1

Figure 8. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on depressive symptoms. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * =
.02
.47***
Illness Representations
p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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.05 (.05)

Body Image

Factor 2
.13*
System 1 Thinking

-.21***
Depressive Symptoms

-.08 (-.06)
Illness Representations
Factor 1
.02

Illness Representations
Factor 2

.13*
System 1 Thinking

.47***
-.12*
Cancer-Related
Distresss

.00 (.00)
Illness Representations
Factor 1

Figure 9. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on cancer-related distress. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * =
.02
.36***
Illness Representations
p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Figure 10. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on body image. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, † = p ≤ .10, *
= p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in.02
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Figure 11. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on post-traumatic growth. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, *
= p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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.46***
-.24***
Depressive Symptoms

-.15* (-.14**)

Illness Representations
Factor Values
1
Figure 12. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on depressive symptoms.
indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * =
p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Factor 1Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, *
Figure 13. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on cancer-related distress.
= p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Figure 14. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on body image. Values
indicate
standardized regression coefficients. For all values, *** = p ≤
.001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Figure 15. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on post-traumatic growth. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values,
***
= p ≤ .001. Direct effects appear in parentheses.
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Figure 16. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 34-year-old man diagnosed with acute
myeloid lymphoma 15 months earlier.
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Figure 17. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 26-year-old woman diagnosed with lung
cancer 15 months earlier.
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Figure 18. Drawing of cancer in the present time by a 26-year-old woman diagnosed with lung cancer 15
months earlier.
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Figure 19. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 24-year-old woman diagnosed with vaginal
cancer four years earlier.
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Figure 20. Drawing of cancer in the present time by a 41-year-old man diagnosed with acute lymphocytic
leukemia more than 25 years earlier.
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Figure 21. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 27-year-old woman diagnosed with bone
cancer 12 years earlier.
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Figure 22. Drawing of cancer in the present time by a 27-year-old woman diagnosed with bone cancer 12
years earlier.
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Appendix A
Recruitment Materials
Recruitment Scripts
Long Script, Suitable for Email or Listserv Posting
Tell us what you are thinking!
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com
Please join us for a research project considering the ways individuals think about their
cancer. Your participation may benefit others like you who are facing the physical and
psychological challenges of the disease.
Individuals who choose to participate will take a 30-45 minute online survey and will have the
option to answer an additional question by mail. The survey will ask you about your thoughts
and feelings about your cancer. You may also be asked about you how you have been feeling
both physically and emotionally.
If you choose to participate, you can enter a raffle to win one of five $75 Amazon Gift
Cards after you complete your survey. If you answer an additional question by mail, you’ll get
another raffle entry. Also, whether you win or lose, a $1 donation will be made to a cancer
charity of your choice once you have completed the survey. Taking part in this project will not
cost you any money and does not include medication. Your decision to participate, or not to
participate, will not impact any medical care you receive.
To take part in the project, you must be:
• 20 years or older
• diagnosed with cancer more than 3 months ago
• able to speak, read, and write in English
Your participation is completely voluntary and you have the right to stop at any time by simply
closing the browser window. All information from you will remain strictly confidential.
Log on to www.thinkingaboutcancer.com. For more information or to ask any questions,
please call the Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 or email support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. Problems
that may result from participation in this study can be directed to Sarah Leon, Human Research
Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu at Hunter College
of The City University of New York.
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Medium Script, Suitable for Website Posting Where Space is Limited
Tell us what you are thinking!
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com
If you are 20 years or older, able to speak, read, and write in English, and were diagnosed with
cancer more than 3 months ago, then consider joining us for a research project studying the
ways individuals think about their cancer. Participants will take a 30-45 minute online survey
and, after completing it, will have the chance to enter a raffle to win one of five $75 Amazon
Gift Cards. Log on to www.thinkingabout cancer to participate, or email
support@thinkingaboutcancer to learn more.
Short Script, Suitable for Website Blurb or Link
Tell us what you are thinking!
If you are 20 years or older, able to speak, read, and write in English, and were diagnosed with
cancer more than 3 months ago, then consider joining us for a research project studying the
ways individuals think about their cancer. Log on to www.thinkingabout cancer to participate,
or email support@thinkingaboutcancer to learn more.
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Recruitment Brochure

165
Raffle Winner Letter

Congratulations! You have won one of five $75 Amazon Gift Cards for your participation in a
study about the ways that individuals think about their cancer (www.thinkingaboutcancer.com).
Our records indicate that you successfully completed your online survey and gave us this e-mail
address at that time.
Please email us back and let us know that how you would like to claim your prize. You may
receive the $75 gift card in one of two ways:
1) The easiest way to claim your prize is by email. Just reply to this email and let us know that
you want to claim your prize; we’ll then send you a link directly from Amazon so that you can
credit your online Amazon account.
2) If you would like to receive a gift card in the mail, please email us the following information:
Your Name:
Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Please note that this information will only be used to send you the gift card. Once we have sent
the card to you, we will permanently delete this email and will not retain any of your contact
information.
If you have any questions about claiming your prize or are worried about the validity of this
email, please contact Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 or email support@thinkingaboutcancer.com.
Thank you once again for your participation in the study!
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Appendix B
Study Materials
Consent Form

The Graduate Center of the City University of New York
Doctoral Program in Psychology
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT
Project Title: Ways of Thinking about Illness Representations of Cancer
Principal Investigator: Ian Z. Pervil, M.A., The Graduate Center of the City
University of New York
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Tracey Revenson, Ph.D., Hunter College of the City
University of New York
INSTRUCTIONS
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. Research studies include only people
who voluntarily choose to take part in them. In order to decide whether or not you agree to
participate, you should know enough about a study’s risks and benefits in order to make a sound
judgment. This process is known as informed consent.
The next page will give you detailed information about the research study. Please feel free to
take your time before making your own decision about whether or not you’d like to participate;
you may discuss your decision with your family and friends if you choose.
Once you understand the study, its risks, and its benefits, you will be asked below to indicate
your consent.
You will need approximately 30-45 minutes to complete this survey. Before clicking ahead, be
sure that you have adequate time to finish it. If you don't have enough time now, you may close
your browser window and start again when you feel you do have enough time to complete the
survey. If you close the browser window in the middle of your survey, you will not be able to
return to it.
Please complete the survey by yourself. Consider going to a place that is quiet, where you feel
you have privacy, and where you won't be distracted. If you are in a public place, be sure to
completely log off once you have finished your survey. Doing so will keep your responses
private.
Click the forward button at the bottom of the screen to move on.
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PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to consider the different ways that people with cancer think about
their illness. The results of this study may allow doctors and psychologists to better understand
their patients’ experiences with cancer and help them do a better job of talking to their patients
about their illness. You are being asked to participate in this study because you are an adult who
has been diagnosed with a form of cancer more than three months ago. Approximately 300 people
will take part in this study.
PROCEDURES
If you decide to be in this study, your part will involve the following:
•

You will be asked to complete a web survey of approximately 200 questions about your
thoughts and feelings about your cancer. You may be asked about you how you have
been feeling both physically and emotionally.

•

You will also be asked to provide some information about yourself, such as your age,
ethnicity, income, and medical history.

•

The entire survey will take about 30-45 minutes to complete.

If you choose to do so, once you complete the Internet survey, you will have the option to
compete an additional task that cannot be completed on the Internet but on paper. The additional
task will be mailed to you. You do not have to complete the additional task and still complete
this survey. As with this survey, your participation is entirely voluntary. The additional task,
which involves drawing, will take approximately 5-10 minutes to complete. You will then mail
your answer back in a postage-paid envelope, which we will provide. Being in the study means
taking a survey for 30-45 minutes and, if you choose, completing an additional drawing task
which will take 5-10 minutes and will be mailed to you.
POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
The following risks/discomforts may occur as a result of you being in this study:
•

There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with your participation in this
study, though it is possible that answering questions about your experience with cancer
might upset you for a short time.

•

If you do feel upset and would like to speak to a counselor, you can contact the Cancer
Hope Network (1-800-552-4366; www.cancerhopenetwork.org), a non-profit
organization that offers free and confidential treatment to cancer patients and their
families. Also, the American Cancer Society (1-800-227-2345; www.cancer.org)
provides 24-hour information on treatment, literature, services, and support.

•

Further, if you do feel distressed or have any concerns about the study, please feel free to
contact the Principal Investigator, Ian Pervil, at 212-817-1911 or at
support@thinkingaboutcancer.com.
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BENEFITS
There are no direct benefits as a result of participating in this study; however, this research may
help others with cancer in the future.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to participate without
prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may stop filling
out the survey at any time or skip any questions.
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPENSATION
Participation in this study will involve no costs to you. For completing the online portion of the
study, a $1 donation will be made to one of three cancer charities of your choice. Once the online
portion is complete, you will also have the opportunity to enter a raffle to win one of four $75
Amazon.com Gift Cards. The raffle will occur once the data have been collected, but no later
than December 2014, whichever comes first. You will be able to enroll in the raffle even if you
skip any question(s). You must reach the end of the survey in order to enter the raffle; however
you will be able to enroll in the raffle regardless of the number of question(s) that you skip.
If you choose to complete the additional drawing task by mail, you will have the opportunity to
enter the raffle a second time. Your additional task must be received by the Principal Investigator
before you are entered. A postage-paid envelope will be provided to you to return the drawing
task.
CONFIDENTIALITY
We will take steps to help make sure that all the information we get about you is kept private.
Your name will not be used in any conference presentations or written articles. All data will be
identified with a participant ID number only. Any identifying information that you provide will
be kept separate from your answers to this survey. Only the Principal Investigator and his advisor
will have access to both data and participant information from this study. This information will
be kept on a single password-protected computer file.
Data will be stored for a minimum of three years, and may be used in the future for other human
subjects research at The City University of New York. By consenting now, you are saying that
this data may be used for these purposes in the future. Data from the online surveys will be
stored in a password-protected folder on a computer in the PI’s advisor’s (Dr. Tracey Revenson)
research suite, and the drawing measures will be stored in a locked file cabinet in her research
suite. If you choose to provide your contact information, it will be kept in a separate passwordprotected file apart from all other data.
We want to make sure that this study is being done correctly and that your rights and welfare are
being protected. For this reason, we will share the data we get from you in this study with the
study team, The CUNY University-Integrated IRB, applicable Institutional officials, and certain
federal offices.
Once all data has been collected for this study, any participant information on file (name, contact
information) will be destroyed. Participants are encouraged to protect their own confidentiality
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by completing this survey in a private setting.
Any published report that uses data from this study will not include any information that could
identify individual participants. If you have any questions about confidentiality, you can contact
the principal investigator at 212-817-1911 or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com.
CONTACT QUESTIONS/PERSONS
If you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the
Principal Investigator, Ian Pervil, at 212-817-1911 and/or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com, or
contact his advisor, Dr. Tracey Revenson, at 212-396-6769. If you have any questions
concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Sarah Leon, Human
Research Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu at Hunter
College of the City University of New York.
STATEMENT OF CONSENT
“I have read the above description of this research and I understand it. I have been informed of
the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that I may have will also be answered
by the principal investigator of the research study. I voluntary agree to participate in this study.
“By selecting ‘YES’, I agree that I understand the information stated in this consent document
and I consent to participate in this study.”
“By selecting ‘YES’, I have not waived any of my legal rights to which I would otherwise be
entitled.”
• YES
• NO
STATEMENT OF CONSENT FOR FUTURE USE
“I give consent for my data to be used in the future by the principal investigator and his advisor. I
understand that my consent is voluntary.”
• YES
• NO
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Survey Questionnaire
Introduction
Thank you in advance for participating in this study. The information you share allows us to
learn more about how individuals think about cancer.
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. Research studies include only people
who voluntarily choose to take part in them. In order to decide whether or not you agree to
participate, you should know enough about a study’s risks and benefits in order to make a sound
judgment. This process is known as informed consent.
The next page will give you detailed information about the research study. Please feel free to
take your time before making your own decision about whether or not you’d like to participate;
you may discuss your decision with your family and friends if you choose.
Once you understand the study, its risks, and its benefits, you will be asked to indicate your
consent.
You will need approximately 30-45 minutes to complete this survey. Before clicking ahead, be
sure that you have adequate time to finish it in a single session. If you don’t have enough time
now, you may close your browser window and start over again when you feel you do have
enough time to complete the entire survey. If you close the browser window in the middle of
your survey, you will not be able to return to it.
Please complete the survey by yourself. Consider going to a place that is quiet, where you feel
you have privacy, and where you won’t be distracted. If you are in a public place, be sure to
completely log off once you have finished your survey. Doing so will keep your responses
private.
Eligibility
• Where did you learn about this survey?
• Do you acknowledge that you are at least 20 years of age?
• Are you able to read and write in English?
• Do you have active psychiatric or cognitive conditions that might interfere with your
ability to participate?
• Were you diagnosed with cancer more than three months ago?
Overview of Survey
You will need approximately 30-45 minutes to complete this survey.
Before clicking ahead, be sure that you have adequate time to finish it.
If you don’t have enough time now, you may close your browser window and start again when
you feel you do have enough time to complete the survey. If you close the browser window in
the middle of your survey, you will not be able to return to it.
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Please complete the survey by yourself. Consider going to a place that is quiet, where you feel
you have privacy, and where you won’t be distracted. At the end of the survey, you will be able
to make a $1 donation to one of three cancer charities, and you will also be able to enter the
raffle for one of five $75 Amazon.com gift cards.
Treatment History
• What kind of cancer has your doctor told you that you have?
• On what date were you diagnosed? (If you don’t remember the exact date, just enter the
month and year.)
• Do you or did you ever have any masses or tumors associated with your cancer?
o Where were they located when you were first diagnosed with cancer?
o Do you still have any masses or tumors associated with your cancer?
o If so, where are they located now?
• Have you had chemotherapy for your cancer?
o Are you still undergoing chemotherapy?
o When did you start your current or most recent round of chemotherapy?
o When did you finish your last round of chemotherapy?
o Have you had multiple types of chemotherapy?
o Indicate the number of different types, and list them if you can:
• Have you had radiation for your cancer?
o Are you still undergoing radiation?
o When did you start your current or most recent round of radiation?
o When did you finish your last round of radiation?
• Are you scheduled to have a bone marrow or stem cell transplant for your cancer?
o When are you scheduled to have the transplant?
o Have you ever had a bone marrow or stem cell transplant for your cancer?
o Was the transplant autologous (stem cells from your own body) or allogeneic
(stem cells from a donor)?
o When did you have the transplant?
o When were you discharged from the hospital?
o Have you ever had graft vs. host disease?
Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ)
Views about Your Illness
Listed below are a number of symptoms that you may or may not have experienced since your
illness. Please indicate by marking “Yes” or “No” whether you have experienced any of these
symptoms since your illness. Then indicate whether whether you believe that these symptoms are
related to your illness.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pain
Sore Throat
Nausea
Breathlessness
Weight Loss
Fatigue
Stiff Joints
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sore Eyes
Wheeziness
Headaches
Upset Stomach
Sleep Difficulties
Dizziness
Loss of Strength

We are interested in your own personal views of how you now see your current illness. Please
indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your illness by
marking the appropriate box.
Strongly
Disagree
m
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Disagree
m

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
m

Agree
m

Strongly
Agree
m

My illness will last a short time
My illness is likely to be permanent rather than temporary
My illness will last for a long time
This illness will pass quickly
I expect to have this illness for the rest of my life
My illness is a serious condition
My illness has major consequences on my life
My illness does not have much effect on my life
My illness strongly affects the way others see me
My illness has serious financial consequences
My illness causes difficulties for those who are close to me
There is a lot which I can do to control my symptoms
What I do can determine whether my illness gets better or worse
The course of my illness depends on me
Nothing I do will affect my illness
I have the power to influence my illness
My actions will have no affect on the outcome of my illness
My illness will improve in time
There is very little that can be done to improve my illness
My treatment will be effective in curing my illness
The negative effects of my illness can be prevented (avoided) by my treatment
My treatment can control my illness
There is nothing which can help my condition
The symptoms of my condition are puzzling to me
My illness is a mystery to me
I don’t understand my illness
My illness doesn’t make any sense to me
I have a clear picture or understanding of my condition
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The symptoms of my illness change a great deal from day to day
My symptoms come and go in cycles
My illness is very unpredictable
I go through cycles in which my illness gets better and worse
I get depressed when I think about my illness
When I think about my illness I get upset
My illness makes me feel angry
My illness does not worry me
Having this illness makes me feel anxious
My illness makes me feel afraid

Causes of Your Illness
We are interested in what you consider may have been the cause of your illness. As people are
very different, there is no correct answer for this question. We are most interested in your own
views about the factors that caused your illness rather than what others including doctors or
family may have suggested to you. Below is a list of possible causes for your illness. Please
indicate how much you disagree or agree that they were causes for you by marking the
appropriate box.
Strongly
Disagree
m
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Disagree
m

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
m

Agree
m

Strongly
Agree
m

Stress or worry
Hereditary - it runs in my family
A germ or virus
Diet or eating habits
Chance or bad luck
Poor medical care in my past
Pollution in the environment
My own behavior
My mental attitude e.g. thinking about life negatively
Family problems or worries caused my illness
Overwork
My emotional state e.g. feeling down, lonely, anxious, empty
Aging
Alcohol
Smoking
Accident or Injury
My personality
Altered immunity

Of those from the previous question, select the three most important causes for you in order of
preference (most preferred at the top).
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Demographic Information
• Tell us a little bit about yourself, both to help us to describe the people who participate in
the study and to put your own situation in context.
• What is your gender?
• In what state do you currently reside?
• What is your birthdate?
• How far did you go in school?
• Are you Hispanic or Latino(a)?
• What is your race/ethnicity?
• How do you identify in terms of sexual orientation?
• What is your relationship status?
• Do you have children?
o How many?
• What is your current religious affiliation?
• What is your current work status?
• Estimate of your total family income.
Writing Measure
Cancer can touch every part of your life -- issues of family, love, anger, career, life and death,
and even issues about childhood and specific experiences in life. In your writing, let go and
explore your deepest thoughts and feelings about the issues that you feel are most important to
you right now. For this task, please try to spend the next ten minutes writing. All of your writing
will be completely confidential. Don’t worry about spelling, sentence structure, or grammar.
There are no right or wrong answers; just begin writing, and try to write for ten minutes.
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40)
Please use the following scale to answer these questions.
Completely
False
m
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

m

m

m

Completely
True
m

I have a logical mind.
I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
I believe in trusting my hunches.
I am not a very analytical thinker.
I trust my initial feelings about people.
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
I don’t reason well under pressure.
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive.
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions.
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
I have no problem thinking things through carefully.
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know.
Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems.
I enjoy intellectual challenges.
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition.
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough
for me.
Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
I don’t have a very good sense of intuition.
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s.
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.

Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D)
The next set of questions asks about how you have been feeling during the past week. Use the
following scale to answer them.
Rarely or None of
the Time
(Less than 1 Day)
m
•
•
•
•
•
•

Some or a Little of
the Time
(1-2 Days)
m

Occasionally or
Moderate Amount
of Time (3-4 Days)
m

Most or All of the
Time
(5-7 Days)
m

I was bothered by things that don’t usually bother me.
I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with the help from my family or friends.
I felt that I was just as good as other people.
I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
I felt depressed.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

I felt that everything I did was an effort.
I felt hopeful about the future.
I thought my life had been a failure.
I felt fearful.
My sleep was restless.
I was happy.
I talked less than usual.
I felt lonely.
People were unfriendly.
I enjoyed life.
I had crying spells.
I felt sad.
I felt that people disliked me.
I could not get “going.”

Impact of Events Scale (IES-R)
Below is a list of difficulties people sometimes have when they are experiencing a stressor in
their life such as cancer. Please read each item, and then indicate how distressing each difficulty
has been for you during the past seven days with respect to your cancer. How much were you
distressed or bothered by these difficulties?
Not at All
m
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A Little Bit
m

Moderately
m

Quite a Bit
m

Extremely
m

Any reminder brought back feelings about it.
I had trouble staying asleep.
Other things kept making me think about it.
I felt irritable and angry.
I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about it or was reminded of it.
I thought about it when I didn’t mean to.
I felt as if it hadn’t happened or wasn’t real.
I stayed away from reminders about it.
Pictures about it popped into my mind.
I was jumpy and easily startled.
I tried not to think about it.
I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it, but I didn’t deal with them.
My feelings about it were kind of numb.
I had trouble falling asleep.
I found myself acting or feeling as though I was back at that time.
I tried to remove it from my memory.
I had trouble concentrating.
I had waves of strong feelings about it.
Reminders of it caused me to have physical reactions, such as sweating, trouble breathing,
nausea, or a pounding heart.
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•
•
•

I had dreams about it.
I felt watchful or on-guard.
I tried not to talk about it.

European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer Body Image Module
During the past week…
Not at All
m
•
•
•

A Little
m

Quite a Bit
m

Very Much
m

Have you felt physically less attractive as a result of your disease or treatment?
Have you been feeling less feminine/masculine as a result of your disease or treatment?
Have you been dissatisfied with your body?

Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI-SF)
Listed below are 10 areas that are sometimes reported to have changed after being diagnosed
with cancer. Please select the appropriate choice beside each description indicating how much
you feel you have experienced change in the area described.
I Did Not
Experience
This Change
as a Result
of Being
Diagnosed
with Cancer
m
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

I
Experienced
This Change
to a Very
Small
Degree

A Small
Degree

A Moderate
Degree

A Great
Degree

m

m

m

m

A Very
Great
Degree as a
Result of
Being
Diagnosed
with Cancer
m

I changed my priorities about what is important in life.
I have a greater appreciation for the value of my own life.
I am able to do better things with my life.
I have a better understanding of spiritual matters.
I have a greater sense of closeness with others.
I established a new path for my life.
I know better that I can handle difficulties.
I have a stronger religious faith.
I discovered that I’m stronger than I thought I was.
I learned a great deal about how wonderful people are.

Survey Completion/Raffle Entry
You’ve finished the survey. Thank you for your participation. We deeply appreciate your
participation in this research. Your help is invaluable to us. We hope that the information you
have shared with us in this questionnaire will allow us to make thinking about cancer easier for
individuals who will face it in the future.
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•

•

Please select a cancer charity below, and we will make a $1 donation to them as a way to
thank you for your time.
o Cancer Care (www.cancercare.org)
o Cancer Research Institute (www.cancerresearch.org)
o Stand Up to Cancer (www.standup2cancer.org)
o Prevent Cancer Foundation (preventcancer.org)
Now, would you like to enter the drawing for one of five $75 gift cards?

Please enter and confirm your email address so that we can notify you if you win the drawing.
Your email address will not be used for any other purposes without your consent, and it will be
stored in a secure, password-protected database.
Drawing Measure
We have an additional question to ask you, but it must be completed by hand and not computer.
May we mail it to you? When you receive it, it should only take about 5-10 minutes and we will
pay for all postage. Once we receive the completed portion, you will receive an additional raffle
entry! Might you be interested in participating?
Thank you for your interest! Once you click the link below, you’ll be able to enter your contact
information so that we can mail the additional question to you.
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Drawing Measure
DIRECTIONS: Use the colored pencils to draw a picture of what you think your cancer
looked like when you first were diagnosed and another picture of what you think your cancer
looks like now. We are not interested in your drawing ability – even a simple sketch is fine. If
you want to start over, please use the back of the page or another piece of paper for your
drawing.
Your Cancer When You Were First Diagnosed
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Your Cancer Now
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Drawing Instructions

Thank you once again for agreeing to participate in a research project that considers the ways
individuals think about cancer (www.thinkingaboutcancer.com). According to our records, you
agreed to answer an additional question by mail.
In this packet you will find the following:
• The additional question (two pages; attached to this letter)
• A pack of six colored pencils for you to use when answering the question
• A postage-paid return envelope
If you choose to participate, please use the enclosed materials to answer the question. Then mail
back your completed response to us in the postage-paid return envelope. (You can keep the
colored pencils!)
We’d appreciate you completing this task in the next 24 hours.
We’ll look forward to hearing from you!
The Research Team
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com
Please remember that your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to
participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If
you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the Principal
Investigator, Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 and/or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. If you have
any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Sarah Leon,
Human Research Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu
at Hunter College of the City University of New York.
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Drawing Follow-up Letter

Thank you once again for agreeing to participate in a research project that considers the ways
individuals think about cancer (www.thinkingaboutcancer.com). According to our records, you
agreed to answer an additional question by mail, but unfortunately, we have not received your
response yet.
In case your materials got lost in the mail the first time, or even if you just forgot about the
survey, we’ve included another packet of materials for you. If you choose to participate now,
simply answer the enclosed question using the materials provided and mail back your completed
response to us in the postage-paid return envelope. (You can keep the colored pencils!)
We’ll look forward to hearing from you!
The Research Team
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com
Please remember that your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to
participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If
you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the Principal
Investigator, Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 and/or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. If you have
any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Sarah Leon,
Human Research Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu
at Hunter College of the City University of New York.
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Appendix C
Drawing Coding Rules
Space
Edges: There is a box where the respondent is asked to draw pictures on the measure. This
category evaluates whether the respondent’s drawing stays within the limits of the frame.
• Inside of the frame, the drawing does not cross the edge of the picture frame.
• Outside of the frame, the drawing crosses the edge of the picture frame at least once.
Size: This is defined as the proportion in which the drawing occupies certain amount of space
within the frame.
• Small Sketch: This category should be used when a drawing occupies less than or equal
to one quarter of the space within the frame.
• Medium Sketch: This category should be used when a drawing occupies between one
quarter and one half of the space within the frame.
• Large Sketch: This coding category should be used when a drawing occupies more than
one half of the space within the frame.
• Multiple Objects: This coding category should be used if the drawing is not cohesive,
but there are two or more discrete objects in different areas of the page, the location and
position of which do not neatly fall into other categories.
Subject Content
Person/People: This category determines whether a person or people are depicted in the
drawing. (If yes, then the following should be coded:)
• Number of People: This category examines the number of people in the drawing.
• Facial Expression: This code categorizes the facial expressions of the individuals in
drawing. For multiple faces, all categories assume multiple faces are concordant unless
otherwise specified.
o Neutral Expression
o Happy
o Sad
o Multiple Faces Not Concordant
• Body/Bodies: This code categorizes whether or not faces are attached to bodies in the
drawing. If all faces are attached to bodies, the category is marked yes; if none are
attached to bodies, the category is marked no. If some are, the category is marked “bodies
not concordant”.
• Medical Professional(s) This code should be used if a doctor, nurse, or medical
professional is depicted in the drawing. Determination of whether the picture is of a
medical professional is determined by context. Is the person wearing a medical coat,
holding a stethoscope, has the figure been labeled “doctor”, etc.
Tumor/Mass: This code should be used when a tumor or mass is seen in the drawings. Yes
indicates that a tumor is clearly depicted; No indicates that a tumor is not depicted. Possible
indicates the presence of a spot or shape that could either be a tumor or not a tumor (e.g. a mole).
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Blood: This code should be used when blood is pictured in the patient’s drawing. Placement,
context, and color should be used when determining depiction of blood. For example, blood may
be determined by depiction of cells, the color red on the body, or by a stream flowing from a
body.
Medical Objects: This code should be used if any medical devices or equipment are depicted.
Examples include an IV, a chemo chair, an x-ray, a needle, Band-Aids, etc.
Abstract—Nonconcrete Figure: This code should be used when the patient draws an abstract
sketch that is not easily understood. There is not an identifiable concrete object (e.g. person,
place, thing), event, or circumstance contained within the drawing.
Signature: Use this code if the participant signed the drawing or put his/her name on it in some
way.
Background Content
Grounded: Use this code to determine if the content of the drawing is grounded in space. A
grounded drawing will depict lines for the floor or grass, or clouds for the sky. There will be
some sense of high and low, up and down in space and the individuals are appropriately located
in space.
Inside/Outside: Are people depicted inside buildings or outside (perhaps in nature)?
Color
In this category, use (or absence) of color is defined.
• Black and White: In this category the patient drawing is depicted in black, gray, or
pencil.
• Number of Colors: This code counts the number of colors used in the sketch. In the
color pack that was provided with each measure, there are eight colors. The patient may
also have used a pencil (grey) of his/her own. This measure will also be condensed to
determine whether or not the respondent used color.
Words
Words: This is a yes/no category that evaluates whether or not words were used in the drawing.
Word Content: Words that are written in the drawing are recorded in this category.
Change
Drawings should be rated for change on three dimensions, including number of words rated as
either happy or sad, change in depictions of illness symptoms and severity (e.g. change in tumor
size), and change in visual content (e.g. rainclouds to sunshine). Taking into account change in
each of these dimensions, each drawing should receive a rating in one of these four categories
(with examples and explanation for guidance):
• Negative Change: The picture is darker, the symbols are more ominous, and/or words
explain that diagnosis has gotten worse, etc.
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•

•

No Change (Neither Worse nor Better): This category consists of two distinct types of
drawing sets: 1) drawings do not differ substantially from each other or are nearly
identical. Similarly, because of abstractness, it is impossible to determine any measure of
change. Or 2) drawings are different, but the underlying feelings are neither better nor
worse. The situation may have changed, but the underlying feelings have not. (e.g.
drawing one contains a tumor or mass; drawing two contains no mass, but freely floating
cancer cells throughout the body)
Positive Change, with Reservations: The picture is lighter, the symbols are less
ominous, and/or words explain that diagnosis has gotten better, etc. Nonetheless, some
ominous symbols remain (e.g. dark clouds, tumor cells, etc.)
Positive Change, with no Reservations: The picture is lighter, there are no ominous
symbols, and/or words explain that diagnosis has gotten better. No ominous symbols or
representation of worry/lingering doubts remain.
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